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I CHAPTER 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since its establishment, the European Union (thereafter EU) has gone through a long 
process of evolution, which has required repeated changes and adjustments. The EU has been 
enlarged a number of times, and it has gained more powers and responsibilities. As the previous 
governmental model was not judged effective or legitimate enough, new forms of governance 
were investigated and resorted to. Indeed, the EU is famous for its dependence on organized 
interests to achieve its goals; this “can be traced back to the lack of popular engagement with the 
EU, the need for consensus from decision making involving [twenty-eight Member States], the 
relative degree of isolation of the European Commission from other potential constituencies of 
support, and a chronic lack of resources in EU institutions relative to the substantive functions 
performed”.1 
                                                 
1
 Justin Greenwood and Joanna Dreger (2013), “The Transparency Register: A European vanguard of strong lobby 
regulation?”, open access journal Interest Groups & Advocacy launched by Palgrave Macmillan, (2013) 2; published 
online 23 April 2013, p. 141. 
 2
In fact, external participation2 in an organized form is identified as one of the new 
elements aiming to improve EU governance. The role of organised interests in the EU system is 
situated somewhere between participatory governance and attempts to stimulate the emergence of 
a European public sphere.3 
While external participation is treated as a threat by some EU institutions, others consider 
it a way of get involved in the EU decision-making process and of achieving the best results in 
drafting and implementing EU legal acts. EU institutions claim that they are determined to be 
transparent for the benefit of civil society (the end receiver of policies and implementation), and 
that they are willing to involve actors into the policy forming process. In order to do that, an 
instrument regulating this involvement would need to be conceived. 
The aim of this thesis is to discover whether the EU institutions are ready to accept more 
actors in policy making and in the legislation forming process. The analysis will be led through 
various EU instruments which are established for efficient involvement of external participants in 
the EU governance.  
External participation may vary in different policy areas of the EU. For some policy areas, 
scientific expertise may be needed while for others, a more political participation is required. In 
addition, each area of the decision-making process may set its own rules for participation and 
reflect particularities, specific to that policy area. For this reason, the environment policy was 
chosen as a way to exemplify the types of external participation to be analysed in this research. 
Indeed, environmental decision-making in the EU was chosen as it was the first policy area 
                                                 
2
 “External participant” is either a natural person who is not employed by an EU Institution and is not considered to 
be a civil servant. “External participant” may also be a legal entity, which does not have any legal obligations to EU 
Institutions. External participants represent their independent interests or expertise. The EU Institutions accept no 
responsibility or liability with regard to the information or advice provided by external participants. 
3
 Eva G. Heidbreder (2012), “Civil society participation in EU governance”, Living Reviews in European 
Governance Vol. 7, No. 2 <http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2012-2> accessed 26 July 2013. 
 3
where binding legal instruments for access to information were implemented and where 
opportunities for external participation were granted. 
The possibilities for external participation are analysed in the academic literature by 
various authors. Their positions and criticisms will be stated and investigated throughout the 
thesis. Some of these positions and questions are supported by EU laws and policies. The outputs 
of the analysis will be checked against the empirical research, where civil servants of the DG 
Environment of the Commission, national civil servants of the ministries of environment and 
external participants representing environmental NGOs, consultancies, universities and other 
stakeholders are targeted.  
To begin with an overview of external participation in EU law and policies is provided. 
The discussion starts with the White Paper on European Governance, as this document can be 
considered to be a real starting point for policies on external participation in EU. It focuses 
mainly on establishing and implementing new forms of governance as well as non-legislative 
instruments to ensure efficient involvement of external participants in the EU decision-making 
process. The two methods, offered by the White Paper, are developed further: better involvement 
and more openness; and better policies and regulation. These two methods lead the discussion 
through the other chapters. 
The second part of the research focuses on external participation in the comitology 
framework. This choice may seem incongruous. However, with comitology, the Commission is 
obliged to consult representatives of national authorities as well as external participants when 
drafting a legislative act. The analysis starts by reviewing the powers conferred over the 
Commission and is followed by a presentation of the importance of scientific and technical 
expertise in its daily work.  
 4
There, two types of external participation are distinguished – the external participation in 
the form of scientific and technical expertise from various NGOs, consultancies, political parties 
and other stakeholders and the representation of national authorities. While the latter is discussed 
in more details in the Chapter “External participation in the EU decision-making process through 
multi-level governance”, external participation in the form of scientific and technical expertise is 
discussed in the chapter on collection and use of expertise. It covers the implementing rules and 
procedures that determine how scientific and technical expertise should be collected and used in 
forming policies and drafting legislative acts. In cases where the scientific basis is insufficient or 
where some uncertainty exists, the Commission should be guided in its risk analysis by the 
precautionary principle (as analysed in the subsequent chapter). 
The penultimate chapter on the Århus Convention focuses on two pillars – access to 
information and access to justice, as these are closely related to external participation. There, the 
parties that are eligible to get the relevant information evaluate it and in case of a breach can 
challenge both acts and omissions of the environmental legislation are identified. 
The last part of the thesis aims to verify the points and arguments made in previous 
chapters by resorting to the empirical data that was collected during the observations, interviews 
and via the questionnaire.  
 
 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II CHAPTER  
 
EU LAW AND POLICY ON PARTICIPATION IN EU GOVERNANCE  
 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION. 
 
“Governance is the capacity of human societies to equip themselves with systems of 
representation, institutions, processes and intermediary bodies in order to manage them by 
intentional action. This capacity of conscience (the intentional action), of organisation (the 
institutions and intermediary bodies), of conceptualisation (the systems of representation), of 
adaptation to new situations is a characteristic of human societies.”1 
In the last fifty years, European integration has gone through a long process of 
evolution. A large section of the public feel that the European Union should deal more with 
their day-to-day concerns, instead of meddling too much in the minutiae of matters that 
naturally fall within the competence of the national and regional authorities.2 This is partly 
because Member States, especially national governments, fail to explain how specific 
decisions are arrived at or there are cases when politicians deliberately mislead their electorate 
                                                 
1
 N.Lebessis and J. Paterson, (2000), Developing New Modes of Governance, European Commission: Forward 
Studies Unit, Working Paper, p. 21, taken from Pierre Calame and Andre Talmant (1997), L’Etat au Coeur: Le 
Mecanno de la Gouvernance, Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, p.19.   
2
 Commission, “Information and Communication Strategy for the European Union” (Communication) COM 
(2002) 350 final/2, 02 October 2002, p. 4. 
 6 
in order to blame EU for costly, controversial and cumbersome decisions that they have 
decided on or requested themselves.  
 
The situation described above shows the need for a change in the whole system of the 
EU, especially its governance. EU governance has become more complicated, and due to all 
the changes as well as institutional impact of globalisation it is constrained to applying 
“decentralisation”3 to multi-level governance in territorial terms. Centralised governance has 
worked over the years as a successful model, but now it needs a wider and more complex 
approach as well as a more effective involvement of all the constituent parts, such as civil 
society, private organisations, experts and other external participants. Decentralised 
governance and external participation can ensure that decisions are taken in response to 
scientific as well as technical progress. Also, the policy-making process faces increased 
demands in terms of technical and scientific knowledge, which is not always available within 
EU institutions. The need for the scientific expertise and the technical aspects on collection 
will be analysed in more details in the Chapter on “Collection and use of expertise”. 
S. Smismans defines two types of decentralism: vertical and horizontal.4 Vertical 
decentralism indicates the processes and actions with regard to territorial decision-making 
levels. It favours the increased role of regional and local authorities as a form of legitimacy 
providing participation in European policy-making and focusing on elements of 
representation and subsidiarity in territorial terms.  The intention to increase the legitimacy of 
EU institutions by focusing on territorial representation and by ignoring functional 
                                                 
3
 “Decentralism refers to the respect of the autonomy of lower or smaller decision-making levels, the procedures 
privileging these decision-making levels (subsidiarity), and the involvement of these decision-making units in 
the case that policy-making is (partially) defined (and implemented) at a more central level.” in S.Smismans 
(2004), “The EU’s Schizophrenic Constitutional Debate: Vertical and Horizontal Decentralism in European 
Governance”, European University Institute, EUI Working Paper RSCAS No. 2004/32, p.1. 
4
 ibid 1. 
 7 
representation has led to a second concept – “horizontal decentralism”. This requires the 
involvement of interest groups, scientific expertise or civil society organisations in European 
decision-making process. 
Vertical and horizontal dimensions make up the core elements in the analysis of 
participation in the EU decision-making process. The dimensions show the need for changes 
in present EU governance by increasing the role of local and national authorities instead of 
providing all the legitimate decision-making power to EU institutions. There is also a great 
demand of the increased role of scientific and technical expertise in the drafted decisions both 
at the EU and the national level. 
The main two documents containing the policies, principles and rules for participation 
and representation are the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)5 and the White Paper on European Governance 
(further in the text – the White Paper)6. These two documents shall not be understood as equal 
ones, though they are the main ones, implementing policies and legal regulation of the 
participation and representation at EU level.  
The analysis of these two documents provides a clearer direction for further research 
on the interaction between the vertical and horizontal dimensions. They are also the core 
documents where the principles of participation and representation are formed and 
implemented in future EU policies and legislative acts. The Treaty of Lisbon sets the 
fundamental principles which define the level at which a decision-making process may take 
place – the EU or national level. It also enacts the four democratic routes, including the 
                                                 
5
 Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union [2012] OJ C 326. 
6
 White Paper: European Governance, COM (2001) 428 final. 
 8 
consultation procedure.7 In addition to these, the non-legislative initiative, the White Paper, 
will be discussed, concentrating mainly on the possible influence of external participants on 
EU governance. This part will cover the definition of external participation and its constituent 
parts and the responsibility of national administrations to involve external participants 
efficiently into the decision-making process at the early stage. This Chapter will also analyse 
EU communication and consultation policies which should be implemented as vital means for 
external inclusion and possibilities for participation. In later Chapters, the discussion will 
focus on the instruments adopted by the EU institutions on external participation in 
environmental decision-making.  
 
2.2. EU PRINCIPLES AND POLICY DOCUMENTS ON EXTERNAL 
PARTICIPATION. 
 
While most of the attention of policy-makers was focused on issues of territorial 
representation and vertical decentralism, very few were concerned with the role of external 
participants in European policy – making. The reasons for integrating them into the debate on 
legitimacy of the European Union are explored below.8 
First, external participants take an important part in the EU decision-making process. 
They ensure the vital technical and scientific knowledge in the context of the drafted 
decisions. External participation forms kind of a body where external scientific know-how 
might be accumulated through all the process. External participants are capable of changing 
                                                 
7
 Meike Rodekamp and Dawid Friedrich (2013), „No Participation without Representation: Demands and 
Supplies on the Representativeness of European Civil Society Organizations“ (Workshop on representation in 
„Arena“ Oslo, Norway, January 2013). 
8
 cf Smismans (n 3) 4.  
 9 
membership in order to ensure that the most recent and top-level technical know-how is 
implemented into the decision-making process. 
Second, they involve external interests, who are the lowest and the most effective link 
between local and national authorities and also the EU institutions in the end. External 
interests can ensure successful and effective implementation of the bottom-up decision-
making procedure. 
No approach should be privileged, but it is obvious that involvement as well as 
participation of different actors is needed at all levels of EU decision-making process. If in the 
past decisions were made mainly by the EU institutions, now the powers of decision-making 
are more structured and intertwined between different actors at different levels. However, the 
division of powers between the EU institutions and Member States is very clearly expressed 
where Member States are the key players. It means that the lead position in EU governance, 
policy shaping as well as legislation is taken by Member States, and this might be defined as 
direct or indirect involvement. Actors from different levels are also acknowledged as a 
constituent part in governance structure. It shows that the EU system accepts external 
participants, which do not belong to a traditional governance structure.  
Nevertheless, both the Treaty of Lisbon and the White Paper are based on concerns 
regarding policy – making: a lack of policy effectiveness, poor implementation, aloofness of 
the political decision-making process and a lack of democratic legitimation.9 
The analysis will be started with an overview of the two documents and the 
possibilities for external participants to get involved in the decision-making at all levels of the 
process.  It is important to acknowledge the necessity of decentralisation of EU governance as 
well as the involvement of external participants as one of the component parts of the decision-
                                                 
9
 A. Heritier (2001), “The White Paper on European Governance: A Response to Shifting Weights in Inter-
institutional Decision-Making”, The Jean Monnet Program: Max-Planck-Project group on Common Goods, 
Bonn, p.1. 
 10 
making process. Only successful participation can ensure efficient and legitimate functioning 
of the whole system.  
The discussion of EU legal and conceptual framework for external participation will 
continue with an overview of the White Paper on European Governance, which is believed to 
be the main non-legislative initiative implementing the principles of participatory and 
representative democracy as the fundamental principles of EU Governance. The analysis will 
focus mainly on the first intentions to improve and formalise an involvement of external 
participants by creating various policies and tools. This policy document, which is even not 
binding on Member States, was chosen intentionally to be analysed first. The White Paper 
was the real “constitutional text” and the initial point of policies which helped to start external 
participation.  
 
2.2.1. White Paper on European Governance. 
 
This document mainly focuses on establishing and implementing new forms of 
governance by including external participants and rearranging the powers of the Commission, 
which have been reviewed and discussed repeatedly by a number of academics when 
discussing various issues.  
The White Paper offers four methods for change in reforming EU governance: it 
follows a less top-down approach, and complements the tools with non-legislative 
instruments, though only two of them, - better involvement and better regulation, - will be 
discussed. 
The analysis will also focus on possibilities of better involvement of external 
participants in the decision-making process by ensuring a stronger interaction with regional 
 11 
and local governments and civil society. The White Paper pays a lot of attention on 
establishing and developing measures and procedures for effective and timely participation of 
external participants via the implemented instruments and communication policy, as the 
quality, relevance and effectiveness of EU policies depend on ensuring wide participation 
throughout the policy chain – from conception to implementation. Improved participation is 
likely to create more confidence in the end result. It shall also bring more reliance in the EU 
institutions by bridging the widening gap between experts and bureaucratic institutions on one 
hand and civil society on the other. 
The White Paper may be used as a benchmark for all further legislations – it was 
decided that all EU institutions would follow the principles covered in this document, as non-
binding legal principles; furthermore, they do not create any obligation on Member States. It 
is also the first document where “the use of the concept of civil dialogue and civil society has 
been broadened and become part of the general legitimacy debate”.10 
 
2.2.2. Fundamental Principles of Participatory and Representative Democracy in the Treaty 
of Lisbon. 
  
To start with, it shall be noted that the Treaty of Lisbon contains less than was planned 
in the Draft Constitution for Europe. While the White Paper highlighted the concept of the 
“participation” as a key principle of good governance, the Draft Constitution for Europe 
included in the text the principles of representative democracy and participatory democracy.11 
However, the principle of participatory democracy has disappeared from the wording of the 
                                                 
10
 R. Goehring (2004), “Interest Representation and Civil Society Formation”, in: A. Warleigh and J. Fairbrass 
(eds.), Integrating Interests in the European Union: The New Politics of Persuasion, Advocacy and Influence. 
11
 Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, submitted to the president of the European Council in 
Rome [2003], Articles 45 and 46. 
 12 
Treaty of Lisbon, though the idea of participation has been left the same. It can be grasped 
from the text of the Treaties, for example, that “every citizen shall have the right to participate 
in the democratic life of the Union”.12   
Additionally, the Treaty of Lisbon does not implement any other legal provisions or 
tools to support the participatory and representative democracy. It only covers general 
competences and powers, conferred on the European Union, as well as the fundamental 
principles, which rule and govern the delegation of powers, the principles of conferral, 
subsidiarity and proportionality.13 The fundamental principles are not directly used to ensure 
external participation, though they define the level at which a decision may be taken and the 
type of an action to be recommended. 
The two principles, - the subsidiarity and the proportionality - will also be analysed in 
more details later in this Chapter as well as in the Chapter “External participation in EU 
decision-making process through multi-level governance”, concerning the established rules of 
the subsidiarity check by national parliaments, and the Chapters “Collection and use of 
expertise” as well as “Precautionary principle in collection and use of scientific expertise” on 
the use of the principle of proportionality. 
 
2.2.2.1. The Principle of Subsidiarity 
 
The principle of subsidiarity is usually applied when the EU does not have exclusive 
competence in the area in question. It states that “only if and in so far as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States, either at central level or at 
regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
                                                 
12
 Article 10 paragraph 3 TEU. 
13
 Article 5 paragraph 1 TEU: „The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral. The 
use of Union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.”  
 13 
action, be better achieved at Union level”14 the EU shall act (“the actions of the European 
[Union] on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity concern not only Member States, but also 
their bodies, to the extent that these bodies possess their own legislative powers, conferred on 
them by national constitutional law”).15 Based on the application of the subsidiarity principle, 
the Commission shall consult widely and, where appropriate, shall take into account the 
regional and local dimension of the action envisaged.16 In cases of emergency, the 
Commission is allowed not to conduct such consultations.17 However, there is very little 
information on what is considered to be a case of emergency. The new Protocol on the 
Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality18 has introduced a new   ex 
ante political monitoring mechanism for national parliaments which enables them to issue a 
reasoned opinion regarding compliance with the principle of subsidiarity for proposals of a 
legislative nature.19 Still, it shall be noted that this right cannot be exercised over delegated or 
implementing acts, which are conferred on the Commission, - there is no instrument allowing 
national parliaments to check whether a detailed delegated act infringes subsidiarity. These 
limitations may be understood by reading together the two Protocols: the Protocol on the Role 
of National Parliaments in the EU20 and the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of 
Subsidiarity and Proportionality, contained in the Treaty of Lisbon.21 
It shall be noted that the Commission also admits a possibility for an assessment of 
subsidiarity either to get abridged (the EU action may be scaled back or discontinued if it is 
no longer justified because circumstances have changed) or expanded (the EU action, in line 
                                                 
14
 Article 5 paragraph 3 TEU. 
15
 cf Smismans (n 3) 4.  
16
 Treaty of Lisbon (n 5) Protocol No. 2 Article 2. 
17
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(author’s comment). 
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 Treaty of Lisbon (n 5) Protocol No. 2. 
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 cf Smismans (n 3) 13. 
20
 Treaty of Lisbon (n 5) Protocol No. 1. 
21
 Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca (2011), “Chapter 3. Competence”, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (fifth 
edition), Oxford University Press, p. 96. 
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with the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon, may be expanded where circumstances so 
require).22  
 
2.2.2.2. The Principle of Proportionality. 
 
The principle of proportionality ensures that the content and form of EU action shall 
not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.23 The EU’s “action 
shall be as simple as possible and leave as much scope for national decision as possible, and 
should respect well established national arrangements and legal systems”.24 The principle of 
proportionality requires to evaluate whether the chosen option goes “beyond what is 
necessary to achieve the objective satisfactorily” and will the created “financial or 
administrative cost for the EU, national governments, regional or local authorities, economic 
operators or citizens” be minimised or commensurated.25 Moreover, well-established national 
arrangements and special circumstances applying in individual Member States shall also be 
respected leaving as much scope for national decisions as possible.26 
Even though it is difficult to disaggregate the two principles – subsidiarity and 
proportionality, national parliaments are not afforded a role in relation to the principle of 
proportionality – they are not able to proffer a reasoned opinion based on this principle.27 
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 Impact Assessment Guidelines, SEC (2009) 92, p.23. 
23
 Article 5 paragraph 4 TEU. 
24
 Impact Assessment Guidelines (n 22) 29. 
25
 ibid 30. 
26
 ibid. 
27
 Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca (n 21) 97. 
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2.2.2.3. The Principle of Conferral 
 
The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality prompt that the origin of the 
decision–making lies within Member States and they have a power to decide if the issue goes 
to EU level or stays within the competence of each Member State. In order to grant the basis 
for Union’s right to act on the principle of conferral, the identified problem needs to be linked 
to at least one article of the Treaties, and the objectives it sets out.28 If the EU does not have 
exclusive competence in the area in question, the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
apply. 
“The principle of conferral of powers is not only binding for the Union in relation to 
its Member States, but is also of relevance for the interinstitutional distribution of 
competences”, granting the institutions authority to take specific acts.29 It is agreed30 that the 
“principle of conferral of powers applies only in case of binding acts”. Article 288 TFEU 
enumerates the binding forms of acts and this enumeration creates a closed system of forms of 
secondary law.31 In that context, it means that Member States confer powers on the EU only 
implemented by binding forms of acts. In such case the competence of Member States will be 
constrained to the extent stipulated by the legally binding act. 
However, there are a number of other forms of actions covered by the Treaty of 
Lisbon, naming “provisions”, “rules”, framework programmes”, “general action 
programmes”, “programmes”, “guidelines”, “measures”, empowering the EU institutions to 
“determine”, to “decide”, to “fix”, or to “lay down”, which are not mentioned in Article 288 
                                                 
28
 Impact Assessment Guidelines (n 22) 22. 
29
 Franz Leidenmuehler (2010), “Is there a Closed System of Legal Acts of the European Union after the Lisbon 
Treaty? The Example of Unspecified Acts in the Union Policy on Environment”, Vienna Journal of 
International Constitutional Law,Vol. 4, No. 2/2010, p. 191-192, <www.icl-journal.com> accessed 1 August 
2013. 
30
 Christian Campbell (2005), “Article 249 TEC”, in Smit & Herzog on The Law of the European Union, Hans 
Smit, Peter Herzog, Christian Campbell, Gudrun Zagel (eds.), published by Matthew Bender, (4 volume), p. 349. 
31
 Franz Leidenmuehler (n 29) 192. 
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TFEU.32 Still, Member States have not conferred power on the EU institutions to implement 
those various forms of actions. “When considering draft legislative acts, the European 
Parliament and the Council shall refrain from adopting acts not provided for by the relevant 
legislative procedure in the area in question”.33 It may be the case that even when an act is 
authorised in the primary law, it does not mean that it can be implemented in any other kind 
of form than those enumerated in Article 288 TFEU. In order for a legislative act to be 
binding on Member States it has to be in a form, enumerated in Article 288 TFEU. Otherwise 
such an act may even be excluded. The above defined forms of acts may only be accepted “in 
case of absence of a specific competence”.34  It is interesting to note that the forms of 
documents which will be analysed later in the Chapter as the main documents implementing 
laws and policies for external participation are not enumerated in Article 288 TFEU either, 
though they may be referred to in the text of the Treaties.35 
With the Treaty of Lisbon, the Commission has been granted the power to enact 
binding delegated acts or binding implementation measures under Articles 290 and 291 
TFEU, as all the other types of acts may only serve the purpose of a self-commitment to EU 
institutions or they may function to govern Member State’s implementation measures.36 
Article 290 TFEU on “delegated” legislation will be discussed in more details in the Chapter 
“External participation through comitology” as it can be considered to be a legal instrument 
for external scientific expertise to get involved into the decision-making process conferred on 
the EU by Member States. 
 
                                                 
32
 ibid 196-202. 
33
 Article 296 paragraph 3 TFEU. 
34
 Franz Leidenmuehler (n 29) 200. 
35
 For example, “communications” are mentioned in the text of the Protocol No. 1 as one of the Commission’s 
consultation documents to be forwarded to national Parliaments (Article 1) (author’s comment). 
36
 Franz Leidenmuehler (n 29) 201-202. 
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2.2.2.4. The Principle of Proximity 
 
There is an additional principle to be analysed - Article 10 TEU also establishes the 
principle of proximity which stipulates that decisions must be taken as closely as possible to 
the citizens. This principle applies especially to the implementation of competences within the 
EU. This implementation should involve national and local administrations as effectively as 
possible, in order to bring the EU closer to its citizens. The Treaty of Lisbon does not really 
provide any procedures on how EU citizens should be represented or how the EU institutions 
should apply this policy. Only the transparency policy is described in Article 15 TFEU: “in 
order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the Union 
Institutions, bodies and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as possible”.  
The European Union is open and determined to get closer to its citizens in order to 
create trust and interest in its institutions and policies, because “many people are losing 
confidence in a poorly understood and complex system to deliver the policies they want, as 
the Union is often seen as remote and at the same time too intrusive”.37 This should be 
achieved by implementing the principles of good governance, which rest on active 
involvement of external participants.  
 
The analysed fundamental principles ensuring the participatory and representative 
democracy at EU level reveal that the possibility of participating in the EU decision-making 
process is strongly linked to the competencies delegated to the EU based on the principle of 
conferral. If the area in question can be linked to at least one article of the Treaties, the basis 
for the EU to act is confirmed and its final result shall be embodied only in binding EU legal 
                                                 
37
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acts. If there is no granted exclusive competence on the issue, the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality shall be applied. The principles define the level at which a decision on the 
issue shall be taken, so it is a signpost for external participants where – at EU or at the 
national level, - the participation and involvement actions shall be targeted. The types of 
initiatives may also be indicated – they may vary from binding legal acts upon the principle of 
conferral to non-legislative initiatives (i.e. communications, general policies, 
recommendations, and strategy papers) which set out commitments for future legislative 
action. Later in the Chapter one of the main non-legislative initiatives – the White Paper on 
European Governance, - will be analysed. It will also cover a number of instruments, which 
were developed and implemented later based on this policy document with the aim to get as 
closely as possible to EU citizens. 
 
2.2.3. Definition of External Participation. 
 
The involvement of external participants was proposed to include all those with an 
interest to represent or a contribution to make, thus enabling them to take part in the policy 
decision-making process.38  
External participation is one of the core elements of better governance and successful 
involvement of civil society and interests groups, especially as most of involved interest 
groups play a significant role in preparing and monitoring decisions. It would be convenient 
to analyse the definition of external participation and its weight on decision-making process 
later in the research.  
                                                 
38
 ibid 11: “[…] democracy depends on people being able to take part in public debate”. 
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First, the term “external participant” shall be explained and its role investigated. In 
general, there is no agreed definition of this term, as usually “external participants” are titled 
as experts, stakeholders, interest groups, scientists and etc. The term “stakeholder” is meant to 
encompass all of those who have a stake. Thus, “not only are the experts and bureaucrats from 
within the policy area traditionally associated with a particular issue included, together with 
those actors from civil society that a more enlightened regulatory approach might bring in, but 
also experts and bureaucrats from other policy areas, other disciplines which are understood 
to have a stake in the context of a policy process which acknowledges interdependencies.”39 
“Experts”, on the other hand, are consulted by policy makers, the media and the public at 
large to explain and advise on diverse issues.40  
Experts may be frequently called upon to identify options, to tackle or prevent 
problems, or to assess impacts. Experts might also be called as “key actors of governance: 
either as proactive agenda – setters in their own right (top scientists, or experts in 
administration) or, more often, as “resources” (external advisers) for actors in government, 
business and civil society.”41 They are also the ones which the EU institutions rely on 
regarding specialist expertise in anticipating and identifying the nature of the problems and 
uncertainties that the European Union faces. The obtained expertise helps to take decisions 
and to ensure that risks are explained clearly and simply to the public.42 The provided short 
descriptions of different counterparts may also suggest the key functions and responsibilities, 
which are assigned to external participants.  
The term “external participant” must be understood broadly here, that is, as shorthand 
for those areas of civil society usually excluded from involvement in policy decision-
                                                 
39
 N. Lebessis and J. Paterson (n 1) 22. 
40
 Working Group 1B “Democratising expertise and establishing scientific reference systems” (Report) [May 
2001], p.2. 
41
 ibid. 
42
 White Paper on European Governance (n 6) 19. 
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making.43 In order to differentiate between the public and private sectors in this analysis, all 
non-civil servants participants will be called external participants. The list of participants who 
may get involved in the decision-making process is non-exhaustive. External participants are 
all legal, natural and private bodies that have a direct interest in the drafted, adopted and 
implemented decision. They are consulted as the interested parties outside the EU institutions. 
The definition of “external participants” does not include in-house “inter-service” 
Commission consultations or consultations directed to other European bodies as provided by 
Union law, and which will be covered in the Chapter “Collection and use of expertise”.  
Another important issue related to the definition of “external participation” to be 
raised is that whatever kind of external participation a body chooses, the EU institutions 
prefer it to be in an organised form. Some of this issue will be discussed in the Chapters 
“Participation in environmental issues – primordial rights of external participants” and 
“External participation in the EU decision-making process through multi-level governance”. 
As an example, the most topical recent issue could be mentioned – the EU Citizens’ Initiative. 
In 2011 the EU Regulation44 was enacted where it is implemented that “the organisers shall 
form a citizens’ committee of at least seven persons who are residents of at least seven 
different Member States” in order to register the proposed initiative to the Commission. It 
means that even the Citizen’s Initiative needs to be in an organised form – there has to be a 
formed committee in order to be allowed to register an initiative. 
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 N. Lebessis and J. Paterson (n 1) 22. 
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 21 
2.2.4. Role of External Participation. 
 
The role of external participants is limited by the fact that they may not be consulted 
on politically sensitive issues and cannot vote on the relevant decisions. The Parliament stated 
in its Resolution on the White Paper:45 “[c]onsultation of interested parties […] can only ever 
supplement and never replace the procedures and decisions of legislative bodies which 
possess democratic legitimacy; only the Council and the Parliament, as co-legislators, can 
take responsible decisions on the context of legislative procedures […]”. It seems that the 
Parliament would never agree to give a vote to interested parties, because “the involvement of 
both the European and national parliaments constitutes the basis for a European system with 
democratic legitimacy, and that organised interest groups and civil society are “inevitably 
sectoral and cannot be regarded as having its own democratic legitimacy”.46 
It might be due to the fact that interest groups and external participants in general are 
not granted democratic legitimacy and only the EU institutions and other administrative 
bodies named in the Treaty of Lisbon are conferred of such right by Member States. The 
conferred rights also require accountability which cannot be requested from external 
participants. Even though such a situation causes a tension between participatory and 
representative democracy, there are no intentions to change such a situation. On the contrary, 
the EU institutions seem to be trying to eliminate active external participation – the 
participatory principle has been withdrawn from the legal provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
and, consequently, the framework of comitology committees has also been restrained by 
                                                 
45
 European Parliament resolution No. A5-0399/2001 on the Commission White Paper on European governance 
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limiting the number of committees and the tasks attributed to the remaining ones.47 It is 
believed that the Treaty of Lisbon has brought a number of changes in the procedures of 
comitology by opening the door for more external influence, though it is not intended for 
external participation at the drafting phase. Such a possibility is opened mainly to the 
Parliament both at the preparation and the vetoing process.48  
The Commission intended at least to give a voice, but it also remained convinced that 
a legally–binding approach to consultation was to be avoided.49 It had supported the 
Parliament’s statement maintaining that it “was particularly keen not to grant civil society 
organisations a role which, either wholly or in part, was that of those holding political 
responsibility and who were elected by universal suffrage”.50  
Nevertheless, it was recognised that involvement of external participants was a key 
issue at all the stages of the decision-making process, especially at the drafting phase, and that 
only effective procedures could guarantee up-to-date and on-line technical and scientific 
information. The involvement of external participants in an organised form will be also 
discussed in more details in Chapters on “Collection and use of expertise” as well as in 
“External participation in the EU decision-making process through multi-level governance”. 
There is no doubt that making expertise more accessible is important, but this has to 
go hand-in-hand with other more fundamental changes, such as accountability and procedures 
to provide a “trace” of sources and uses of expertise, procedures to acknowledge minority 
views, involvement of “stakeholders” at early stage and better management of uncertainty.51 
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The management of uncertainty at the risk assessment level by including scientific expertise 
and advice into the decision-making process will be analysed in the Chapter “Precautionary 
principle in collection and use of scientific expertise”.  
 
2.2.5. The Forms of Participatory and Representative Democracy. 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon was expected to renew the institutional architecture as well as 
EU’s democratic foundations. For the first time in the history of EU treaty reforms, the Treaty 
of Lisbon includes “explicit provisions on democratic principles”52. Title II TEU incorporates 
the most important democratic statements – the democracy in EU is based on the principle of 
equality (Article 9) and it shall be embodied by means of representative democracy (Article 
10).  
The new Treaties still do not offer an integrated idea about democracy; they outline 
four possible democratic routes: electoral representation, direct democracy (European 
Citizens’ Initiative, Article 11 paragraph 4) or direct participation, functional representation 
(Article 11 paragraph 1)53 and territorial representation.54 Consultation is part of a direct 
participation, which is not yet a strong system, though a well-organised one. 
The principles of representative and participatory democracy assure the democratic 
life of the European Union by providing a right for the “citizens to be directly represented at 
European Union level” as “every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic 
life of the Union”. To do so, the European Union binds itself to “give citizens and 
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representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views 
in all areas of the European Union action”,55 “maintain an open, transparent and regular 
dialogue with representative associations and civil society”.56 Article 11 paragraph 3 specifies 
an obligation to the Commission to carry out “consultations with parties concerned”. The 
wording of this legal provision seems to offer a consultative practice by following the 
democratic demand that “all those who are affected by a decision should also be included in 
the making of these decisions”.57 This general rule was already implemented in 1974 by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (thereafter CJEU) decision in the case Transocean 
Marine Paint Association v. Commission.58  
Both, the obligation of the Commission to maintain a dialogue and a consultation with 
parties concerned, will be discussed in more detail in the sub-chapter “Communication and 
consultation policy” later in this Chapter.  
Direct participation introduces the instrument of citizens’ initiatives at EU level, 
demanding a support of “not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant 
number of Member States” for an initiative. This innovation was put into practice by the 
Regulation,59 adopted by the Parliament and the Council. It seems as if EU has tried to 
discover another role for its citizens beyond their function as the electorate for the first time in 
the EU Treaties.  
The second democratic route is territorial representation, which is formed from 
“Member States, represented in the Council of the European Union and the European Council, 
and also, with subnational authorities, in the Committee of the Regions”, which is 
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“intertwined with electoral representation and is delimited through the Council’s 
supranational character”.60 It can also be named as a “multi-level” representation, which will 
be covered in more details in the Chapter “External participation in the EU decision-making 
process through multi-level governance”. 
The functional representation shall be highlighted as an example of how the two 
fundamental principles of representation and participation are combined – collective actors 
gain participatory access to the policy process upon the condition that they are 
representative”,61 referring to “representative associations” in Article 11 TEU. There is no 
specification on what is meant by “representative associations”, which is mentioned twice in 
Article 11, though the wording itself “points to the need for associations to somehow prove 
their representativeness” or even demand for “organizational representativeness”.62 In the 
Communication63 on consultation of interested parties the Commission argues that “belonging 
to an association is another way for citizens to participate actively, in addition to involvement 
in political parties or through elections”. It shall also be specified that reference of EU 
institutions to the participation of collective actors, rather than individuals, is quite ambiguous 
and necessitates the conceptualization of non-electoral forms of representation.64 On the other 
hand, this reference explains better the decisions of the EU institutions on issues analysed in 
other chapters, as for example, in the Sub-chapter “Access to justice in environmental 
matters” in Chapter “Participation in environmental issues – primordial rights of external 
participants”. 
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2.2.5.1. Involvement of external participants. 
 
The new reform mainly focuses on electoral representation, which could be named as 
the fourth democratic route. The Treaty of Lisbon establishes that the Parliament is composed 
of representatives of EU citizens,65 which links with the idea that “citizens are directly 
represented at Union level in the European Parliament”66 and political parties shall express the 
will of citizens of the EU.67 Additionally, a new form of institutionalization of democracy has 
been implemented in the Treaty of Lisbon – a number of new rights and powers have been 
conferred to the national parliaments.68 However, there are doubts whether the increased role 
of national parliaments will “strengthen the parliamentary dimension of the EU’s multilevel 
structure and enhance the democratic legitimacy of EU dimensions”.69 Additionally, it is 
important to make place for the participation of external interests in the decision-making 
process at the national level as governments of Member States constitute the most decisive 
legislative organ with the most important executive function. On the one hand, national 
authorities are in a great demand of external data and scientific or social opinion on an issue 
in the same way as the EU institutions. So, national authorities might be keen to involve local 
and regional representatives in forming a national position on the issue to be represented at 
EU level. In such case, electoral representation gets interlinked with functional representation, 
which is analysed in more details later in the Chapter.  
On the other hand, interest groups, which are active and well represented at EU level, 
will be forced to relay information or lead debates in Member States to influence the drafted 
national position or EU policies and legislative framework to be integrated into national legal 
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system. “This debate needs to be encouraged, and can only take place if the policy-making 
process is seen to be relevant and to add value to the legislative process in individual Member 
States”.70 
 
The EU does not want to bind itself, and most EU official procedures do not mention 
external participation. The Commission and other involved EU institutions do not take the 
responsibility to create a well functioning system of access for citizens, but “democratic 
institutions and the representatives of the people, at both national and European levels, can 
and must try to connect Europe with its citizens” as “this is the starting condition for more 
effective and relevant policies”.71 The first steps have been taken and the EU has issued 
consultation papers on participation of experts and interest groups in the decision-making 
process. This document was also mentioned in the White Paper as a tool aiming for a higher 
involvement with the creation of a consultation policy. It was already stressed that this policy 
cannot be achieved by legal rules and that most of civil servants as well as external lobbyists 
are against regulation of their practice. Still, the first attempts saw the implementation of the 
European Transparency Register. It was decided that the best way to formalise this policy was 
to establish standard rules to be followed. It was believed that the standards would improve 
the representation of civil society organisations and structure their debate with the EU 
institutions.72 
Member States should also be actively involved in this consultation policy by 
establishing a more systematic dialogue with representatives of regional and local 
governments by bringing greater flexibility into EU implementation and by taking into 
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account regional and local conditions at an early stage of policy shaping.73 The White Paper 
states that involvement of regional and local level in preparing their position on different 
issues of EU policy is the responsibility of national administrations. Each Member State 
should use the most appropriate instruments for consultation when discussing EU decisions 
and implementing EU policies with a territorial dimension. It is especially important, as the 
Protocol on Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality74 imposed an 
obligation on the Commission to consult widely before proposing legislative acts (Article 2) 
and enhanced the role accorded to national parliaments. However, the legal aspects of multi-
level governance and the possibility on external participation in this context will be analysed 
in more details in the Chapter “External participation in the EU decision-making process 
through multi-level governance”. 
The analysis provided above shows that external participants are not guaranteed 
participation in the decision-making process, but that there is an attempt to involve civil 
society organisations as well as other external participants in the drafting process of new 
policy measures. It is obvious that the mechanism for decision-making from conception to 
implementation in the EU institutions is more or less developed, but there is a big gap in the 
consultation of external participants. It is confirmed that the responsibility for involvement of 
external participants should not be shifted only to the EU institutions. Member States and 
their national administrations should also get actively involved by ensuring participation of 
local and regional interests in decision-making process. They could also create a culture of 
consultation and accumulation of up-to-date information bearing in mind the fact that their 
role in the EU decision-making process has drastically increased. 
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2.3. CONSULTATION AND COMMUNICATION POLICY AND STRATEGY.  
 
It is recommended that both the EU institutions and Member States communicate 
more actively with the general public on European issues. “The Commission also considers 
that communication on European issues is the responsibility of all those involved in the EU 
decision-making process”.75 It is one of the core requirements, implementation of which 
guarantees the needed reform of European Governance.  
Consultation is considered to be a part of direct participation. It is a well-organised 
process with a well established technical tool, even though the opinions and outputs of the 
consultation do not have much influence as yet over the decision-making process at EU level. 
Depending on the issues at stake, consultation is intended to provide opportunities for input 
from representatives of regional and local authorities, civil society organisations, undertakings 
and associations of undertakings, the individual citizens concerned, academics and technical 
experts, and interested parties in third countries.76  
What is needed is a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue; a culture which is 
adopted by all the EU institutions and which associates particularly the Parliament in the 
consultative process.77 Ensuring successful participation and involvement of external 
participants, diversity of different actors and interests groups has to be acknowledged. It has 
to ensure “the fair treatment of all Member States from the largest to the smallest […] and 
provide a means to arbitrate between different interests by passing them through two 
successive filters: the general interest at the level of the Commission; and democratic 
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representation, European and national, at the level of the Council and European Parliament, 
together with Union’s legislature.”78 
First of all, it is necessary to address the question of “how European issues can be 
brought systematically into the public eye and their relevance made tangible to civil 
society”.79 In order to involve civil society and external participants successfully into the 
problem-solving and the decision-making procedure, the European Union has to accept the 
different political systems with their specific forms of interest mediation, the equal value of 
different cultures, structural differences in ideas, identities, interests, institutions, problems, 
knowledge, status, power and etc.80 The described differences can be a positive potential for 
legitimate and effective decisions in the European governance, ensuring relevance of 
European policy to the concerns of civil society at every level.81  
 
The Commission has put a lot of efforts in implementing the first steps towards a 
reinforced consultation culture, as earlier experts and/or scientists were invited on a random 
basis whenever expertise was needed for a drafted decision. Setting standards and guidelines 
on how an expert advice should be collected and external participants involved into the 
decision-making process guarantees the inclusion of more stable scientific knowledge into the 
decisions drafted, as well as forms a valuable expert group which could be used whenever it is 
needed. However, the set guidelines and standard rules do not provide legitimate assurance 
that participating experts will be allowed to provide its input till the end result is achieved; as 
the Commission does not oblige itself to assure that they would take into account the advice 
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provided. There is a risk that eliminating participants in the middle of the process, the 
provided technical solution might be lost or changed when other participants are involved. 
The process might become cumbersome, and if the provided scientific and/or technical advice 
is not monitored to the very end, loss of information, varying interpretations at different 
drafting phases and etc. might give negative results. 
In order to avoid those risks, the EU institutions have attempted to create a more 
transparent and effective system, which was discussed in the White Paper. As the efficiency 
directly depends on the information, the priority is set on development of a communication 
policy. The Communication policy is developed in two directions – one covers national 
authorities and regional participants (which will be discussed in more details in the Chapter 
“External participation in the EU decision-making process through multi-level governance”), 
another – experts and scientific knowledge through the whole EU (those issues will be 
covered in the Chapters “External participation through comitology” and “Collection and use 
of expertise”). Those two sections have to be supported by a number of other issues, such as 
providing access to information and documents in official languages, guaranteeing systematic 
dialogue and establishing a multi-level partnership/governance. 
 
2.3.1. Communication on Minimum Standards for Consultation. 
 
The Commission asserts that creating a culture of consultation cannot be achieved by 
legal rules. A number of official documents in which the relation between mainly the 
Commission and an organized civil society are framed in the language of participation have 
been issued. In the Discussion Paper82 on non-governmental organisation the Commission has 
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acknowledged for the first time the contribution of the NGOs in fostering a more participatory 
democracy both within European Union and beyond. Based on the discussion paper itself and 
the feedback received, this initiative was developed further. In December 2002, the 
Commission adopted the Communication on "General principles and minimum standards for 
consultation of interested parties",83 which sets up a coherent and flexible framework for 
consultation of stakeholders, including NGOs. The Commission clarifies that organizations, 
which seek to contribute to EU policy development, must follow the principles of openness 
and accountability and be ready to disclose “which interests they represent” and “how 
inclusive that representation is”,84 having in mind that the Commission favours “the need for 
a proper balance, where relevant, between the representatives of […] wider constituencies”.85 
The more detailed analysis of this communication is provided in the Chapter “Collection and 
use of expertise”. 
 
2.3.2. Information and Communication Policy and Strategy for the European Union. 
 
Thus, in order to ensure the transparent and efficient participation of external 
participants in the policy-shaping process a communication policy of the Commission and the 
other EU institutions86 had to be established. The Communication Policy promotes efforts to 
deliver information at national and local level, making use of networks, grassroots, 
organisations and national, regional and local authorities, where possible.  
The Commission has adopted both communication and consultation policy, as 
identified in the White Paper. The latter is strictly used by the Commission’s civil servants. 
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This document is quoted in all other policies and linked to the consultation initiatives and 
practical guidelines of EU. However, the consultation and communication policy themselves 
cannot exist on their own; access to documents, access to information and similar issues must 
be taken into account. On the other hand, as it was already mentioned in the analysis of the 
White Paper, that it is one of the obligatory conditions for the public to have access to reliable 
information on the European issues and be able to scrutinize the policy process on its various 
stages.  
Another element to be mentioned with regard to consultation and communication is 
access to information presented in a way that is adapted to local needs and concerns, and 
available in all official languages.87 The need for reliable information and communication on 
ongoing issues has become one of the priority issues in the EU. Without relevant information, 
the EU institutions will not be able to provide effective and timely policies, and deliver what 
is needed on the basis of clear objectives, and the public will not be able to evaluate the 
achievements or the decisions taken. The Communication Policy is also one of the constituent 
elements in order to implement one of the five principles – “openness”,88 proposed in the 
White Paper. 
In order to develop an informed debate on the future of Europe along the lines of the 
White Paper, a certain amount of advance planning is required to raise citizens’ awareness 
and associate them in an active and positive manner.89  
                                                 
87
 “The definition and development of the main messages must be expressed in the language of general public: 
effective communication must always be seen in terms of general public rather than of the institutions”, in 
Commission, “An Information and Communication Strategy for the European Union” (Communication) COM 
(2002) 350 final/2, 02/10/2002, p. 13. 
88
 “Five principles proposed in White Paper on European Governance: openness, participation, accountability, 
effectiveness and coherence”. White Paper on European Governance (n 6) 10. 
89
 Economic and Social Committee on the “Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions entitled a new framework for 
cooperation on activities concerning the information and communication policy of the European Union” 
(Opinion) (2002/C 48/25) [2002], p.109. 
 34 
The objective of this Communication Strategy is to “generate awareness and combat 
ignorance and apathy so as to lay a firm foundation for the management of public life, a 
clearly understood form of governance between the European Union and its citizens”.90 After 
two years of further development of the Communication Strategy, the objective has changed 
slightly: “to improve perception of the European Union and its Institutions and their 
legitimacy by deepening knowledge and understanding of its tasks, structure and 
achievements and by establishing a dialogue with its citizens”.91  
Member States and the EU institutions are enabled to develop a set of messages on 
each topic as part of an overall process, which “cannot be reduced to the mere provision of 
information: it must convey a meaning, facilitate comprehension, set both action and policy in 
a real context, and prompt dialogue with national public opinion so as to enhance the 
participation of the general public in the great European debate”.92 The messages to be 
prepared and disseminated should be acknowledged as priority ones not just by the European 
Union but also by the general public. They are usually set on different topics, and essentially 
act as a collective memory, crystallising knowledge at a given point and acting as a basis for 
future action.93 It also includes raising the quality of the European public debate, associating 
the public in the European decision-making, listening to the public and their concerns more 
attentively, and the methodical, consistent rebuilding of EU’s image.94 
On the other hand, “[c]onsulting those who will be affected by a new policy or 
initiative and those who will implement it is a Treaty obligation, […] [as it] helps to ensure 
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that policies are effective and efficient, and it increases the legitimacy of EU action from the 
point of view of stakeholders and citizens”.95 
The development of the Communication Strategy means that the communication 
should be targeted “at two distinct levels, using different messages and appropriate tools”:96 
dialogue should be prepared in a certain way, as civil servants of the EU institutions are 
already reasonably informed, whereas dialogue with the general public must be 
understandable for those who are uninterested and unfamiliar with the European Union. “In 
addition, information and messages must be geared to local realities, languages, perceptions 
and to specific interests and concerns of various target groups”, who are “selected in 
accordance with the communication plans negotiated with Member States on each of the 
priority topics agreed on”.97 It is suggested, that alongside an open and public consultation 
specific efforts should be made in order “to ensure that all relevant stakeholders are both 
aware of and able to contribute to the consultation”, as an open consultation may not “provide 
a fully representative picture of opinions” due to uneven possibility for interest groups “to 
take part in consultations or express their views with the same force”.98 
 
Without active support from national and regional authorities, the EU institutions will 
not be able to get their messages across to or engage with the general public. In order to 
spread the formed messages as effectively as possible, the cooperation with Member States 
must operate at three levels: inter-institutionally, where the EU institutions set the thematic 
priorities for information and lay down joint guidelines on EU information and 
communication leaving freedom for Member States to decide whether to join it; in the various 
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aspects of decentralisation, by shifting of communication obligations from EU institutions to 
outside experts and Member States via the memorandum of understanding; and in the 
partnership with civil society by distributing the end opinion of the debated decisions, which 
have to go through all levels of communication. 99 
The follow-up and implementation of the discussed communications had several 
weaknesses – there was a continuous fragmentation of communication activities and they 
were too focused on financial issues rather than on dialogue and proactive communication; 
the majority of formed messages reflected political priorities were not necessarily linked to 
citizens’ interests, needs and preoccupations.100 
 
2.3.2.1. Action Plan to Improve Communicating Europe. 
 
After the last three policy documents on information and communication, the 
Commission has adopted “three other initiatives centred on listening, communicating and 
“going local”.101 The Action Plan102 was set “to improve communicating Europe by the 
Commission”103 and to re-arrange the use of internal communication resources. First, it aimed 
to listen to EU citizens by allowing expressing their opinions so that the Commission could 
understand their perceptions and concerns. The research function was presented as a 
fundamental element of the “listening process”, through the analysis of Eurobarometer and 
other surveys’ (data-banks, impact studies, research on audiences and ad-hoc studies) 
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results.104 The newly presented strategic principles aimed to ensure more effective and 
selective communication in EU by listening to EU citizens through the analysis of various 
research results, information relays and consultations. Nevertheless, the Commission did not 
identify whether it could be considered as one of the mechanisms of an active participation of 
civil society. 
 
2.3.2.2. The Plan-D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate 
 
The Plan-D105 dovetailed with the Action Plan and created a long-term framework for 
citizens’ dialogue, “where citizens are given the information and the tools to actively 
participate in the decision making process and gain ownership of the European project”. The 
Commission indicated in the Plan-D that as part of the communicating process it had 
improved its consultation on major initiatives by issuing Green and White Papers as well as 
arranging internet consultations over the whole range of citizens’ panels and targeted focus 
groups. It underlined “the national character of the debate but also recommend[ed] a 
structured feedback process and a series of possible initiatives to be taken at the [Union] 
level”.106  
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2.3.2.3. White Paper on a European Communication Policy 
 
And the White Paper on a European Communication Policy107 supported a two-way 
communication involving active public participation of citizens with a “going local” 
approach. Consultation, as a standard practice, which is limited to specific policy initiatives 
and to an open dialogue on various views and concerns to be expressed has been underlined. 
Participation democracy is implemented through a right to express views, be heard and have 
the opportunity for dialogue with the decision-makers. 
 
Later communication policies and strategies were mainly focused on the use of state-
of-art internet technology to actively debate and advocate the Commission’s policies, which 
had become an important opinion-forming forum of debate on the internet.108 Additionally, 
the Commission planned to innovate its web and digital communications to keep pace with 
citizens' expectations as well as exploiting the potential of new technologies. 
 
2.3.3. Consultation Instruments and Procedures. 
 
On the other hand, the consultation is one of the Commission’s duties according to the 
Treaties and it helps to ensure that proposals put to the legislature are sound. Nevertheless 
neither the EC Treaty nor the Treaty of Lisbon has included any general provision that obliges 
EU institutions to consult external representatives prior to making decisions.109 Despite the set 
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obligation “[i]n the fields of cohesion, environment and rural development policies, managing 
authorities must meet minimum communication requirements”.110 
Article 2 of the Protocol No. 2111 implies that “the Commission shall consult widely” 
before proposing the legislative acts. Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1112 defines consultation 
documents of the Commission – Green and White papers and communications.  However, “a 
general approach on how to undertake such consultations has not existed. Instead, 
consultation has been based on a variety of traditions and each of the Directorate Generals has 
had its own mechanisms and methods for consulting its respective sectoral interest groups”.113 
The Commission already consults interested parties through different instruments, 
such as Green and White Papers, Communications, advisory committees, business test panels 
and ad hoc consultations. It helps to arbitrate between competing claims and priorities, and 
assists in developing a long term policy perspective by shaping a more effective policy, based 
on early consultation and past experience. Better consultation and involvement will allow 
consider much more critically the demands from the EU institutions and from interest groups 
for new political initiatives. 
A better informed public increasingly questions the content and independence of 
expert advice that is given, which guarantees the transparency of the primary information 
sources. The European Union is required to apply the precautionary principle and play its role 
in risk assessment and risk management.114 This part of the decision-making is one of the 
main ones as it involves national administrations via the multi-level partnership/ governance. 
Risk assessment can only be trusted to experts and technocrats with a scientific and technical 
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background. However, the last decision regarding risk assessment and management is usually 
taken by a participant with political authority. 
 
2.3.3.1. Guidelines on Collection and Use of Expertise. 
 
The Commission has already adopted general principles and minimum standards for 
consulting non-institutional interested parties115 on the major policy initiatives it proposes, 
and guidelines on collection and use of expert advice116 to provide for the accountability, 
plurality and integrity of the expertise used. The consultation guidelines set the main 
principles on how external participants can be involved into the decision-making process and 
ensure that all relevant parties are properly consulted and the triggered input from external 
parties is used for the shaping of a legislative proposal prior to a decision of the Commission. 
The guidelines define the involvement of interested parties through a more transparent 
consultation process, provision of general principles and standards for consultation to help the 
Commission to rationalise its consultation procedures and to promote mutual learning and 
exchange of good practices within the Commission.117 “Under this definition, both specific 
consultation frameworks already provided for in the treaties, consultation requirements under 
international agreements and decisions taken in a formal process of consulting Member States 
comitology procedure are excluded”.118 This Communication will be discussed in more detail 
in the Chapter “Collection and use of expertise”. 
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2.3.3.2. Communication on Interactive Policy Making. 
 
The Commission has also adopted a Communication on Interactive Policy Making 
(IPM),119 as one of the consultation tools, which aims to improve governance by using the 
internet for collecting and analysing reactions in the marketplace for use in the European 
Union’s policy – making process. It aims to use modern technologies to allow both Member 
States administrations and EU institutions to understand the needs of citizens and other 
external participants. This tool can also be used by the Commission for internal 
communication, internal surveys, website user surveys, preparation of events and conferences 
etc. IPM may assist in developing policies “by allowing more rapid and targeted responses to 
emerging issues and problems, improving the assessment of the impact of policies (or the 
absence of them) and providing greater accountability to citizens”.120  
 
2.3.3.3. Code of Conduct. 
 
The culture of consultation should be achieved by a code of conduct that sets 
minimum standards, which shall reduce the risk of the policy-makers just listening to one side 
of the argument or particular groups getting privileged access on the basis of sectoral interests 
or nationality. An established culture of consultation might further lead to partnership 
arrangements, and may convince the Commission to involve external participants on a more 
regular basis. It is believed that the code of conduct for consultation, which also structures the 
EU’s relationship with civil society, identifies responsibilities and improves accountability for 
all partners. On the other hand, the Commission encourages interest groups to establish their 
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own mechanisms for monitoring the process, so that they can see what they can learn from it 
and check that they are making an effective contribution to a transparent, open and 
accountable system.121 The idea of a code of conduct was introduced in the White Paper and 
later re-introduced again by the Green Paper on European Transparency Initiative.122 
However, neither of documents addressed in detail “the issues of how such a code should be 
drawn up and exactly how it would be monitored in practice”.  
An established culture of consultation might further lead to partnership arrangements, 
and may convince the Commission to involve external participants on a more regular basis. It 
is believed that the code of conduct for consultation, which also structures the EU’s 
relationship with civil society, identifies responsibilities and improves accountability for all 
partners. On the other hand, the Commission encourages interest groups to establish their own 
mechanisms for monitoring the process, so that they can see what they can learn from it and 
check that they are making an effective contribution to a transparent, open and accountable 
system.123 The idea of a code of conduct was introduced in the White Paper and later re-
introduced again by the Green Paper on European Transparency Initiative.124 Though neither 
of documents addressed in detail “the issues of how such a code should be drawn up and 
exactly how it would be monitored in practice”.  
The Commission has even opted for self-regulation in this area by inviting interested 
parties to adopt their own voluntary codes of conduct, implementing the following features: to 
act in an honest manner and always declare the represented interests, to avoid dissemination 
of misleading information and to avoid any form of inducement in order to obtain information 
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or to receive preferential treatment.125 However, there are already cases of misdemeanour 
reported in relation with voluntary codes of conduct. Additionally, it seems that only 
consultants have applied this intention, while lobbyists and other groups of interest 
representatives have not considered it to be applicable. Again, a notion to put in place a 
compulsory code of conduct, as the Parliament has applied in its practice for all seeking 
accreditation, has been raised. It may soon become a reality if the obligatory registration, 
which is analysed in the next sub-chapter, will be implemented. 
 
2.3.4. European Transparency Register.  
 
In an effort to give a further boost to the transparency of the EU decision-making 
process, the Parliament and the Commission have launched a joint, public European 
Transparency Register which provides more information on those who seek to influence 
European policy,126 - in other words, a new EU lobby register was launched. This Register 
was established to ensure that the EU institutions interact with various external participants in 
a constant and legitimate manner. The Register was intended to provide information on the 
participants aiming to influence the EU decision-making process and on the level of resources 
to be invested in these activities.127 
The Transparency Register incentivises mainly the provision of information about 
lobbying organisations rather than separate individuals, even though the FAQ, prepared by the 
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Joint Transparency Register Secretariat,128 explains that “all organisations and self-employed 
individuals engaged in “activities carried out with the objective of directly or indirectly 
influencing the formulation or implementation of policy and decision-making processes of the 
EU institutions” are expected to register”. 
It is believed that the main incentive for joining the Register is to get the EP 
accreditation. Another potentially strong incentive is that the EU institutions may restrict 
participation in meetings of organisations which have not registered themselves, especially 
where the views of key stakeholders over the details of a specific policy are in a variety of 
consultative forums.129  
It can be assumed that this Register may represent a possibility to get actively involved 
in an EU decision - making and implementation process, as other means and instruments 
discussed in the later Chapters “External participation through comitology” and “Collection 
and use of expertise”, are mainly established for a possible passive involvement. By joining 
the Register, a registered participant gains the right to get into the EU Parliament meetings at 
its own discretion as well as to get involved in selective consultation meetings at the 
Commission and get consultation alerts for nominated policy fields. Of course, active 
participation also includes some passive participation – the search engine of the Register 
“permits a limited number of data fields to be examined and cross-referenced, with the 
selection of enquiry fields seemingly driven mainly by the needs of EU institutions to identify 
consultees”.130 The chosen external consultees can presumably be invited to the forming of a 
defined policy and/or legislative act or share expertise in the relevant policy area. It is worth 
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noting that entries on the Register also draw think tanks, research and academic institutions, 
representatives from public authorities, not only commercial practitioners. 
The Register came into force in June 2011, although it is believed to have a large 
number of shortcomings due to its voluntary nature.131 The Parliament has expressed its 
position on a mandatory register, due to the fact that “many of the largest lobbies in Brussels 
simply don’t sign up; law firms appear to be boycotting the register (some who signed up last 
year have since withdrawn once pressed to reveal their clients); there is very weak oversight 
and enforcement of the register, and the Commission relentlessly spins the myth that the 
register is a success simply by virtue of the number of new organizations continuing to 
join”.132  
 
2.3.4.1. Legal basis to establish a system of compulsory registration. 
 
The Commission favours a voluntary register, as it believes that there is no legal base 
for a mandatory register in the EU Treaties.133 However, professor M.Krajewski134 has 
substantiated that mandatory and binding lobby regulation can be adopted through the 
ordinary legislative procedures, on the basis of Article 298 TFEU,135 and followed, by a 
binding EU regulation or directive. It is reasoned that due to the fact that the Register itself 
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was established by Inter-Institutional Agreement136 between the Parliament and the 
Commission, which is “binding on the institutions and can, therefore, have similar factual 
binding effects on lobbyists if they interact with the respective EU organs”.137  
Nevertheless, it shall be noted that the legal basis for lobbying under Article 298 
TFEU is limited only to lobbyists who target the EU institutions engaged in administrative 
tasks, i.e. it refers to all administrations at the European level. This includes the organs most 
associated with executive and legislative power, namely the Council, the Commission and the 
Parliament, but also all agencies and other independent institutions engaged in administrative 
tasks.138 However, if an external participant targets other tasks, for example, legislative or 
general policy-making, these activities will be outside the competence implemented by 
Article 298 TFEU. In such case the doctrine of implied powers may be applied.139  
The doctrine of implied powers, developed by the CJEU,140 held that the Union had 
powers not only expressly laid down in the Treaty but also to be implied from express 
provisions, which is subject to extremely restrictive criteria.141 “It is only exceptionally that 
such powers are recognised by case-law and in order to be so recognised, they must be 
necessary to ensure the practical effect of the provisions of the Treaty or the base regulation at 
issue”.142 This position was argued by Mr. Trabucchi,143 stating that it is not even considered 
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that “the recognition of powers of action conferred on the  [Union] is necessary, not generally 
to attain the objectives of the Treaty, as this rule provides, but more precisely for the correct 
exercise of powers specifically conferred on the  [Union] in determined sectors”.  
Another extension of competences and the possibility to implement binding 
regulations comes in via the special procedure mentioned in Article 352 TFEU. This Article is 
“usually employed if the treaties neither explicitly nor implicitly confer a competence on the 
EU, but its activities are nevertheless required to attain an objective mentioned in the 
treaties”.144 This interpretation may be contested on the grounds of subsidiarity by national 
parliaments, as the flexibility clause entails an exceptional use of EU legislative power.145 
Indeed the German Federal Constitutional Court has already raised concerns with the scope of 
this Article: it has stipulated that the exercise of any such competence constitutionally 
required ratification.146 As Article 352 TFEU not only establishes a competence for action for 
the European Union but at the same time relaxes the principle of conferral, it may be 
considered as a threat to most Member States’ constitutions. 
 
2.4. CONCLUSIONS. 
 
The aim of this Chapter was to review the EU legal and policy basis for external 
participation. The analysis commenced with the White Paper on European Governance as this 
is the real “constitutional text” and a starting point for external participation. Even though this 
document is just a consultation paper of the Commission, which is not binding on Member 
                                                                                                                                                        
143
 Case C-8/73 Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven v Massey-Ferguson GmbH [1973] ECR I-897, Opinion of AG 
Trabucchi. 
144
 Markus Krajewski (n 131) 12. 
145
 Weatherill, Stephen; (2005), “Better Competence Monitoring'”, 30 Thomson/ Sweet and Maxwell: European 
Law Journal p.23. 
146
 German Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 from 30.6.2009, Absatz-Nr. (1 - 421), 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html, paras 326–328. 
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States and other bodies, it was a great support to start external participation. The principle of 
participation was not retained in the Treaty of Lisbon though originally it was introduced in 
the Draft Constitution for Europe. It means that the primary legislation has left a legal gap on 
participatory legislation as well as external inclusion in the decision-making process. 
The White Paper recommends implementing a number of various instruments for 
involvement of external participants as well as scientific and technical knowledge into the 
decision-making process at the EU level. There is a myriad of communications, policy 
documents, and initiatives in this domain, the variety of which strikes. An attempt was made 
to cover only the main documents, directly interlinked to participation and external 
involvement at the EU level, though it shall be admitted that there is a real danger of 
confusion and contradiction with such a number. 
The analysis in this Chapter has also revealed that the consultation culture is not 
adequately formed when discussing EU decisions and implementing EU policies in order to 
listen and learn from external experience. The Commission welcomes efforts to take into 
account local and regional knowledge and conditions as the latter can make it difficult to 
establish one set of rules that covers the whole EU, without tying up the legislation in 
excessive complexity. The Commission has left the participation at regional and local level 
for national responsibility. Due to different communication and consultation practices in 
national administrations, participation might differ in the same drafted implementation 
measures. It might lead to distrust in decision-making process and possibility to be involved. 
Also, the choice of voluntary registration in the European Transparency Register may 
not serve the purpose to ensure constant, legitimate and necessary quality of democracy 
interaction between the EU institutions and external participants. Due to its voluntary nature, 
this instrument does not seem to ensure the efficient monitoring of external interests engaged 
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in activities aiming at influencing the EU decision-making process. It neither ensures 
involvement of all coherent participants in forming a defined policy and/or legislative act or 
share expertise in the relevant policy area. Favouring a non-legal rules may be interesting but 
it is at variance with what happens in many countries and Member States. 
The subsequent Chapter will analyse the possibility for external actors both at regional 
and local levels, possessing credible and politically sensitive information, to get involved in 
the decision-making process with the Commission.  
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III CHAPTER 
 
EXTERNAL PARTICIPATION THROUGH COMITOLOGY 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION. 
 
The preceding Chapter “EU law and policy on participation in EU governance” 
analysed the need for a change in EU Governance by reforming multi-level governance and 
involve more actors, such as civil society, private organisations, experts and other external 
participants. Not only has the demand for technical expertise increased in the EU decision-
making process, but the involvement of external participants ensures confidence in the final 
outcomes. This is particularly important as these outcomes are implemented by local and 
regional authorities.  
Consequently, key documents on involvement of external participants acknowledge 
their importance in the future decision-making process. The instruments that regulate the 
organisation of external expertise in the EU decision-making process are analysed in more 
details in the Chapters “Collection and use of expertise” and “Precautionary principle in 
collection and use of scientific expertise”. However, even though external participation and 
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comitology may not proceed from the same rationale, the new system of implementation of 
EU law and policies is a way for the expression of external participation. 
There are considerable speculations in the EU, regarding the origin and functions of 
committees and the powers that are delegated to them. The organisation of committees and 
their influence in the decision-making procedure has changed over time. While comitology 
committees had gained in power and influence over time, the Treaty of Lisbon has changed 
significantly “the theory and practice of the delegation of implementing powers to the 
European Commission”, “in terms of procedure, legal basis and institutional balance”.1  
Originally, comitology committees were established to enable Member States to control 
the implementation of the Commission. Comitology committees did not aim to involve 
external participants. There are no directly implemented provisions allowing external 
participants to be joined to the decision-making process. However there are phases in the 
decision-making process when external expertise is required by the Commission. Those 
instances will be also discussed in more details below. 
First, this Chapter provides a short historical overview of rulemaking in the EU. It is 
followed by the explanation of the creation of comitology, the procedures and delegation of 
some functions to the newly established bodies. The focus then shifts to a detailed evaluation 
of the approach to rulemaking in the Treaty of Lisbon. The second part of the Chapter covers 
the implementation of the supporting measures, such as the Comitology Register and the 
Annual Report. The third and last part of the Chapter analyses the typology of comitology 
committees and their main participants. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 A. Hardacre and M. Kaeding (2011); Delegated and Implementing Acts. The New Comitology, EIPA Essential 
Guide, version 2, p. 4. 
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3.2. DEFINITION OF COMITOLOGY COMMITTEES. 
 
Looking at the history of comitology committees, it could be argued that they were 
established in response to dramatic needs, thereby achieving a unique status. Historically, the 
use of committees by the  Union institutions dates back to the 1960s, when the Council, 
urgently needing to reduce its workload in implementation of the   Union’s agricultural 
policy, decided to delegate certain discretionary powers to the Commission.2 National bodies 
resisted delegations of power to the Commission, however committees of national 
representatives were established; these were to be consulted prior to any implementation 
decision.  
 
The expression of comitology committee was chosen on purpose, as the etymology of 
the modern word ‘committee’ goes back to the Latin verb committere,3 which means – 
“bringing together, coming to blows, and making a start”.4 The special characteristic of 
people brought together in a so-called committee, is usually their outstanding knowledge or 
expertise, formed by academic training or professional experience; moreover they are not 
recruited as individuals, but as representatives of some social group, faction, party, sector, 
region, country or other constituency.5  
                                                 
2
 C. Bertram (1967), “Decision-making in the E.E.C.: The Management Committee Procedure”, 5 CML Rev., p. 
246 – 264; P. Schindler (1971), “The problems of decision-making by way of the management committee 
procedure in the European Economic Community”, 8 CML Rev, p. 184-205; and H. Schmitt von Sydow (1973), 
“Die Verwaltungs – und Regelungsausschussverfahren der Europaischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaften”. 
3
 M.P.C.M. van Schendelen (1998), “Prolegomena to EU Committees as Influential Policymakers”, in M.P.C.M. 
van Schendelen (eds.), EU Committees as Influential Policymakers, Ashgate, p. 3. 
4
 “The common notion is that different people are brought together to do something. In the course of time, this 
general notion acquired two specific elements. The people, who were brought together, possess some special 
characteristic: an outstanding strength, ability, status or knowledge. And they are subordinate or “committed” to 
some higher authority such as the king, the parliament or the people. In the past, the concrete manifestations of 
these two elements have varied much within societies.” M.P.C.M. van Schendelen (n 3) 3. 
5
 H.F. Pitkin (1972), The Concept of Representation, University of California Press, Berkeley. 
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One of the core aims of comitology committees is to meet “at times unexpected, 
functional demands of an ever-expanding European Union for technical information and 
expertise.”6 Beyond expertise and technical knowledge, committees need to respond to other 
demands,7 - institutionalisation,8 specialisation9 and representation.10 The demands could be 
achieved with the help of “effective and efficient [Union] decision-making, to ensure the 
continuing presence of Member States within the [Union] decision-making process and to 
include the views of socio-economic parties”.11 It leads to a definition that committees are: 
“institutionalised groups of specialised and representative people”.12 
There is also one more reason for the creation of committees – they gather interests, 
experience and opinions of persons, who are usually highly specialised. The collected 
                                                 
6
 Gunther F. Schaefer (1996), “Committees in the EC Policy Process: A First Step towards Developing a 
Conceptual Framework” in R.H. Pedler and G.F. Schaefer (eds.), Shaping European Law and Policy: The Role 
of Committees and Comitology in the Political Process, Maastricht, European Institute of Public Administration, 
p.3-38. 
7
 J. Alt and A. Alesina  (1996), “Political economy: an overview” in R.E. Goodin and H.D. Klingmann (eds.), A 
New Handbook of Political Science, Oxford University Press, Oxford,. 
8
 “Institutionalisation” means that comitology committees are considered to be legal bodies, which do not 
interfere with the Community’s institutional structure, even though they are not foreseen by the Treaties and it 
was feared that this body might distort the established institutional relationship between the Commission and the 
Council. However, in order to ensure the principle of the institutional balance it needs to accommodate the 
recognition of transnational governance structures between the Community and the Member States, which leads 
to an increased and reinforced role of committees. To conclude, comitology committees are part of the EU 
institutions to be consulted on issues delegated by the Council and/or the Commission. In Ellen Vos (1999), “EU 
Committees: the Evolution of Unforeseen Institutional Actors in European Product Regulation“, EU 
Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics, Christian Joerges and Ellen Vos (eds.), Hart Publishing: 
Oxford-Portland, p. 23 - 34. 
9
 “Specialisation” means that each comitology committee as well as the appointed members specialise in specific 
issues, defined by secondary legislation. Delegated tasks are quite narrow in the area and require specific 
knowledge, so the proposed measures have to have a scientific basis, to take account of the most recent scientific 
and technical research and the provided advice is based on excellence, independence and transparency. It shows 
that the consulted comitology committees have to possess very specific and narrow experience, which can be 
relied to be received at any relevant moment. In Ellen Vos (n 8) 30-39. 
10
 “Representation” means that members of comitology committees usually come from national administrations 
or other established governmental agencies and represent interests of a separate Member State or the interests of 
civil society (“Member State” for the purpose of the institutional provisions refers only to government authorities 
of the Member States and does not include the governments of the regions or autonomous communities). 
Representation might be also applied to specific area of interests or to part of EU public. Representatives 
participate in the EU decision-making process and provide a position of the represented part in the drafted 
decision. In Ellen Vos (n 8) 35. 
11
 Gunther F. Schaefer (n 6) 3-38. 
12
 M.P.C.M. van Schendelen (n 3) 25-37. 
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expertise is considered to be the most important tool in helping EU politicians and civil 
servants to reach successful results.  
Consequently the European Union committee system aims to fulfil:13 
1) the need of an ever higher level of technical, scientific, legal and political expertise in 
policy-making which is required by the growing complexity of the regulation of 
contemporary society; 
2) the need for efficient vertical co-ordination between the different levels of governance 
outside a hierarchical organisation of command and control; and for horizontal 
coordination, communication and deliberation between Member States. 
 
Committees do not form a separate European institution with decision-making powers, 
and they are not mentioned in the Treaty of Lisbon. All the more, all committees assisting and 
counselling the Commission do not have its own administration, budget, archive or premises, 
or an address of its own. “They have turned into a unique, “freewheeling transnational 
structure”, with its own merits as deliberative forums, but also without a clear legal structure 
or form”.14 The same issue was endorsed in the case Rothmans,15 where the CJEU decided 
that comitology committees “do not have their own administration, archive, or premises, or 
even an address, and as such cannot be regarded as constituting “another [Union] institution 
or body”, or to fail within the third-party categories established by the authorship rule”.16   
Committees help to create a policy for the European internal market, involving a 
plethora of policy objectives, regulatory techniques, specific structures of governance and 
                                                 
13
 Daniel Gueguen and Caroline Rosberg (2004), “Comitology and other EU committees and expert groups. The 
hidden power of the EU: finally a clear explanation”, European Public Affairs Series, p.15 
14
 R. Nickel (2005), “Participatory transnational governance”, EUI Working Paper LAW No. 2005/20; p. 23; 
15
 Case T-188/97 Rothmans International BV v Commission of the European Communities [1999] ECR II-2463; 
16
 Joanne Scott and David M. Trubek (2002), “Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the 
European Union” in the European Law Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1, p. 12; 
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perceptible legitimacy problems. They also “shape policy and play a significant role in 
contributing to the formulation and adoption of binding rules”.17 In the EU legal order, 
committees are expected to transform “strategic interaction into deliberative problem-
solving”,18 and exert a real influence in the shape of final legislation that will be applicable in 
all Member States. On the other hand, the committees and expert groups are entrusted with 
the implementation of the final legislation at national and/or regional level. At EU level, the 
decision-making institutions and the Commission, have to design regulations for their 
decentralised application, while anticipating and overcoming difficulties in ensuring uniform 
implementation and compliance. 
 
The committee system can be characterised as a form of action through which the  
Union executes long-term policy goals. It is clear that the practical shape of the committee 
depends on the tasks associated with market integration; of course, these can change over 
time. As a result, the committee structure itself must remain supple and have a flexible 
internal structure that can meet the ever changing demands of performance capacity which the 
EU institutions place upon it. Finally,19 the committee system is, without doubt, a specific 
form of Union governance, or of market management, which carries enormous 
“constitutional” significance, what was already discussed in the Chapter “EU law and policy 
on participation in EU governance”.   
                                                 
17
 Gunther F. Schaefer (n 6) 3-38. 
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 C. Joerges and J. Neyer (1997), “Transforming Strategic Interaction into Deliberative Problem-solving: 
European Comitology in the Foodstuffs Sector” 4 JEPP, p. 609-625; C. Joerges and J. Neyer (1997), “From 
Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes: The Constitutionalization of Comitology” 
(1997: 278) 4 JEPP, p. 609 – 625; J. Neyer (1997), “Administrative Supranationalitat in der Verwaltung des 
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 C. Joerges (1999), “Bureaucratic Nightmare, Technocratic Regime and the Dream of Good Transnational 
Governance”, EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics, Christian Joerges and Ellen Vos (eds.), Hart 
Publishing: Oxford-Portland, p. 9. 
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And finally, the term “comitology” shall be defined, which is described as the 
structure being “transformed from a stage in a para-legislative process focused on the 
European Commission to a building block of networked deliberation – by diverse groups of 
experts concerned with concrete problems and responding to the interventions of a concerned 
public – found at nearly every stage in framework making and revision”.20 Comitology 
committees, possessing the power to review proposals for the Commission’s exercise of 
delegated regulatory powers provide a “good illustration of a new pattern in [EU] law, which 
is to give national agencies greater discretionary powers, but to combine this form of 
decentralisation with cooperation mechanisms designed to create a partnership among the 
national agencies, but also between the national agencies and the Commission”.21 
 
The definition of core elements and delegated functions of comitology committees 
would help in identifying the ways where committees can affect drafted decisions, in ways 
that non-committee decision-making processes cannot. As the core elements of committees 
are people and their outstanding knowledge and expertise, any form of specialised knowledge 
in shaping a policy and formulating binding rules shall be integrated in the EU decision-
making process. Institutionalised or organised form of external expertise shall meet the core 
criteria of a committee and be considered as the most important tool in helping EU politicians 
and civil servants. “Comitology was the response, allowing Member States a real input into 
the making of implementing measures, thereby exerting some control over the Commission 
and having an institutionalized forum through which to debate their contending views”.22 It 
shall be noted that the academic literature does not discern the origin of this expertise – it is 
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 Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin (2008), “Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of 
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 D. Geradin and P. Pettit (2004); The Development of Agencies at EU and National Levels: Conceptual 
Analysis and Proposals for Reform; Jean Monnet Working Paper 01/04 (NYU School of Law); 
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 Paul Craig (2012); EU Administrative Law, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, p. 137. 
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equally effective whether it needs to come from national representatives or external individual 
expertise. 
The further study will analyse which mechanisms and implemented tools comitology 
committees root their influence in.23  
 
3.3. POSITIONING OF COMITOLOGY COMMITTEES IN THE EUROPEAN 
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE.  
 
The Council has delegated certain implementation powers to the Commission to 
provide independent right of decision. However, some of the comitology committees, having 
stronger decision-making powers, are believed to distort the institutional balance of powers 
within the Community. The principle of institutional balance requires that each EU institution 
exercises its powers with due regard to the powers of the other institutions.24 As 
implementation powers are delegated to the Commission under the principle of institutional 
balance, national influence is no longer guaranteed. As Member States strive to restore their 
influence, they promote committees of national representatives within the  Union; 
consequently, the latter accommodates transnational governance structures.  
This analysis addresses merely the most significant stages in the development of both 
the rulemaking and comitology framework in EU, in order to lay the foundations for the 
analysis of external participation through the system of comitology thereafter.   
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 Thomas Gehring (1999); “Bargaining, Arguing and Functional Differentiation of Decision-making: the Role 
of Committees in European Environmental Process Regulation“, EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and 
Politics, Christian Joerges and Ellen Vos (eds.), Hart Publishing: Oxford-Portland, p.196. 
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 Case C-70/88 Parliament v. Council (Chernobyl) [1990] ECR I-2041. 
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3.3.1. Stages in the Historical Development of Comitology 
 
This presentation of the historical development of comitology will be divided into two 
parts – one will detail the historical development of rulemaking, while the second will analyse 
the evolution of the rules for the implementation of the relevant secondary legislation. 
 
3.3.1.1. Conferral of Powers.   
 
Over the last 60 years, the Treaties established a balance between the institutions and 
assigned specific roles and powers to each one. Though, the “delegation of implementing 
powers to the European Commission was not foreseen in the original Treaty of Rome in 
1957”,25 the “European Union relied to a large extent on the delegation of implementing 
powers to the European Commission”, by “setting up hundreds of committees to oversee the 
way that the Commission makes use of these powers”.26 The Council therefore held a 
monopoly over the elaboration and implementation of comitology. This was challenged by 
both the Commission and the Parliament; while the Commission considered comitology to 
impinge upon the independent exercise of its executive functions, the Parliament wanted to 
play a role in the comitology process.27 The latter issue will be discussed in more details in 
the next sub-chapter. 
Consequently, each of the institutions had to exercise its powers with due regard to the 
powers of the other institutions. Under Article 164 of the EEC Treaty the  CJEU had to be 
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 A. Hardacre and M. Kaeding (n 1)5. 
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able to maintain the institutional balance, which could be done by reviewing the prerogatives 
of the institutions by the means of appropriate legal remedies.  
According to the EC Treaty, the original law-making powers were vested in the 
Council, while the Commission only had powers of surveillance and implementation. 
However, the CJEU held that there was no basis in the EC Treaty provisions governing the 
institutions (Articles 189, 145, 155) for the view that all original law-making powers were 
vested in the Council.28  
The Commission is allowed to implement secondary measures, but it has to consult 
comitology committees in accordance with the procedures, deadlines and voting rules set out 
in the basic legislative instrument. In short, the Council gave the impetus for the system of 
comitology committees. The first time the CJEU officially recognised the existence of the 
comitology committee and acknowledged their functions in the EU decision-making process 
was in the Westzucker case.29 The CJEU held that one of the aims of the management 
committee procedure was to enable the Commission to prepare its implementing measures in 
close cooperation with the national authorities charged with the management of the rules 
concerned. Therefore it was normal that Member States should emphasize their interests 
within this framework. The Commission was to mediate in order to resolve the conflicts of 
interests and protect the general interest.  
Little by little, the EU institutions started to accept comitology committees as a 
constituent part of the system. However, the delegation of powers and independent 
responsibility for the implementation measures came only after years of proving their 
abilities. Indeed the know-how possessed by the comitology committees is not equalled by the 
EU institutions themselves due to high demand on technical and scientific data. 
                                                 
28
 Cases C-188-190/90 France, Italy and UK v. Commission [1982] ECR I-2545. 
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 Case C-57/72 Westzucker GmbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Zucker [1973] ECR 323. 
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Furthermore, the first legal provision giving a basis to comitology, - Article 202 of the 
EC Treaty, - also specified that the Council may impose “certain requirements” to be 
contained in the procedures laid down by the Council in advance. So the standard procedures, 
which governed the implementation power of the Commission and also the work of these 
committees, were known as the committee procedures decisions. Although article 202 of the 
EC Treaty was considered to be the main legal basis for comitology, they could be traced 
back to the Commission’s launched strategy “New Approach to Technical Harmonization and 
Standards”.30 The strategy mentioned only the harmonization of trade barriers, under Article 
36 of the EC Treaty, and limited itself to drafting legislative essential safety requirements and 
imposing technical standards, to be produced by the European standardisation bodies. To do 
so, a new instrument, which could accelerate the decision-making procedure, had to be 
introduced.31 Obviously, this could be achieved through the Commission, especially as it 
already had the necessary implementation powers, in other words – the Commission was 
responsible for the implementation of Union legislation.32 It only had to establish a committee 
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procedure.33 The genesis of comitology “was closely tied to the search of an ad hoc solution 
for the difficulty of regulating the economic and social life of the [Union] while relying 
exclusively on legislation”.34 
The question of interpretation is the most difficult one when it comes to the 
development of comitology committees: decisions were challenged in the CJEU to establish 
the range of considerations that committees were allowed to take into account. In the 
Zuckerfabrik Franken case,35 the Commission’s Regulation went beyond the wording of the 
basic Regulation, including in its area of application, products which were not mentioned in 
the basic Regulation. However, the CJEU ruled that the Commission was authorized to enact 
all the measures that were necessary or appropriate for the implementation of the basic 
Regulation. These measures cannot be contrary to the basic legislation or to the implemented 
legislation adopted by the Council, but they are expected to be justified only in the specific 
framework of the principles of a common organisation of the market.36 So, the  CJEU  
concluded that the Commission was authorized to interpret the provisions within the set 
limits, - as none of the Council Regulations contained a precise definition of these concepts – 
so long that it respected the legislative aim. The concept of detailed rules for the application 
of the basic Regulation had to be given a wide interpretation. Since the general rules for the 
implementation had been adopted by the Council, it followed that the Council intended to 
refer to the Commission the determination of all other implementation rules.37 
The CJEU held that the participation of the management committee in the decision-
making procedure was legitimate because the committees did not have any decision-making 
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powers of their own: in the end it is always the Commission or the Council that adopts the 
formal decision.38 On the other hand, the CJEU held that the basic elements of a particular 
area should be adopted according to a specific procedure contained in Article 37 of the EC 
Treaty, as only the exercise of executive competence can be delegated.39 
Once the Council laid down essential rules governing the matter in its basic 
Regulation, it could delegate general implementing powers to the Commission, without 
having to specify the essential components of the delegated power. Consequently, a provision 
drafted in general terms provided a sufficient basis for the Commission to act. 
Summarising the above analysis, the Commission has struggled through to strengthen 
its position among other institutions in the decision-making process. At the very beginning, 
the Council was vested with the right of law-making power, and the Commission only had 
implementation power. Over the years this position has evolved. Earlier on it was mentioned 
that the Commission could not oblige Member States to lay down the essential rules, which 
are not under the control of the Council. But the analysis has showed that as the Council can 
confer upon the Commission wide powers of discretion and action the Commission became 
empowered to do that.  
However, the procedure established in the EU Treaty had to be followed if the 
essential provisions in the legislative acts were being amended or repealed. When adopting 
implementation measures, it was enough for the Commission to get the delegated powers 
from the Council. It had to follow the concept of wide interpretation and not to interfere with 
the essential elements in the legislative acts. All the other measures were left to the 
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Commission. But in order to fulfil the delegated tasks, the Commission needed to follow the 
set rules and procedures. This issue will be analyzed in later three sub-chapters on legal 
background and the involvement of comitology committees into the decision-making 
procedure. It will analyse the new changes implemented by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
 
Additionally, the Commission wished to be less “hampered by comitology”40 in 
forming the legislative framework decisions. The temporary Committee of Inquiry into BSE 
has remarked in its report that “[by] virtue of opaqueness, complexity and anti-democratic 
nature of its workings, the existing system of comitology seems to be totally exempt from any 
supervision, thereby enabling national and/or industrial interests to infiltrate the [Union] 
decision-making process. The phenomenon is particularly serious where public health 
protection is at stake”.41 The Commission’s intention to have greater autonomy over 
secondary rules may be traced back to the Maastricht Treaty, where it aimed to propose a 
hierarchy of norms for the EU, with a distinction being drawn between primary laws and 
secondary acts.42 “The Commission’s mantra that implementation is a natural part of the 
executive function over which it should naturally have autonomy is premised ultimately on 
contentious assumptions about the meaning of those very concepts, implementation and 
executive function.”43 
The White Paper on European Governance proposes to reform the work of 
comitology, leaving only essential aspects of policy-making to the Council and the Parliament 
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on the one hand, while leaving all the details to the executive on the other. Despite the broad 
acknowledgment of “non-legislative” approaches and support of such innovations as 
framework directives, partnerships, greater participation by civil society in policy formation 
through “civil dialogue”, and wider use of the social dialogue, The White Paper on European 
Governance does not accept comitology in any detail by proposing a new approach to 
regulation enforced by independent regulatory agencies or through framework directives that 
would be implemented exclusively by the Commission.44 All preferred approaches either 
promote uniformity or give the Commission a central role in policy making by proposing a 
wide range of policy instruments, including EU regulations, and suggests that the 
Commission or regulatory bodies under its jurisdiction should enjoy responsibility for 
executing policy and legislation through the adoption of implementing measures.45 It proposes 
the abolition of regulatory and management committees.46 
 
This issue was also raised in the Working Group on Simplification:47 which proposed 
the simplification of some committee procedures, in particular, the procedure of regulatory 
committees. However, Member States were not willing to grant the necessary degree of power 
“to provide answers to the issues of practical and normative choice left outstanding by the 
primary regulation”.48 
Still the Commission has achieved its intentions to “dismantle the Comitology regime, 
at least insofar as it entailed management and regulatory committees”.49 This will be 
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discussed in more details in the sub-chapter on the new legal implementations introduced by 
the Treaty of Lisbon. 
 
3.3.1.1.1. First Comitology Decision. 
 
The First Comitology Decision was the first attempt to legalise the Council’s 
intentions to vest the powers of implementation of essential measures to the Commission. It 
was stipulated in Article 145 EEC that “the Council should confer on the Commission, in the 
acts adopted by the Council, powers for the implementation of the rules which the Council 
laid down, and that it could impose certain requirements in respect of the exercise of these 
powers”, unless the Council provided reasons as to why it should reserve specific 
implementing power to itself.50 
Before the adoption of the Council Decision 87/373/EEC,51 the EU institutions tried to 
resolve some of the procedural difficulties by introducing some challenges in the CJEU. At 
the beginning it was believed that the inclusion of comitology committees was contrary to the 
EC Treaty as this kind of body was not mentioned therein and might compromise the 
institutional balance.52 The CJEU decisions53 were the first steps towards the adoption of the 
original Comitology Decision. This Decision consolidated the three classical procedures 
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which had grown out of established Union practice, supervising the implementing powers 
delegated by the Council to the Commission by advisory, management and regulatory 
committees (the safeguard procedure was not often used), with the management and 
regulatory committee procedures being further subdivided into (a) and (b) versions.  
The advisory committee’s procedure is designed to give the Commission a possibility 
to consult a committee. Under the advisory procedure, the Council is not involved, as the 
Commission has the power to invite members of an advisory committee and take the utmost 
account of the committee’s decision, later it must inform the committee of the manner in 
which its opinion has been taken into account. In some cases the advisory committee 
procedure must be used when the management or regulatory committee procedures are not or 
are no longer considered appropriate. Therefore, the power of participating representatives is 
low and the opinion is not binding for the Commission.  
The management committee procedure is very similar to the advisory procedure, only 
the following differences could be identified. The management committee procedure is more 
complex: the Commission is obliged to invite representatives of Member States; the Council 
has more significant power, as in cases when the committee members do not provide an 
opinion, the Council is obliged to make a decision by a majority voting. However, in cases 
when neither management comitology committees, nor the Council can take a decision, the 
Commission is obliged to do that.   
The regulatory committee procedure is to be used for measures of general scope 
designed to apply, update or adapt essential provisions of the basic instruments. Regulatory 
and safeguard comitology committee procedures are very similar to the management ones. So, 
to conclude it is possible to state that in some cases, when the Council cannot take a decision 
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by majority, the Commission is delegated with significant power to do that. However, 
comitology committees do not possess such powers yet. 
 
3.3.1.2. Reaction of Other EU Institutions – Second Comitology Decision. 
 
The Parliament expressed concerns over the comitology regime early on. From the 
very beginning, the Parliament “had been very much on the side lines of the legislative 
process, with only a bare right to be consulted where the Treaty so provided”.54 The rise of 
comitology committees limited the Parliament’s capacity to control the Commission. The 
Commission and the Council could not ignore the Parliament anymore. “The TEU took the 
process further, with the creation of the co-decision procedure and this was followed by the 
expansion of the areas to which the procedure applied, coupled with modifications of the 
procedure so as to further strengthen the role of the European Parliament therein”.55 
Following a Declaration attached to the Amsterdam Treaty calling for a new 
comitology Decision, the Decision 87/373/EEC was replaced in 1999 by the Second 
Comitology Decision.56 This streamlined the comitology structure by reducing the types of 
committee to three: advisory, management and regulatory (the safeguard procedure was still 
in the legislation, but in practice it was not used), each of which was chaired by a 
Commission representative. The choice of procedure was laid down in the “basic instrument”, 
which referred to the primary EU legislation relating to the particular policy area in 
question.57 
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Advisory committee was essentially advisory by default. The Commission had the 
strongest power against Member States. Member States were often represented by experts in 
the particular field, who together delivered an opinion. Although the Commission was 
required to “take the utmost account of the opinion delivered by the committee” (Article 3) 
and inform the committee how this had been done, but it was not legally bound to follow the 
committee’s opinion. An advisory committee was more formal and better accepted in the EU 
decision-making process.58 Advisory committees in most cases consisted of civil servants, 
who specialized in specific policy and implementation areas. These civil servants usually did 
not have much decision-making power either at national level, or in the EU decision-making 
process. 
In the management committee procedure the Commission had more constraints. 
Member States were usually represented by civil servants, who again delivered an opinion on 
the Commission’s draft within an agreed time limit. If an opinion was positive (or not 
provided at all), the Commission could adopt the proposal. However, a management 
committee had the power to block the Commission’s proposal if a qualified majority so voted.  
Under the regulatory committee procedure, the Commission got the least power. 
Depending on the importance of the proposals, the regulatory committee was generally 
composed of top civil servants. Given the greater importance of the measures considered by 
these committees, the proposal had to be adopted by a qualified majority, after the European 
Parliament exercised its right of scrutiny. If it could not muster a majority, the Commission 
was required to submit immediately to the Council a proposal relating to the measures to be 
taken, and to inform the Parliament (if it fell under the co-decision procedure). If the 
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Parliament considered the measure ultra vires and if the basic instrument was subject to co-
decision, the Commission needed to inform the Council of the position.  
The Second Comitology Decision showed that the Commission still retained 
significant powers in the decision-making process. In light of the comitology committee 
procedures adumbrated above, it was possible to argue that the established committees helped 
the Commission in taking the final decision, but did not implement the drafted measures 
independently; in fact, powers of implementation were not normally given to established 
committees: the legislation merely indicated that the Commission ought to be assisted by a 
committee composed of representatives of Member States. However, with the regulatory 
committee procedures the Commission had to take into account the opinion of committee 
members. Gaining more power, the national representatives could block the draft decision, 
which meant the extension of the procedure for an indefinite period. The Commission, for its 
part, tried to find the best solution to help speed the process up. It checked the “temperature” 
in Member States in order to prepare different scenarios for final adoption. However, if the 
decision was not taken by a qualified majority in a comitology committee, the Council had 
four options to deal with it and in extreme cases, after following all the regulated procedures 
the final decision might be taken by the Commission. Again, the power of decision if the 
relevant institutions could not agree on the draft was left with the Commission. 
 
3.3.1.3. Transparency and Information on Comitology – Third Comitology Decision. 
 
The Second Comitology Decision was not long-lived. After three years the 
Commission adopted the Council Decision 2006/512/EC.59 The Third Comitology Decision 
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introduced “a new type of procedure for the exercise of implementing powers, the regulatory 
procedure with scrutiny, which allow[ed] the legislator to oppose the adoption of draft 
measures where it indicat[ed] that the draft exceed[ed] the implementing powers provided for 
in the basic instrument, or that the draft [was] incompatible with the aim or the content of that 
instrument or fail[ed] to respect the principles of subsidiarity or proportionality”.60  
The inclusion of a new procedure enabled the legislator, in the context of the existing 
EC Treaty, to provide a horizontal and satisfactory solution to the Parliament’s wish to 
scrutinise the adoption of “quasi-legislative”61 measures implementing an instrument adopted 
by co-decision.62 Additionally, the Third Comitology Decision was designed to improve 
information transmission to the Parliament by providing that the Commission informed on a 
regular basis of committee proceedings, especially in the framework of the Regulatory 
Procedure with Scrutiny; transmitted documents related to activities of committees; and 
whenever it transmitted the Council measures or proposals for measures to be taken. 
The procedures under the Regulatory Procedure with Scrutiny were similar to 
regulatory committee’s procedures; however, the decision-making process was much more 
scrutinized. This procedure was used in cases, where measures of general scope were 
                                                 
60
 ibis preamble § 2. 
61
 “Under this procedure, all draft implementing measures will go through a Committee stage and then a 
supervisory stage in which they are sent to both the European Parliament and the Council. If either institution 
objects to the draft, the Commission must present a legislative proposal, present a new draft, possibly modified 
in which case the procedure begins again or withdraw its draft measures. The powers of the main institutions are 
also changing under the new quasi–legislative procedure: the Council will not be able to adopt the measures 
itself and the Parliament will not be able to object to implementing measures on ultra vires grounds. The 
Commission gains more power – immediate adoption and application of implementing measures on grounds of 
urgency is allowed, with a right of objection from the both legislative branches”. “Proposed elements of a 
Revised Council Decision Laying down the Procedures for the Exercise of Implementing Powers”, intended to 
the Friends of Presidency (Comitology) Working Group from the Council of the European Union [2005] No. 
15334/05. 
62
 Statement by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission concerning the Council Decision of 
17 July 2006 amending Decision 1999/468/EC laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing 
powers conferred on the Commission (2006/512/EC) [2006] OJ C255/01. 
 71 
designed to amend non-essential elements of a basic instrument adopted in accordance with 
procedures referred to in Article 251 EC Treaty.63 
It stipulated that if the Commission could not find a consensus with the committee, the 
drafted measures had to go to the Council, which decided if they could be adopted the way 
they were drafted. If the Council envisaged the proposed measures, they still needed to be 
verified by the Parliament. The procedures also let the Commission adopt the measures 
without an opinion from the committees or reactions from the legislature.64 The executive 
responsibilities of the Commission under the new Regulatory Procedure of Scrutiny, allowed 
dealing with the objections from the Parliament or the Council. This did not exclude the 
Commission’s consultation of committees made up of Member States’ representatives who 
were experts on the matters in question.65 
In cases of urgency regarding health protection, safety or environmental issues, the 
Commission in accordance with the opinion of the Committee could adopt the measures and 
implement them immediately, respectively communicating the implemented measures to the 
Council and the Parliament. If the two institutions opposed the measures, the Commission 
needed to repeal them, replacing the provisional measures only when that definite instrument 
came into force.66 
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To summarise, the Third Comitology Decision was implemented in order to focus on 
advisory procedure “whenever the executive measures have an individual scope or concern in 
the procedural arrangements for implementing basic instruments”67 and regulatory procedure 
“whenever the executive measures are designed to implement fully the essential aspects of the 
basic instrument or adapt certain other aspects of it.”68 There was no management procedure 
left in the amended version.  
The implemented Procedure with Scrutiny did not provide much delegated powers to 
comitology committees. To look at it from the perspective of comitology committees, only in 
cases when the Parliament opposed the drafted measures, “the Commission need[ed] to 
submit the Committee an amended draft of the measures or present a legislative proposal on 
the basis of the Treaty”.69 In other cases, the Commission was allowed to act on its own 
discretion within the delegated powers. 
 
3.3.1.4. Modus Vivendi Right extended into the Right of Scrutiny.  
 
The First Comitology Decision failed to resolve a brewing controversy between the 
Union institutions. In particular the Commission and the Parliament were upset to see the 
regulatory committee procedure (especially in its contre-filet variant) included in the Decision 
notwithstanding their vehement protests. Subsequent to its unsuccessful attempt to attack the 
validity of the Comitology Decision before the CJEU,70 the Parliament formally requested the 
Commission to be informed of all Commission proposals submitted to advisory, management 
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or regulatory committees, which resulted in the adoption of the “Plumb-Delors” agreement.71 
Although its initial judicial and political campaign against the regulatory committee procedure 
had failed, the Parliament was soon supplied with an opportunity to oppose the use of 
regulatory committee procedures. Once legislative powers were granted with the co-decision 
procedure (compulsory for inter-alia Community acts under Article 100a EC) by the Treaty 
of Maastricht,72 the Parliament argued that Article 145 paragraph 3 of EC Treaty did not 
apply to measures adopted jointly by the Parliament and the Council, but only to acts derived 
solely from the Council.73 The Council was finally forced to negotiate with the Commission 
and Parliament, which resulted in the conclusion of a modus vivendi in December 1994.74 
Under this modus vivendi, the Commission is obliged to forward copies of draft measures sent 
to comitology committees to the appropriate parliamentary committee. The modus vivendi 
contains one important additional element: the Council is obliged to consult the Parliament 
should a committee fail to reach an agreement, and the Commission is forced to refer a 
proposal to the Council.  
 
Consequently, the Bilateral Agreement establishes different role for the European 
Parliament.75 Firstly, it organises a right of information, which guarantees:  
1) receiving, at the same time as the members of the committees and on the same terms, the 
draft agendas for committee meetings, the draft implementing measures submitted to the 
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committees under basic instruments (Article 251 of the EC Treaty), voting results and 
summary records of the meetings and lists of the authorities to which the persons 
designated by Member States to represent them belong (point 1); 
2) forwarding information, at the request of the relevant parliamentary committee, specific 
draft measures for implementing basic instruments.  
 
The right under the modus vivendi was suspended, but instead the Parliament was 
guaranteed the right of scrutiny pursuant to Article 8 of Decision 1999/468/EC. Accordingly,  
before formal adoption of the draft measures for implementing a basic instrument, the 
European Parliament may indicate in a resolution within a month from receiving the final 
draft, that a basic instrument adopted under the procedure provided by Article 251 of the EC 
Treaty exceeds the implementing powers provided for in that basic instrument. In this case the 
Commission needs to re-examine the draft measures and to inform the European Parliament 
of the action it intends to take.  
The right of the Parliament was limited to the possibility of checking the drafts, where 
the Commission exceeded its delegated powers.  
The Third Comitology Decision – the Council Decision 2006/512/EC76 clearly 
regulated the Parliament’s right to scrutinize the adoption of “quasi-legislative” measures 
implementing an instrument adopted by co-decision. It meant that whenever the Commission 
consulted comitology committees, especially in cases where the measures of general scope 
sought to amend non-essential elements of a basic instrument, it needed to submit the drafted 
measures to the Council and the Parliament for scrutiny.  
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The right of scrutiny has been retained to the Parliament and now also the Council in 
the new Implementing Acts Regulation No. 182/2011. “Where a basic act is adopted under 
the ordinary legislative procedure, either the European Parliament or the Council may at any 
time indicate to the Commission that, in its view, a draft implementing act exceeds the 
implementing powers provided for in the basic act“ under the right of scrutiny.77 Either 
legislator may pass a non-binding resolution, which confirm a „limited (but not to be 
neglected) right of scrutiny“.78 Though all the efforts to enhance its own role in the new 
comitology system (demands had included observer status, a right of opposition, full access to 
information, including on voting behaviour, and a case-by-case alignment of the acquis)79 
have been declined due to the lack of „insight and will to engage into crucial aspects of the 
comitology file, leaving the Commission and member states to determine the outcome to a 
large extent“.80 
 
3.3.1.5. Involvement of External Expertise. 
 
This part aims to analyse the strengthened competencies of the Commission in the 
Treaty of Lisbon and its consequences for the institutional structure of EU. The Commission 
is granted the right of initiative, the responsibility for the implementation of EU policy, of 
Council laws and regulations for the budget.81 The new Treaty also increases the delegated 
powers of the Commission with the creation of two new legal instruments: delegated and 
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implementing acts.82 There is an intention that the two resulting acts are mutually exclusive 
and have different legal names. However, the TFEU does not clearly differentiate the two 
categories of acts nor provide a clear guidance on when either instrument ought to be applied. 
It seems that “the provisions on delegated acts are clearly formulated in terms of scope and 
consequences while the implementing acts article is defined on the basis of the rationale 
behind it, i.e. the necessity for uniform conditions to apply”.83 So the institutions are likely to 
argue over undefined terms in Articles 290 TFEU and 291 TFEU, and the CJEU will be the 
one called upon to adjudicate on the appropriate classification of a proposed use of delegated 
authority.84 
 
3.3.1.5.1. Delegated Acts. 
 
Article 290 TFEU “allows the legislator to delegate to the Commission the power to 
adopt non-legislative acts of general application to supplement or amend certain non-essential 
elements of a legislative act”. It is referred to in the terminology as “delegated acts” (Article 
290 paragraph 3).85 The set criteria are cumulative – if either of these conditions is not met, 
this Article may not be applied.86 “This provision does not require the adoption of any binding 
instrument of secondary legislation to ensure its implementation; it is sufficient in itself and 
contains all the elements required by the legislator for defining, case by case, the scope, 
content and practical arrangements for delegating power”.87 And the CJEU remains 
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competent on the basis of Article 263 TFEU to deal with any violation of the conditions 
established in the decision to delegate. 
 
3.3.1.5.1.1. Definition of “delegated acts”. 
 
It is interesting to note that in the Constitutional Treaty “delegated acts” (non-
legislative acts of general application) had been called “delegated regulations”. It may be just 
a semantic change, though some authors do not “exclude the likelihood that some delegated 
acts will be quasi-legislative in nature”.88 Or it may be the case, which was already discussed 
in the Chapter “EU law and policy on participation in EU governance”, that “non-legislative” 
acts may simply refer to the defined instruments, which do not meet the definition of a 
legislative act, set in Article 288 and Article 289 paragraph 3 TFEU. 
“Such non-legislative acts can supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of 
the legislative act, but the legislative act must define the objectives, content, scope, and 
duration of the delegation of power”.89 The Treaty of Lisbon also lays down the limits of 
delegation providing that delegated power cannot affect the essential elements of the 
legislative acts90 as well as the Commission may never adopt a delegated act relating to a 
measure of an individual nature.91 The CJEU has already defined the term “essential elements 
of the legislative acts” as entailing “provisions which are intended to give concrete shape to 
the fundamental guidelines of [Union] policy”.92 
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“Delegated” acts “would flesh out the detail or amend certain elements of a legislative 
act, under some form of authorisation defined by the legislator. This would be in cases where 
the legislator felt that essential elements in an area, as defined by it, necessitated legislative 
development which could be delegated, although such delegation would be subject to limits 
and to control mechanism to be determined by the legislator itself in the legislative act”.93 
However, Article 290 does not contain any provision referring to the procedure by which the 
Commission adopts a delegated act.94 It shall be noted that the “powers delegated may range 
from rules on the technical and detailed elements which develop a legislative act, to the 
subsequent amendment of certain aspects of the legislative act itself”.95 So, it is one of the 
major innovations implemented by the Treaty of Lisbon that the “legislator is free to set the 
objectives, scope, duration and the conditions to which the delegation is subject in each and 
every legislative act”.96 It is believed that delegated acts “will be subject to more 
interinstitutional discussions much earlier in the legislative process given that the objectives, 
scope, duration and the conditions to which the delegation is subject can change in every 
legislative act”.97  
This category of legislation has been created to deal with sensitive matters where the 
legislators are granting extra powers to the Commission for the sake of speed and efficiency, 
getting extra control in return.98 Even though the definition of the delegated acts is very 
similar to the Regulatory Procedure with Scrutiny, which was introduced by the Decision 
2006/512/EC,99 the scope of the delegated acts as well as other important details are not 
identical. The Commission has strictly highlighted that “the similarity of the criteria does not 
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mean that they will be implemented in exactly the same way” and any automatic duplication 
shall be avoided.100 Despite the terminological similarities between the Regulatory Procedure 
with Scrutiny and Article 290 TFEU delegated authority, the overall use of the Regulatory 
Procedure with Scrutiny is influential on the implementation of Article 290 TFEU.101 
However, there are also some distinctions between the two. The 2006 Comitology Decision 
only implemented the right of opposition for “all or nothing – the European Parliament or the 
Council had to oppose the entire Commission proposal for delegated authority, even if only 
an aspect of the proposal was considered objectionable”,102 while Article 290 TFEU also 
includes a power to revoke the delegation.  
 
3.3.1.5.1.2. Conditions on “delegated acts”. 
 
Though, the freedom to set “the objectives, content, scope and duration”103 and “the 
conditions to which the delegation is subject”104 shall be “explicitly defined”. Legislators have 
also insisted on the delegation of powers to the Commission to be clear, precise and detailed.  
Conditions on “delegated acts” also cover the established “control mechanism” at the 
legislator’s disposal. Article 290 TFEU specifies “the two conditions to which the legislator 
may subject the delegation of power: firstly, the right to revoke the delegation of power, and 
secondly the right to express objections, that is the right of opposition”.105 This would mean 
that the Council and the Parliament have the power to object to an individual delegated act on 
any grounds whatsoever (the right of objection or the ex ante control) or the right to revoke 
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the delegation altogether (the ex post control).106  It is believed107 that the ex ante control will 
be difficult for the Council and the Parliament to monitor and enforce. It may be due to the 
fact that they may lack the knowledge and the time for the exercise of regulatory choices. The 
ex post control, - the revocation of delegation – might be useful as an ultimate weapon, 
though the veto power is crucially dependent on understanding the relevant measure.108 If the 
Parliament and the Council lack the knowledge on the issue, they will prevent the entry of the 
delegated act into force without being able to propose an amendment. The Council “clearly 
has neither the time nor expertise to perform this task unaided”.109 The Parliament may 
develop such expertise by creating more advisory committees to get information on the issue 
without relying on informational resources coming from comitology committees as there will 
not be any. Both the institutions may consult advisory committees, which will operate in an 
informal way between the major institutional bodies. 
Though, the specified controls are not mandatory, and they will only operate if they 
are written into the legislative act.110 Pursuant to the legislation, the list seems to be an 
exhaustive one, and the Commission may only include the two rights in its legislative 
proposals for the basic legislative acts.111 The two rights of much greater control were granted 
after the requirement to obtain an opinion for the Commission was abolished and a system of 
a comitology committee was eliminated.  
Though, in “theory, nothing in Article 290 TFEU forbids the use of comitology as a 
form of control mechanism”.112 However, “Article 290 TFEU makes no mention of such 
committees and because the Comitology procedures would create an imbalance between the 
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Council and the European Parliament within Article 290, which is formally, built on 
institutional parity between the two bodies in relation to control over delegated acts”.113 For 
the time being, Member States have clearly refused to use comitology under Article 290 
TFEU. The Council and the Parliament require the Commission to make use of expert 
advisory committees, a recommendation with which the Commission is almost certain to 
comply.114 
One more issue shall be noted regarding the implementation of Article 290 TFEU – is 
the right of scrutiny for the Council and the Parliament that is not expressly mentioned in the 
text of the TFEU, though it stemmed from the principle of transparency implemented in 
Article 15 TFEU.115 It seems that the present wording of the legislation and the formal 
positions of the institutions on implementation of the Article 290 TFEU contemplates only the 
use of ex post control based on the right of revocation. Though the right of scrutiny is 
expressly implemented in the Implementing Acts Regulation116 under Article 291 TFEU, 
which enables both legislators, the Parliament and the Council to pass a non-binding 
resolution whenever it is believed that the Commission has exceeded the implemented powers 
provided for in the basic act. 
 
So far, only the delegation of powers between the EU institutions has been presented. 
There is nothing referring directly or indirectly to external participation or representation. 
However, the Commission has expressed its intention to consult systematically experts from 
the national authorities of all Member States where preparatory work requires any new 
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expertise.117 As soon as the provisions are set in a legislative text, the relevant expert group(s) 
needs to be established to assist the Commission in drafting the delegated acts.118 The 
preparatory work is intended to be carried out in order to ensure, “first, that from a technical 
and legal point of view the delegated acts comply fully with the objectives laid down by the 
basic instrument and, second, that from a political and institutional point of view everything 
possible is done to avoid any objections being made by Parliament or Council”.119 The 
Commission may also form new expert groups by making it public via the register of expert 
groups or conduct any research, analysis, hearings and consultations required.120 Though, it 
shall be made clear that these experts will have only a consultative rather than institutional 
role in the decision-making procedure. 
The Commission’s intention to consult national experts have raised contentions, as a 
majority of Member States in the Council wanted the inclusion of a recital stating the 
obligation to consult national experts in the preparation of delegated acts.121 The Commission 
considered it inadequate, as, “first, it would give the impression that the Council was trying to 
introduce comitology through the backdoor by adding a formal deliberating stage with 
national experts before the submission of the delegated act, and, second, not all delegated acts 
might actually require expert input in the preparation stage”.122 The Parliament could have 
consented to this recital if its own experts were also included. In the end, the word “national” 
was deleted from the contentious recital, implying that any expert could be consulted. 
Though, in practice it seems still to give rise to some discrepancies, as “when the Commission 
adopted its first delegated acts on the regulation concerning energy efficiency labeling, a row 
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between Council and Commission erupted, because the Commission had consulted national 
experts together with other experts. A number of Member States in the Council reacted by 
stating that the Commission should invite member state experts separately and after they 
consulted other experts”.123 The more detailed analysis on the disaggregation of the 
representatives of Member States that serve on the committees from those who are involved 
in the Council’s activities will be provided in the next part of the Chapter. 
Officially there is a legal basis for the Commission to invite external experts whenever 
there is a need for an expert input in the preparation phase, though it seems that there is a lack 
of trust from the Council “in delegating powers to the Commission without the control 
member states used to have under the old comitology rules”.124 Even though the old 
comitology committees have been abolished, in some policy areas new agencies were created 
“to accord the Member States significant decisional autonomy on such bodies”, where 
“Member States dominate the organizational structure of these authorities”.125 
 
3.3.1.5.2. Implementing Acts. 
 
Member States are primarily responsible for adopting the necessary measures of 
national law to implement legally binding EU acts,126 if, the competence is delegated to the 
EU institutions.127 Implementing acts are of general application. If there is a need for 
“uniform conditions”,128 the Commission is authorised to adopt implementing acts, but 
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subject to overall control by Member States.129 Article 291 TFEU designates the power for 
the Commission to implement the legislative acts, which “are presumably intended for 
technical measures that are considered necessary for giving effect to “legally binding Union 
acts”.130 The granted power is purely executive and the intervention of the Commission is not 
optional but compulsory.131 
As it was already identified, the control has to be exercised by Member States, and 
that neither the Council nor the Parliament are conferred a direct role on the comitology 
committees.132 Though, both legislative bodies may have access to information about the 
process. Article 291 paragraph 3 TFEU does not stipulate any legal provision providing a role 
for the Parliament and the Council to control the Commission’s exercise of implementing 
powers. Such control can only be implemented by Member States and the rules and general 
principles concerning mechanisms for such control shall be laid down in advance. The 
exercise of control is implemented by representatives of Member States serving on the new 
comitology committees.  
The new Regulation separates the representatives of Member States on comitology 
committees from those on the Council. This approach differs from the one under the previous 
comitology regulation. It is not yet clear how this separation will work out in practice, though 
it is assumed that “the ministers that represent the Member States on the Council may well 
take a keen interest in the appointees from their respective states that serve on the new 
Comitology committees”.133 Usually working parties in the Council “consist mainly of civil 
servants representing the Member States but in many cases a Member State is not represented 
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by only one person but by several, although only one person is allowed to be the 
spokesperson for his or her country. Usually at least two persons are present per Member 
State – one from the permanent representation and one from the relevant ministry – but it is 
also common to find civil servants present from other administrative bodies in the Member 
States, such as agencies and regional and local government”.134 Additionally, it shall be noted 
that some Member States may ask a person from the permanent representation also to be 
present during the comitology committee meetings on the issue and report back the outcome. 
This person is usually provided with all the relevant information and is required to send back 
a detailed report after the meeting takes place. Again, it proves that the separation of the 
representatives of the two committees is not easily made. It is admitted135 that the very same 
person can be present in expert groups, comitology committees and working parties, which is 
especially true with smaller Member States. 
“Thus, it is difficult to believe that Member State representatives in the Council will 
not discuss, brief, and consult their representatives on the Comitology committees on the 
policy position that should be taken on important implementing acts”.136 Most often the 
results of committee voting are mirrored the voting on the Council. It might be the reason, 
why some of Member States in the Council reacted on the Commission’s decision to consult 
national experts together with other experts instead of inviting national experts separately and 
after the external consultation. The Council aims to withstand the impact on the drafting of a 
legislative act as it used to be under the old comitology regime. 
With regard to the implementation of Article 291 TFEU, a regulation of the Council 
and the Parliament is required to be implemented in order to lay down the new comitology 
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procedures. The new Regulation was published in the Official Journal on 28 February 
2011.137 The new procedures, laid out in the new Regulation, will be analysed in a separate 
sub-chapter on “Fourth Comitology Regulation” later in the text. 
 
In conclusion, it shall be noted that there are difficulties in the division of the two 
types of acts – delegated and implementing ones, - since very different controls apply. “The 
rationale for the divide was to distinguish between secondary measures that were “legislative” 
in nature, delegated acts, and those that could be regarded as more purely “executive”, 
implementing acts”.138 The Commission suggests139 that the key distinguishing feature is that 
implementing acts execute the legislative act without amendment or supplementation. This 
explanation seems to constrain the division of the application of the two.  
For example, if the Council and the Parliament decide that a secondary measure does 
not supplement the legislative act by adding any “new” non-essential element - Article 291 
can be used. Though, “they might in other instances find that the relevant article in the 
legislative act is less definitive, the conclusion being that while it has provided sufficient 
guide as to essential principles, the secondary measure has nonetheless supplemented it by the 
addition of “new” non-essential elements, the conclusion being that Article 290 must be 
used”.140 The division of the delegated and implementing acts as well as the normative 
foundation for the differential controls is not clear. There is also another issue to be tackled in 
this case – the “time problem”. Based on the implemented procedures, it is not possible to 
tackle whether a secondary measure falls into the category of delegated or implementing acts 
until it is made. It is due to the legal provision, allowing “until the committee delivers an 
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opinion, any committee member may suggest amendments and the chair may present 
amended versions of the draft implementing act“.141 “This may take the measure from the 
category of delegated to implementing act, or vice versa“.142 There is also a risk that the EU 
institutions may be tempted to categorize secondary measures under a certain type in order to 
maximize their control. The Council may seek to categorize the measures as implementing 
acts, due to the fact that the representatives of Member States have an opportunity for formal 
and detailed input into the making of the measure on comitology committees. The Parliament 
may press for more measures to be included within the category of delegated acts, as this legal 
provision contains the veto power.143 
As for external participation, such legal provisions will create a number of various 
advisory committees by the Council and most probably by the Parliament pursuant to Article 
290, „in order to enable the institutions to decide whether they should exercise their veto 
power, and there is no formal mechanism for such committees to be known or listed“.144 It 
shall be noted that those committees and their membership will be distinct from the ones 
created under Article 291 TFEU. 
 
3.3.1.5.3. Fourth Comitology Regulation. 
 
Implementation of Article 291 TFEU required a regulation to lay down the new 
comitology procedures. The new Implementing Acts Regulation145 came into force on 1 
March 2011. The previously established committees remain in place though only two 
procedures are left to be operated under. Pursuant to Article 4, advisory procedure has been 
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retained in exactly the same form as it was used in the previous Comitology legislation – it is 
to be used except when the examination procedure is mandated. Though, the management and 
regulatory procedures were abolished. Instead, a new examination procedure was introduced 
(Article 5). The Regulatory Procedure with Scrutiny has been replaced by Article 290 TFEU, 
and was discussed in the sub-chapter “Delegated Acts”.  
The common provisions, implemented in Article 3, are applied to both – advisory and 
examination procedures. The Commission continues to be assisted “by a committee composed 
of representatives of the Member States [...] and chaired by a representative of the 
Commission“.146 The Fourth Comitology Regulation proposes a possibility to implement acts 
within a comitology committee, empowering „any committee member [to] suggest 
amendments and the chair [present] amended versions of the draft implementing act [...] [and] 
inform the committee of the manner in which the discussions and suggestions for 
amendments have been taken into account“.147 The same possibility is also implemented in 
the appeal procedure: „until an opinion is delivered, any member of the appeal committee 
may suggest amendments to the draft implementing act and the chair may decide whether or 
not to modify it“.148 This procedure increases the powers of the representatives of Member 
States in comitology committees as they can amend the proposed implementing acts until the 
final opinion is delivered.149 
The advisory procedure shall be used for all other implementing measures, except 
those measures with general scope and with a potentially great impact (for those measures the 
examination procedure shall be used). Under the advisory procedure, the Commission is free 
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to decide whether or not to carry out the proposed measure, but must "take the utmost 
account" of the committee's opinion before deciding. 
The examination procedure is applied for the adoption of implementing acts of general 
scope and other implementing acts, in particular, relating to programs with substantial 
implications; the common agricultural and common fisheries policies; the environment, 
security and safety, or protection of the health or safety, of humans, animals or plants; the 
common commercial policy; and taxation.150 Although this Regulation is enacted for 
implementation of Article 291 TFEU, the definition of “implementing measures of general 
scope” may cause some misunderstandings, as Article 290 TFEU implements the power to the 
Commission to adopt “non-legislative acts of general application”.151 The TFEU implements 
two separate procedures under the separate legal provisions, so it may be confusing as the 
formula bears very close similarities.   
The voting system of the examination procedure is also left the same as the old 
regulatory procedure. The Commission needs to get a qualified majority to be able to adopt 
the Implementing Act, as it is implemented in Article 16 paragraph 4 TEU.152 There are two 
possible cases – if the Committee adopts a positive opinion or delivers “no opinion” (the 
committee is not able to get a qualified majority for or against), the Commission is able to 
adopt the implementing act, unless “that act concerns taxation, financial services, the 
protection of the health or safety of humans, animals or plants, or definitive multilateral 
safeguard measures; the basic act provides that the draft implementing act may not be adopted 
when no opinion is delivered or when a simple majority of the committee members opposes 
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it”.153 In the listed cases the Commission may either reconsider and resubmit a modified draft 
implementing act to the same committee or forward it to the appeal committee for further 
deliberation. The same constraints will be applied if the Committee delivers a negative 
opinion.154  
The Commission’s flexibility may also be constrained by the right of scrutiny granted 
to the Parliament and now the Council,155 which enables to pass a non-binding resolution, if 
either of the legislators believes that “a draft implementing act exceeds the implementing 
powers provided for in the basic act”. 
The appeal committee156 is a new creation in the Implementing Acts Regulation. The 
same provisions on the membership of the committee shall be applied – it shall have one 
representative from each Member State and the committee shall be chaired by the 
Commission.157 It is empowered to vote changes, to accept the text or to reject the amended 
draft implementing act.  It is believed that “referral to the Council has been replaced by an 
Appeal Committee that is the Council in everything but name”.158 It is believed159 “to be a 
replica of COREPER, but chaired by the Commission”. The Appeal Committee was created 
for the Council to have a political body for controversial or sensitive issues.160 
Those are the two main new procedures, though the Regulation has also implemented 
two other possibilities – for exceptional cases (Article 7) and immediately applicable 
implementing acts (“urgency procedure”) (Article 8). If there is a risk of creating a significant 
disruption of the markets in the area of agriculture or a risk for the financial interests, the 
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Commission is allowed to adopt a draft implementing act where it needs to be adopted 
without delay, though it must be immediately submitted to the Appeal Committee to find a 
qualified majority. The immediately implementing acts shall be adopted “on duly justified 
imperative grounds of urgency”. Implementing acts, adopted under Article 8, shall remain in 
force for a period not exceeding six months.  
 
3.3.2. Differences between Comitology secondary legislation. 
 
The aim of this sub-chapter is to highlight the biggest changes and explain why they 
were applied during the evolution of the Comitology secondary legislation. The analysis 
shows the main differences between the enacted legal acts and what the end results are. 
Overall new Implementing Acts Regulation have simplified “the use of comitology by 
providing for a standard comitology system with two exceptions for implementing measures 
of general scope and measures that require urgent application”.161  
 
• The retained and new procedures. The Commission has retained the advisory procedure 
unaffected, though the other two procedures – management and regulatory – were 
replaced by an examination procedure. The safeguard procedure, even though it was still 
left in the Third Comitology Decision, was not believed to be functioning. It was mainly 
initiated for the temporary measures to be adopted in relation to emergency situations 
endangering human health and safety.162 The safeguard procedure was replaced by the 
regulatory procedure with scrutiny, which implemented additional measures regarding 
urgent matters of health protection, safety or environmental issues. The new Implementing 
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Acts Regulation has completely abolished the safeguard procedure, as it also establishes 
Immediately Applicable Measures, which may be adopted “on duly justified imperative 
grounds of urgency”. The new instrument with scrutiny, which was implemented by the 
Third Comitology Decision, will continue to exist as a procedure in committees, albeit one 
that will be removed by the end of 2014.163  
• Standardisation of Rules of Procedure. The Second Comitology Decision stipulated that 
each committee shall adopt its own rules of procedure on the basis of Standard Rules of 
Procedure, which shall be published in the Official Journal. Having regard to Regulation 
No 182/2011, and in particular Article 9 paragraph 1 thereof, the already existing 
committees shall adapt their rules of procedure to the standard ones.164 The individual 
rules of procedure shall be adopted by a simple majority, on a proposal from the chair of 
the committee. Where necessary, existing committees must adapt their rules of procedure 
to the new standard rules.165 The standardisation of this procedure was done by leaving a 
wide interpretation power in this area and allowing the committees to apply different 
procedures. It brought both freedom and confusion when following the activities of 
committees, as they were allowed to change or exclude some of the provisions. Even so, 
the standard rules aim to harmonize the procedures, ensuring that the proposals will be 
discussed and accepted/rejected in the same way in all committees. The accepted rules of 
procedure have to be strictly followed. However, the Standard rules of procedure also give 
some freedom in regulating some of the procedures (for example, working languages in a 
committee).  
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• The obtained powers of the Parliament and the Council. The Parliament has also “called 
for a right of objection for both Council and the Parliament that would be binding on the 
Commission”.166 The Parliament did not get a role in the new Implementing Acts 
Regulation as well as no binding right of objection except a non-binding right of scrutiny.  
This right was retained by Parliament and now is extended to the Council (Article 11) 
either legislator can adopt a non binding resolution at any time if it believes that the draft 
Implementing Act exceeds the implementing powers provided for in the basic act.167 In 
such a case, the Commission will review the draft measure in question and will explain to 
the European Parliament and the Council what it intends to do.168 
• European Parliament’s “droit de regard”. Before the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the Parliament was also demanding an observer status in the committees, full 
information on voting behaviour of Member States, and a case-by-case alignment of the 
acquis.169 The Parliament did not get the observer status. “Article 291 of the Treaty 
provides that the Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall lay down in advance the rules 
and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the 
Commission's exercise of implementing powers”.170 It means that with regard to 
implementing acts, Member States controlled the Commission, not the Council or the 
Parliament. The Parliament has also lost its droit de regard provided for in Article 10 of 
the Implementing Acts Regulation, which the Commission names as “incompatible with 
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Article 291”.171 It means that the legislators do not have the power to suspend the 
decision-making process based on the right of information, granted by Article 10. 
• External participation is still not regulated. In all the committee procedures it is specified 
that the Commission is assisted by committees of Member States representatives, but 
there is no reference to participation by external participants. Also the Decisions fail to lay 
down provisions on the openness of committee activities. Greater transparency could be 
ensured by the publication of the dates of the meetings and agenda, as well as the 
committee members, whilst open (“enlarged”) meetings could be organised with 
interested parties.172 
• Comitology implementation measures. As far as transparency is concerned, the 
Comitology Decision II lists and the Comitology Regulation IV retains a number of 
instruments: a continued use of the existing Register of Comitology of the European 
Commission (Article 10); a list of all committees, assisting the Commission with its 
implementation task (Article 10 (1a)); an annual report on the working of committees 
(Article 10 (2)). The Commission has also aimed to maintain a commitment to 
transparency by extending Article 15 of the TFEU transparency rights to comitology 
proceedings.173 The commitment to transparency shall be governed by the principles and 
conditions on public access to documents and the rules on data protection applicable to the 
Commission implemented by the Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001.174  The same rules and 
principles shall be applied to comitology committees.  
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3.4. IMPLEMENTATION OF SUPPORTING MEASURES FOR COMITOLOGY 
COMMITTEES.  
 
There is a clear need for more transparency and access to committee documents. 
Furthermore, the manner in which committees are composed and/or operate often depends 
solely on the “goodwill” of the EU institutions, and in particular upon that of the Commission 
which possesses the administrative leeway to disrupt committee activities.175 
In order to implement successfully all the planned executive powers, the EU 
institutions need also to implement a number of supporting measures. One instrument, 
introduced in the Second Comitology Decision and retained in the later secondary comitology 
legislation, is the Comitology Register.176 This should help follow the flow of information 
between MEPs, Commission civil servants as well as external participants. The Comitology 
Register is also tightly linked to the Regulation No 1049/2001177 regarding public access to 
EU documents. Though it shall be noted that the Comitology Register is distinct from the 
Register of Commission documents178 which contains other Commission’s documents (COM, 
C and SEC series). As some documents might contain sensitive, political or personal data, the 
EU institutions are obliged to adopt measures to secure the flows of sensitive information. It 
will be discussed in the second part of this sub-chapter.  
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3.4.1. Comitology Register. 
 
The Register of Comitology of the Commission is a web-based instrument, which 
executes the Commission’s legal obligation, resulting from the Council Decision 
1999/468/EC.179 This gives a public access to a register of reference information on the 
documents relating to the work of comitology committees that the Commission transmits to 
the Parliament and now the Council as of the commencement date of the Implementing Acts 
Regulation. The new application, having an internal and an external interface, establishes an 
integrated system, which, simultaneously, replaces the existing procedures for transmission of 
documents to the Parliament and the Council and creates a public register and a repository. 
The Register was to be set up by 2001, but became operational only in December 
2003, covering transmitted documents from 1 January 2003.  
The Register also contains a repository of the documents sent to the Parliament. This 
gives external users direct access to such documents, provided they are not excluded from the 
repository.180 The obligations concerning transmission of documents to the Parliament and the 
Council rise from the same Council Decision 1999/468/EC.181 However this Decision does 
not define all details or modalities. This obligation has been retained in the later Comitology 
secondary legislation, which was already discussed in preceding parts of this Chapter. 
 
Article 7 (3) of the Second Comitology Decision sets out the documents emanating 
from the comitology committees. These documents are subject to mandatory routine 
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transmission to the Parliament182 and now the Council183 under the new Implementing Acts 
Regulation, especially:184 
1) (draft) meeting agendas of comitology committees; 
2) the draft implementing acts on which the committees are asked to deliver an opinion; 
3) the final draft implementing acts following delivery of the opinion of the committees. 
Additionally, the Comitology Register makes accessible to the public more documents 
than it is requested to: draft implementing acts submitted to committees,185 the results of 
voting; summary records of the meetings and the lists of authorities representing the Member 
States and where relevant, other related documents, which are discussed at Committee 
meetings. Of course, the Parliament and the Council shall also have access to this information 
whenever it is required by the rules.  
 
3.4.1.2. Restricted transmission 
 
The Register includes, by definition, reference information on all comitology 
documents that are transmitted to the Parliament, except documents that are formally 
classified “EU CONFIDENTIAL” and/or higher “EU SECRET” / “EU TOP SECRET”. 
Commission Decision 2001/844/EC186 amended by Decision 2006/548/EC of 2 August 
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2006187 contain the “Commission security rules”. According to these, documents may be 
classified as “EU RESTRICTED” and higher. The documents, described in this paragraph, are 
sent or made available to the Parliament and now the Council, but they appear in the register 
only if the author has given its consent. 
Even without formal classification, documents may contain sensitive information and 
data, related to issues of public security, personal and commercial interests, defence and 
military matters. These documents are sent to the Parliament and the Council under specific 
procedures, which preserve confidentiality between the institutions. It is for the responsible 
Commission service to take position, on a case-by-case basis whether such documents should 
be made publicly available in accordance with the exemption clauses “clauses of 
confidentiality” of Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, and they may not be directly 
accessible via the repository. Comitology documents which have not been sent to the 
Parliament and the Council do not appear via the repository.  
One should mention Article 4 of Regulation No 1049/2001 that provides exceptions to 
protect specific interests, decision-making process and third party documents. Since a 
disclosure of implementing measures and supporting documents at the time of transmission to 
Member States and the Parliament may “impede the proper functioning of the committee”, 
Article 4 paragraph 3 specifies that direct access can be postponed until the committee has 
delivered its formal opinion on the draft measure or issue.188 
After final adoption by the Commission, most implementing measures that were 
considered confidential in their draft form during the committee procedure are finally made 
publicly accessible via the Register of Commission documents. 
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3.4.2. Annual Report on the work of Comitology committees. 
 
Article 10 paragraph 2 of the Implementing Acts Regulation stipulates that the 
Commission has to present an annual report on activities of comitology committees. All the 
reports are structured in a similar way: 
1) general comments regarding the comitology system, consisting of the short description on 
comitology committees and their institutional context, the Parliament’s right of scrutiny, 
referrals to Council and wider developments. The last available annual report189 also has a 
separate part on the new comitology procedures, implemented by the Implementing Acts 
Regulation; 
2) horizontal overview of activities provides information on number of committees and types 
of procedures including number of meetings and figures on the formal delivered opinions 
by the committees and implementing measures adopted by the Commission. 
3) an Annex provides more detailed statistical information on activities by sectors.  
 
The aim of the supporting measures to be implemented was requested both by the EU 
institutions and the external participants, as for many years it was not clear what kind of 
information was available to comitology committees and how it was used in the drafted 
measures. If, for instance, the European Parliament’s committees as well as their working 
documents were accessible to the public, the Commission’s comitology committees did not 
publish their working documents and meeting dates. During the interviews, some of the civil 
servants stated that as the decisions were not yet adopted there was no position to be 
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published; also, the drafted measures might create a lot of speculations and do more harm 
than good. However, sometimes comitology committees were buried in such secrecy that 
other EU institutions were not able to follow their work. As a result, the Commission was 
forced to implement the regulated supporting measures to ensure some transparency in the 
decision – making process.  
 
3.5. TYPOLOGY OF COMITOLOGY COMMITTEES. 
 
In this part a classification of different comitology committees’ types will be provided. 
The classifications are based on theoretical models, which were extracted from academic 
literature. Moreover, it shall be noted that a comitology committee, established by a unit, may 
cover the characteristics of all of the described types. An attempt was made to keep the 
structure as simple and effective as possible. 
 
3.5.1. Comitology committees structure according to decision-making phases. 
 
The first typology will be provided according to three phases: drafting, adoption and 
execution or implementation.190 At different phases, different committees are involved.  
 
3.5.1.1. Drafting phase. 
 
At this stage the consultation of different committees is not compulsory, but 
participants of the committees often have the most influence over the decision. The assisting 
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bodies, which may take the form of expert groups or sub-groups, might be appointed if 
provided for in procedural measures or on an ad hoc basis. Before the final submission of the 
draft legislative proposal, the Commission works with three main bodies: advisory 
committees, scientific committees and expert groups. Those committees do not vote – it is 
enough to submit the final decision for the Commission to decide. Scientific committees 
might be asked to adopt their report at a plenary meeting by a majority. 
However, the committees, the consultation of which is not compulsory, might also be 
influential due to the following reasons: 
1) many of the committees are created by an official decision and are thus officially involved 
in the drafting; 
2) since the Commission’s consultative committees and expert groups are involved at the 
earliest stage of the EU policy-making, they can potentially influence the outcome 
considerably; 
3) the members in these committees and groups are supposed to be top-experts191 (this 
affirmation was also confirmed by the CJEU),192 respected for their specialisation. They 
tend to issue highly credible technical and political advice. 
In general, the higher the draft progresses in the hierarchy, the more difficult it is for 
interested parties to have their views taken into account.193 
The level of influence also depends on the committees themselves, as well as on the 
adopted approach. If the committee does not succeed in becoming powerful, it can enjoy other 
kinds of benefits: 
                                                 
191
 “Top-expert” is identified as an individual, having widely accepted knowledge and/or experience in some 
area. The person might deal with sensitive and quite secret information, which is necessary to be incorporated 
into the drafted measures. Usually it is expected, that the provided technical and/or scientific advice of a top-
expert is up-to-date and highly credible and does not need to be questioned during the decision-making process 
(author’s comment). 
192
 Case C-269/90, Technische Universität München v Hauptzollamt München-Mitte [1991] ECR I-5495. 
193
 Daniel Gueguen and Caroline Rosberg (n 13) 32. 
 102 
1) the committees bring together people with a common specialised interest from different 
countries, i.e. different administrations or sectors. There they can exchange views and 
experiences, and try to form collective opinions; 
2) also, membership in one of these committees or groups provides an excellent opportunity 
to monitor other parties involved and to find out about their position (particularly the 
Commission). 
 
To summarize, it is possible to state that members of comitology committees, involved 
in the drafting phase of decision-making process, can be influential only if they possess 
scientific and technical knowledge that is credible and politically sensitive.  
 
3.5.1.2. Adoption phase.194 
 
When the Commission adopts the legislative proposal formally, the decision-making 
power lies with the Council and the European Parliament. The Economic and Social 
Committee (ECOSOC) also participates in the decision-making process as a consultative 
body. The same goes for the Committee of Regions (CoR), which participates as a simple 
advisory body. 
In order to influence the decision-making at this phase, a participant has to be a 
recognised expert. It is not enough to be a representative of a Member State; an expert has to 
be known at the EU level. It is of no use to conduct political lobbying at this level before the 
adoption. The adoption phase requires pure technical and/or scientific knowledge in order to 
ensure successful implementation of legislative acts. By possessing the required technical 
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and/or scientific information it is possible to influence the final decisions. Political influence 
is done at two other  phases. 
 
3.5.1.3. Implementation phase. 
 
It should be repeated once more, that powers of implementation are not normally 
given to established committees, the legislation merely indicates that the Commission shall be 
assisted by a committee composed of representatives of Member States: it is most uncommon 
for legislation to name a particular committee to exercise the relevant powers.195 Secondly, 
implementation procedures are specific to individual sections of EU legislation, and various 
activities authorised by a single piece of legislation may be subject to different 
implementation arrangements involving different committees of national experts.196 Thus, it is 
not possible either to identify what committee is likely to exercise the implementation 
function in relation to an individual piece of legislation, nor to identify the legislation for 
which an individual committee is responsible.197 
The Implementation phase is regulated by legislation and also committees at this stage 
cannot escape judicial review. It is also worth noting that comitology committees working at 
the implementation phase have also to deal with drafting issues. The provided implementation 
measures in a secondary legislation have to be drafted according to credible and up-to- date 
information. So, the different phases sometimes cannot be distinctly separated as they 
intervene with each other.    
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3.5.2. Binding nature of consultation of comitology committees. 
 
Committees can be divided between those that must be consulted when drafting EU 
legislation, and those that do not have to be consulted.198 Depending on the weight of their 
opinion, the first category of committees can be further subdivided into advisory or 
examination committees. This classification can be easily traced, as the distinction between 
the committees is regulated in Comitology Decisions and the newly enacted Implementing 
Acts Regulation. On the other hand, it will not be absolutely true to say that consultation of 
advisory committees should be disregarded. As shown earlier, the opinion provided in 
advisory committees may be influential, if the representative members possess credible and 
up-to-date information. Experience and knowledge are in high demand at this level, and 
although their consultation is not compulsory, the Commission takes usually the advice given 
into account.  
 
3.5.3. Level of influence of comitology committees. 
 
Another suggested classification of comitology committees was offered by D. 
Gueguen and C. Rosberg199 in the drafting phase, but it could also be applied to other already 
discussed phases. This classification is also used in the empirical research, which 
differentiates the influence of the comitology committees and groups, which may vary on the 
scale from 0 to 10, 0 being no influence and 10 very influential. 
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1) Committees with importance 0-3. Some of the established comitology committees are not 
very influential in the drafting phase. They are mainly set up to advice and express 
opinions on the relevant policy. The advisory comitology committees are supposed to 
discuss matters for which the Commission has asked an opinion. They can also propose 
that the Commission consults them on matters within its competence. The comitology 
committees do not vote at the end of discussions. Sometimes the meetings of such 
committees might be counterproductive due to the following reasons: 
a) the distribution of power within the Committee is unbalanced – it might belong to one 
of the interest groups, forming majority in a comitology committee; 
b) there might be no dialogue between the members in a comitology committee – the 
producers do not want to listen to consumers and vice versa. This might produce 
totally fragmented opinions, often contradictory, sometimes conflict. 
 
2) Committees with importance 3-7. A comitology committee might be more influential, if 
more important actors meet. Most of those groups consist of representatives from the 
infrastructure, national regulation groups-, consumer-, trade unions-, university-, NGO 
representatives and etc. Those groups are not highly influential when it comes to drafting 
proposals but they are very important forum for meeting stakeholders, creating networks 
and finding information. More than advisory groups, they are forums for reflection. Their 
discussions and conclusions constitute a good basis for proposals and decisions  of the 
Commission. 
 
3) Committees with importance 7-10. Depending on which policy area these Committees 
cover, their opinions carry different weight. Expert groups are seen as having more 
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influence than advisory committees since they meet more frequently and may offer the 
Commission more than plain expertise. By involving a member within them, associations 
and companies enhance their ability to influence future legislation and also take part in 
shaping it. 
 
The distinction between comitology committees based on their level of influence does 
not mean that advisory committees belong to the first group and regulatory ones, especially 
the legalised regulatory committees with scrutiny, to the third level. However, sometimes 
advisory committees can acquire more influence if it becomes clear that the issue debated is 
linked to the environment, health or safety. 
 
3.6. COMMISSION RELATIONS WITH EXTERNAL PARTICIPANTS.  
 
In general, there are currently no general laws or legally-binding provisions in effect 
that could safeguard the participation of interest groups, NGOs, or other social actors in the 
law-generating processes under the supervision of the Commission.  
“Behind the formal structures of the EU we find a vast number of informal structures 
and procedures without which the EU would not function at all”.200 Such a complex informal 
system is needed to compensate the shortages in the formal one. The main weakness is the 
lack of existence of a people from whom the EU system could deduce its input legitimacy (or 
procedures) to be followed by the government in its decision-making capacity allowing the 
public to participate in.201 If you cannot bring people in you can try to bring everyone else 
instead. “And this is precisely what the vast system of committees and groups try to do, 
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bringing together different kinds of experts, civil servants, politicians, interest representatives 
and other persons with status and authority and getting them to agree on European 
policies”.202 
At this stage it would also be important to include general information on the 
constituent parts of comitology committees. It was already mentioned that the established 
comitology committees are in high demand due to their scientific and/or technical knowledge 
and powers to represent the position of each Member State on the drafted measures, which 
will be implemented in national legislation. For this reason, the Commission forms ad hoc 
working groups, scientific committees, invites experts or other stakeholders.  
 
Whilst some committees consist of Member States’ representatives (hereafter, the 
comitology committees), others constitute forums for interest groups or independent experts. 
The members of established groups as well as organisations, representing individuals and/or 
structured interests, under the umbrella of comitology committees are collected under this list, 
which is not exhaustive: 
1) civil servants – usually appointed by Member States to represent national interests;  
2) civil servants from Directorates-General (DGs) in the Commission other than that under 
which the expert groups is placed; 
3) civil servants from the responsible Directorates-General. It shall be noted that civil 
servants from the Commission are not officially allowed to participate in the comitology 
committee’s work. They do all the drafting work, collect scientific data, consult the public 
on different issues and provide the final document for the comitology committee to vote 
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on. The only official civil servant, who can participate in the comitology committees 
meetings, is the chairman of the committee, but he/she is not allowed to vote; 
4) “real” or scientific experts (e.g. EEA); 
5) “negotiating” experts; 
6) experts, nominated by Member States – high-level governmental experts; 
7) experts, originating from the specialised state agencies or from functioning governmental 
departments; 
8) representatives of NGOs; 
9) representatives of public organisations; 
10) representatives of private organisations; 
11) representatives of trade unions; 
12) representatives of SMEs, usually belong to associations, but sometimes might participate 
as an individual body, if the discussed decision has direct influence on the exercised 
activity; 
13) stakeholders (regional, national and international); 
14) ad-hoc groups (usually set on temporary basis); 
15) interest groups (industry, commerce, consumer and environment, which as well might be 
EU and non-EU); 
16) consultation forums (ad-hoc working group involving different interested parties); 
17) competent bodies (Member States representatives); 
18) politicians; 
19) union leaders. 
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The provided list does not present all the possible participants in the EU decision-
making process. Some of them might belong to a couple of defined bodies at the same time, 
as well as be invited into different consultative bodies or expert groups. The only possible 
restriction in participation in different groups is avoidance of conflict of interests, which 
might be important in some cases. 
Many groups were established to develop appropriate experience and create contact 
networks. Now the Commission faces another dilemma – how to make all the established 
expert groups continue to provide scientific advice, but at the same time guarantee their 
monitoring and efficient management. Some of them have delivered what they were mandated 
for and have been closed; others have been re-structured or merged with other expert groups 
in order to address overlapping issues. The need for expertise is always in high demand, but it 
changes constantly, so the expertise needs to be updated and monitored all the time. Members 
of expert groups are changing constantly, as recent solution may be replaced on the basis of 
new expertise to provide new scientific alternatives. Consequently, there is a continuous 
rotation of people. 
Experts usually steer early deliberations on policy direction and help Member States to 
regain control over all agenda setting, as well as influencing not only the negotiation process 
but also the design of the directive. They are also trusted to check all the technical issues and 
provide their competent advices on decisions, which cannot be comprehensively examined 
and decided by the overworked and over-tasked Commission.  
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3.6.1. Types of representation of national interests. 
 
This issue is not related directly to the issue of external participation, however, it is 
important to investigate how national civil servants participate in the work of the committees: 
as national government representatives, independent experts, or supranational actors.  
To start with it shall be noted that the “national representatives on the committees are 
usually bureaucrats or technocrats with experience in the relevant area”.203 Usually, they are 
not related to politicians and they bring deliberative perspective to the issues.204 Nonetheless, 
it has to be cautioned that committee members might be unaware of “the profound political 
and moral choices involved in their determinations and of their shared bias”.205 
It is important to consider the types of national representation in the comitology 
framework through various perspectives.  
From the perspective of loyalty, civil servants remain loyal to their national 
government institutions,206 if they act as government representatives. “[T]rue representation 
occurs only when the representative acts on explicit instructions from their constituents”.207 
Consequently, domestic civil servants act as ‘government representative’ when attending EU 
committees. According to this concept of representation, EU committees are 
intergovernmental arenas for negotiation between sovereign nation states, mediated through 
their delegates. If the representative evokes roles that deviate significantly from the 
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‘government representative’ role, the representative may be recalled, either permanently or 
temporarily.208  
From the supranational perspective, representatives are seen as experts with a great 
deal of behavioural discretion at their disposal. A supranational role involves identifying 
oneself as an ‘EU participant’ or as an ‘EU committee participant’. Intensive participation on 
comitology and/or expert committees creates likelihood that the representatives evoke into 
supranational and sectoralized role perceptions. 
From the realistic perspective, “committees are the products of a general strategy of 
national administrations to construct and extend channels for their own participation, i.e. to 
establish access and exert influence in the political space”.209 And they “are seen as a natural 
extension of national administrations which are, in turn, vital elements in making and keeping 
decisions acceptable to EU citizens. National administrations are necessary to preserve the 
only legitimate “institutional balance”.210 It is logic to expect a confrontation between national 
and EU administrations, which might influence conflictual voting and aims to shift 
responsibility from the committee level to the Council, which is seen as preserving national 
interests.  
From a federalist perspective, it is feared that “powerful committees of national civil 
servants would be seen as serving national interests only and thus constituting a major 
obstacle to a proper federal institutional balance which alone could guarantee efficient, 
effective and legitimate European policies”.211 Based on this claim that national 
administrations represent legitimate rights based on national constitutional principles and on 
national parliamentary sovereignty and “the style of inter-administrative bargaining within 
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these committees will be structurally unable to solve the problems of the  [EU]”, EU citizens 
are against the search for more power to such committees.212  
From a neo-functional perspective, national civil servants are involved in the 
integration process, which might result in shifting “their loyalties, expectations and political 
activities towards a new centre whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-
existing national states”.213 This theory states that in the near future, comitology committees 
might be among the first ones to be abandoned, as they would be replaced by the EU 
administrations and their officials, who would get the de facto decision-making power 
shifting out of national control.  
From the functionalist perspective, comitology committees shall focus on functional 
“problem-solving” rather than political “bargaining”,214 by reaching an agreement based on 
common analysis from which the best solution to a problem could be deduced. It is believed 
that this kind of committee should be delegated strictly to experts; - no generalists or legal 
advisers should be allowed to participate. 
From an erosion perspective, national bureaucratics use this complex system for their 
self-interests in order to establish a network. “Comitology committees are thus seen as 
significant indicators for the strengthening of the administrative hold of any government, and 
they are frequently used as an effective means to escape both the parliamentary control and 
judicial review to which national administrations are normally subjected”.215 The interaction 
style within the committees is formal and procedural; however it is hostile to anyone – 
political authorities, interest groups, other bureaucratic “rivals” or European parliamentarians. 
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It is believed that participating civil servants from such multi-level administrations betray 
their governments and populations. “The individual citizen is confronted with a multi-layer 
functional set-up which can neither create loyalty nor establish any kind of solidarity”.216  
From the perspective of the governance school, even being at a secondary level of 
decision-making, comitology committees have an important power for collective decision 
implementation for taking of binding decisions “beyond the state”.217 They offer “new 
insights into the dynamics of European governance and would therefore indicate a change in 
the relationship between the European society of states and European civil society”.218 If 
comitology committees could increase their power in the self-governance of networks, 
allowing civil servants to be more embedded in networks of social groups as spokespeople. 
Alternatively, they could become an extension of unilateral steering by government, however 
limiting interaction with other NGOs.  
From a fusion perspective, comitology committees are seen as “indicators of a process 
by which national governments and administrations, (…) public and private actors, 
increasingly merge public resources from several levels of the state”.219 Comitology 
committees might help to form a partnership encompassing all relevant levels of Member 
States’ administration, including national, regional and local levels. The growing networks of 
mixed administrations is a good indicator of the broad horizontal and vertical merging of 
political systems, which could imply into the final result a joint management of the whole 
policy cycle, i.e. also in those phases where either the Commission or Member States 
originally had exclusive powers.220  
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The above described types of representation of national interests distinguish the most 
common participation types at the comitology committees level. It may be either an attempt to 
extend channels of participation of national authorities at EU level or to serve national 
interests in powerful committees of national civil servants. Generally, the participation of 
national representatives is treated as a representation of a body and a representative is 
expected to be loyal to the represented body. Though, there might be rare circumstances 
where a national civil servant becomes an external participant. In such cases a representative 
shall be seen as an expert with a great deal of behavioural discretion at his/her disposal. And 
on the contrary, some national bureaucratics my take advantage of the comitology committees 
framework for their self-interests in order to establish a network by escaping both the 
parliamentary control and judicial review, which they are normally subjected at the national 
level. 
The intensity of EU participation for civil servants in sessions of councils, as well as 
in meetings of comitology committees, occupies a huge amount of time, including the time 
needed for preparation and following the work back at home. “In addition to those directly 
involved, other civil servants of national governments also take part in the decision 
preparation and implementation within the ministry”.221 This fact shows that the participation 
demand at EU level becomes more intense and might be considered a major part of the 
evolving political system. On the other hand, it seems that “national procedures for the 
Council preparations and the demand for participation in the sessions of the Council indicate a 
special mistrust between national departments and ministries”.222 Considering the number of 
civil servants involved in all phases of EU policy, through internal procedures in capitals, by 
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establishing offices in Brussels, and by close collaboration, national administrations have 
considerably developed their ability to compete with other administrations.223 
Keeping comitology committees involved, the Commission staff tends to make 
positive proposals. Participants of comitology committees do not want to rely on politicians, 
so ministers are kept out of the dealings between administrators, which satisfy the 
Commission civil servants, who pay more attention to formalities rather on their business-
minded colleagues in the administrative committees. On the other hand, many civil servants 
are not aware of the exact legal nature of their committee, as they seem to participate in 
meetings in different phases of EU policy cycle, and that different forms of committees on the 
same topic follow one another without formal change.224 
Civil servants are not the only actors trying to move to Brussels. Political leaders 
(heads of state and government) are also becoming “professional Europeans” and have often 
intervened directly as “ultimate decision-makers” in work normally done by the Council. 
Comitology committees might become overruled by higher and more specialised 
administrative and political levels, whenever issues become politicised.225  
Even though there are numbers of discussions regarding the low power of influence of 
comitology committees, through their complex and sometimes hidden participation, it could 
be argued that administrative interactions with national civil servants, in several different 
forms, have increasingly played a major role in preparation, decision-making and 
implementation, without real threat to be replaced by the EU administrative bodies. However 
these actors, interested in EU affairs, should consider a bigger investment in order to obtain 
access and influence. The demands, which comitology committees put on national 
administrations, helps to Europeanize this kind of group of actors, which might be treated as 
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an extension of national government and administration, and not a straightforward abolition 
of its influence. Participants of comitology committees are confronted with different actors 
and at the same time national civil servants have to convince colleagues with different 
political and administrative cultures as well as different interests.226 
 
3.6.2. Expert Groups and Other Similar Entities 
 
Expert groups or consultative groups assist the Commission in its many functions. 
“An expert group can be almost anything, ranging from just a few members with very special 
knowledge to a very complex structure with several subgroups, sometimes including hundreds 
of persons from almost every walk of life”.227 They are used to help to prepare new legislation 
to be drafted by the Commission, to coordinate and facilitate an overview of different policy 
areas, to implement the adopted legislation and to exchange experience and information. 
Involvement of experts was also confirmed by the CJEU. In 1990 the CJEU approved 
the participation of “group of experts” for the first time.228 It was based on the fact, that 
Member States did not have the information necessary to assess whether instruments of 
equivalent scientific value were manufactured in the Union, the applications in question were 
to be forwarded to the Commission. The Commission then needs to consult Member States 
and if they give a negative opinion, it has to place the matter before a “group of experts”. This 
group has to comply with the duty to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant factual 
and legal aspects of each case. The Commission, on the other hand, shall have the power of 
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appraisal in order to fulfil its tasks and be able to prove that the group is composed of 
individuals possessing the necessary technical knowledge in the relevant scientific field. 
 
3.6.2.1. Types of Expert Groups  
 
Depending on the advice sought, expert groups might be categorized into various 
types. For example, Horizontal Rules for Commission Expert Groups229 establishes three 
expert groups, namely a formal expert group, which is set by a Commission Decision; 
informal expert group, which is set up by a Commission service with the agreement of the 
Secretariat General; and other similar entity (or a consultative entity) which was not set up by 
the Commission or its services, the role of which is the same as, or similar to, that set out in 
Rule 3 and for which the Commission services ensure administrative and financial 
management”.230 It shall also be noted that an expert group must comprise of at least six 
members and must meet more than once. 
Based on the influence, four other types may be distinguished – senior officials group 
(consisting of one or two high-level officials from each of Member States; in some cases the 
national permanent representations may be required to send an expert); umbrella groups (if 
five or six Member States have an interest on the issue, they form an umbrella group and 
invite other Member States, where the initiative is discussed and a general approach is 
decided on); expert groups (composed of representatives from Member States, industry, 
interest groups and NGOs; these work on a draft proposal, amend or produce new legislation) 
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and sub-groups (if some of the subjects are too sensitive or require more meetings for 
extensive discussions).231 
 
Due to their technical and/or scientific expertise, basic and extended knowledge on 
many specialised topics, external experts, scientists and experienced civil servants, lobbyists 
and other interests usually serve as providers of up-to-date technical advice. The Commission 
and the established committees are the recipients of the technical or scientific advice, on 
which they can base their political interests to be finally adopted. The other reason for setting 
up expert groups is the fact that the Commission needs strategic information regarding the 
political situation in Member States, i.e. it wants to know “what the political opinion is on 
these topics in the Member States and what degree of resistance proposals are likely to meet, 
if any”.232 And the most enigmatic reason is that “since many expert groups emerge as the 
result of skilful and intensive pressure from outside the Commission, the agenda may have 
been “confiscated” by outside interests, leaving the Commission to perform the function of a 
secretariat putting together ideas and thoughts formulated by others”.233 And one more reason 
shall be highlighted – “the weight of the arguments and the collected knowledge of the issue 
are of greater importance here than later on in the process, [so] the Commission needs allies 
with good ideas and prospects in order for the expert groups to be able to open the door for 
interests which may not always have a strong position in other phases of the decision-making 
process in terms of economic resources, members or votes”.234 
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The distinctions between comitology committees and expert groups shall be 
highlighted as the following ones – “the expert or consultative group/committee does not 
necessarily consist of national officials” and another important point is that “expert groups 
[are] normally used only for entities that the Commission may set up and dismiss of its own 
accord” either on a temporary or a permanent basis.235 There is a deficiency regarding this 
freedom of the Commission – “[a]nyone in charge of setting up committees or groups will 
have unlimited possibilities to use this to his/her advantage to influence the outcome of the 
committee or group by deciding on who is going to chair the committee or group, who will be 
its members, who is going to be the secretariat, and so on”.236 Therefore, expert groups are 
better described as a place for finding a consensus rather than a control mechanism for the 
Commission. The Parliament members seem not to be invited into the work of expert groups. 
 
In conclusion, it shall be admitted that expert groups are mainly the only one 
possibility for external participants to get involved into the EU decision-making process at the 
earliest stage. Experts and civil servants from Member States are actually seen as 
representatives or semi-representatives of national bodies, though there are groups where 
independent experts, interest groups and other stakeholders may be included with equal status. 
Though, it has to be made clear that it is the sole responsibility of the Commission to draft the 
proposal. 
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3.7. CONCLUSIONS. 
 
This Chapter has mainly focused on the possibility for external participants to get 
involved into the EU decision-making process. The powers are not directly delegated to 
members of comitology committees – the committees are rather established to control the 
Commission over the conferred powers to implement delegated and implementing acts. Even 
though it is believed that comitology committees have the highest potential in attracting 
technical and scientific knowledge, this power is not implemented in the discussed primary 
and secondary legislation and mainly executed on an ad hoc basis.  
Earlier the analysis has showed that the EU governance faces the demand to apply 
decentralisation and involvement of external participants in order to get the EU closer to its 
citizens. In order to make them effective and integrant part of the EU institutions, comitology 
committees have to have some of the delegated powers in the decision – making process. At 
the very beginning, implementation of essential measures of basic instruments was delegated 
to the Commission. However, over a period of time, Member States demanded to be involved 
and they gained some decision-making powers by participating in comitology committees. By 
law, this participation was limited to civil servants, but external participants with highly 
credible expertise were also involved in this process due to a high demand for technical and 
scientific knowledge.   
The second part of the Chapter has presented the kind of comitology committees that 
are established and has listed the constituent parts that are essential to ensure their mission in 
the decision-making process. There the most important element of comitology committees is 
its ability to provide credible scientific knowledge. In addition, the level of influence 
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delegated to members of comitology committees often determines whether the advice given 
will be taken into account.   
The main elements and conclusions of this analysis are carried into the next chapter, 
where empirical results are analysed. The observation of comitology committees and the 
interviews of some of their members are used to decide whether in practice comitology 
committees do need technical and scientific expertise when drafting implementation 
measures. It will also be called upon to assert whether comitology committees are sensitive to 
political issues when they deal with the implementation of essential elements. Finally, it will 
help test the accuracy of the typology of comitology committees adumbrated above. 
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IV. CHAPTER 
 
COLLECTION AND USE OF EXPERTISE 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION. 
 
 The comprehensive analysis of various forms of participation and representation in the 
EU decision-making process, discussed in previous chapters, have identified the possibilities 
for external participants to get involved into the process and the procedures to be applied. The 
aim of this chapter is to analyse a new kind of participation, which mainly involves scientific 
expertise and know-how to be involved into the EU decision-making process as the main forte 
of the discussed participation. As it was already discussed in the earlier chapters, it is vitally 
important for the European Institutions to collect and process as much up-to-date information 
as possible in order to exploit the most appropriate expertise and sound knowledge at all 
stages of the EU policy – making. All the implemented changes in the enlarged European 
Union force the society to face with the challenge of finding its proper place where 
knowledge, in particular science, technology and innovation, are indispensable.1  
                                                 
1
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 It is also very important to establish a debate on the relationship of science2 and 
technology with society3 and Europe’s citizens in order to be able to take the most efficient 
decisions and be competitive in the global market, which is crucial for policies to be based on 
the best available knowledge, as well as to become the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more 
and better jobs and greater social cohesion.4  
 At present, EU Institutions have established a number of channels for feeding advice 
from experts into science-based policy development: a well-structured system of scientific 
committees, a variety of international and European mechanisms in policy areas to be 
complemented by ad hoc arrangements according to the nature, urgency, or state of the 
knowledge of the issue to be addressed, different layers and forms of advisory structures at 
national level. Within this framework a distinction can be made between collective, formal 
advice provided by identified committees or advisory groups and established by policy-
makers, and scientific information, provided by individuals or organizations outside any 
formal process, which might assist formal advisory groups if the taken decision has stuck in 
the process.5 
  
 The need for expert advice has been enhanced by the new comitology legal provisions, 
to be more precise, Article 290 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union,6 
allows the legislator to delegate to the Commission the power to adopt non-legislative acts of 
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2
 “Science” includes all public and private activities of a scientific and technological nature, including social 
sciences. Commission, “Science and Society Action Plan” (Communication) COM (2001)714 final, p.4. 
3
 “Society” covers all citizens and their associations, as well as businesses and public authorities.” ibis. 
4
 ibid 3. 
5
 ibid 21. 
6
 Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) [2010] OJ C 
83, volume 53. 
 124 
general application to supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of a legislative 
act,7 and the adopted acts are referred as “delegated acts”. “The Commission intends to carry 
out the preparatory work it considers necessary in order to ensure (…) that from a technical 
and legal point of view the delegated acts comply fully with the objectives laid down by the 
basic instrument”.8 “Once provisions for a Delegated Act are in a legislative text it will be 
necessary to identify the relevant expert group(s) assisting the Commission in drafting the 
Delegated Acts”.9 On the other hand, “the Commission intends systematically to consult 
experts from the national authorities of all the Member States, which will be responsible for 
implementing the delegated acts once they have been adopted”.10 The Commission aims at 
using the already possessed expertise, as well as forming new expert groups at the need11 only 
for a consultative role without any legal power in the decision-making process.12  
 Having in mind this new turn in the constructed comitology structure, it should be 
highlighted the importance of expertise (of a scientific and technological nature) in general, 
the influence of which in the decision-making process would be analyzed in more detail in 
this chapter. 
 Another important issue, the analysis of which is also included into the context of this 
Chapter, is the use of precautionary principle. As this is quite a novel principle “as a precept 
of administrative law”,13 and the first usage of it was mainly referring to interpretation of the 
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EU legislation, which makes the principle applicable in the environmental field. This 
principle is intended to be applied “where there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent of 
risks”14 and scientific uncertainty exists or additional scientific findings are needed to be 
substantiated in the decision-making process.  
 
 The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the need of scientific knowledge and expertise in 
the EU institutional decision-making process and enactment of legally binding rules, examine 
the procedures of an external participant to be able to offer the possessed expertise for the 
already established legal bodies and various EU instruments. The earlier provided analysis has 
showed that EU Institutions as well as other public bodies are in high demand of scientific 
knowledge, the collection possibilities of which will be provided in this chapter.  
 
 The first section of the chapter comprises of a short overview of the evolution of the 
need to involve scientific expertise into political decision-making process as an aftermath of 
the BSE crisis. The crisis has showed that there is a lack of an individual as well as 
institutional responsibility, which has led to administrative difficulties and the way the crisis 
situation was solved. It could be identified that the acknowledgement of importance of 
scientific expertise is the basis for further legal and political developments regarding an 
involvement and use of external expertise in the EU decision-making process and sound 
administration, which is going to be asserted in the following parts of this chapter. 
 The second part is based on the analysis of different political and legal instruments, 
which have followed the establishment of the need to involve the scientific expertise in most 
of EU legislations as well as political decisions. As the scientific advice is aimed to be 
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obtained from the work of scientific committees, the Commission has established the 
Scientific Steering Committee, which was further developed into the European Food Safety 
Authority, having more authority in the scientific decision-making process, European 
regulatory agencies, under the framework of which the European Environment Agency has 
been developed. The analysis will also cover the transition of legal responsibility on the 
created scientific bodies. 
 The third part of the chapter will mainly focus on the evolution of the decisions of the 
Commission in regards to collection and use of the scientific expertise. This is followed by 
the analysis of the Commission political and legal policies on collection and use of scientific 
expertise, covering the main documents, such as the Action Plan regarding science and 
society dialogue in EU, the guidelines from the Commission on the collection and use of 
expertise by the Commission and related ones. 
 The future perspective of the possibility for external scientific expertise to be involved 
in the EU decision-making process will be evaluated based on the provided analysis. 
  
4.2. Evolution of the Need for Scientific Expertise. 
 
 After the British government announced on 20 March 1996 that a novel fatal disease 
in humans had emerged,15 which imposed the EU-wide ban on UK beef exports on 27 March 
1996, the EU has embarked on a process of reforming the administrative organization of the 
EU, including the setting-up of a new regulatory agency, the European Food Safety Agency, 
and a commitment to the more effective use of scientific information.16 The aftermath of the 
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crisis has led to various institutional review procedures, for example, pointing out the 
problems of having a number of different authorities competent in the area of agriculture, 
animal health, and public health protection, which had created administrative difficulties, 
leading to the lack of the individual or institutional responsibility of the Council of the 
European Union and the European Commission.17 
 The temporary Committee of Inquiry into the BSE has been established by the 
European Parliament, which in its report18 has noted that most of the problems of the 
European Commission’s taken actions, in particular that during the BSE crisis, were, first, 
related to trying “to follow a policy of downplaying the problem, despite a wide variety of 
discussions in scientific bodies”19 and, second, “there being no possibility of the European 
Commission consulting “independent, multidisciplinary advisory committees”.20 
Only the BSE crisis made the Union to pay more attention to scientific committees, 
“that where the  [Union] has been forced to deepen its activities in the field of risk regulation, 
it has also been faced with a concurrent need for an increased scientific expertise. This has in 
turn led to an increasing reliance upon the ad hoc scientific committees set up by the 
Commission for the very purpose of providing it with technical information and expertise. It 
might be deduced that where the Commission has set up a scientific committee to ensure that 
its measures have a scientific basis, to take account of the most recent scientific and technical 
research, and to ensure that only measures are adopted which are necessary to protect human 
health, the Commission is obliged to consult this committee.21 In Parliament’s Resolution22 it 
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was stipulated that scientific committees must be consulted in the cases laid down by  Union 
legislation – especially on issues which affect consumer health and safety should be 
preferred.23 First, it would ensure that the scientific advice resorted to is based on the 
principles of excellence, independence and transparency which are explicitly adhered to by 
Decision 97/579/EC, and is not dependent on an ad hoc approach of the Commission. Second, 
this would enable the Commission to fulfill its obligation under the new text of Article 100a 
(3) inserted by the Amsterdam Treaty (renumbered Article 114 (3) of TFEU)24  to take 
account of “any new development based on scientific facts”. 
 The following events as well as a collection of critical reports25 on the “perceived 
failings of the administrative system of the EU after the “BSE crisis”26 has led the European 
Parliament to establish a Committee of Independent Experts or “Wise Men”. It was 
“delegated” the European Parliament’s supervisory mission, which was not constituted under 
any precise institutional regulations and had a priori no formal investigative power.27 The 
reason why this committee was created was mainly based on the “failure of formal audit and 
control mechanisms and the vague ethical responsibility of the Commission – not clearly 
defined in [Union] law – show the indefinite and scattered nature of the norms and values that 
regulate [Union] public life. They also prove the flexibility of institutional innovation within 
the EU”.  
A second justification for the creation of the Committee can be found in the technical 
(mismanagement) and ethical (fraud and nepotism) responsibilities of the Commission, which 
are not well defined in community law and are difficult to identify by the EU control 
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institutions. The role of the Committee of Independent Experts was therefore not to judge, in 
the judicial sense of the word, nor even to find any political responsibility – Union law makes 
ample provisions for both cases – but to define a new form of responsibility based on a 
common core of standards of proper behaviour – in the absence of specific rules or codes of 
conduct.28 
 Although difficult to prove, the independence of the Committee of Independent 
Experts was limited by the involvement of their members in national politico-administrative 
systems. As various studies on the European Parliament and the Commission have shown,29 
the work of the Committee of Independent Experts is marked by dual dialectics between 
independence form, and dependence on, the national governments. But, on the other hand, it 
was confirmed that “the experience of the Committee of Independent Experts reveals that the 
legitimacy of democratic control in the EU is no longer in the hands of political 
representatives. It comes from experts and “wise men” who define the standards of sound 
administration – as they act primarily as judges of how efficient political processes are”.30 The 
conclusions of the Committee of Independent Experts therefore demonstrate that the 
legitimacy of the experts, who are empowered to tell EU citizens how EU should work, now 
prevails over that of the members of the Parliament who are elected to represent them. 
Entrusting experts – whether they are “wise men”, central bankers or civil servants – with the 
smooth running of democracy directly addresses the problem of their accountability to elected 
representatives. 
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4.3. Administrative Instruments, established for Collection of Scientific Expertise. 
  
 The above provided analysis has defined that EU Institutional bodies are obliged to 
consult scientific committees, which are established under the auspices of the European 
Commission, for a needed scientific advice. However, the performed analysis has showed the 
weakness of the existing system on collection of scientific advice – it was implemented 
mainly on ad hoc basis, whenever specific technical and scientific information was needed to 
be implemented into a specific decision-making process. This part of the chapter will cast a 
glance on the development of institutional bodies, established specifically for obtainment and 
processing of scientific data to be continuously used in EU institutional work. 
 The initial response of the European Commission to the reported criticism came in its 
Communication on Consumer Health and Food Safety.31 First, the European Commission, 
aimed to inform all the interested parties of the action being taken “to reinforce the manner in 
which it obtains and makes use of scientific advice”. Second, “the core of a new political 
departure [is] based on three general principles”,32 namely: 
- first, that responsibility for legislation should be separate from that for scientific 
consultation; 
- second, that responsibility for legislation should be separate from that for 
inspection; 
- third, that there should be greater transparency and more widely-available 
information throughout the decision-making process and inspection measures. 
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The Commission intended to reinforce three complementary instruments: scientific 
advice, risk analysis, and control, as a platform for an effective policy implementation.33 
Scientific advice was mainly planned to be obtained from the work of the scientific 
committees. In relation to the provision of a scientific advice, the European Commission has 
established the Scientific Steering Committee under the Commission Decision 97/404/EC and 
97/579/EC,34 which were replaced and repealed by the Commission Decision 2008/721/EC35 
setting up Scientific Committees in the field of consumer safety, public health and the 
environment. The committee was established by responding to the criticisms of a systematic 
failure to possess sufficient scientific advice when responding, in this case, to the initial stages 
of the BSE crisis in the UK.36 The members of the Scientific Committees may be “appointed 
on the basis of their expertise and consistent with this a geographical distribution that reflects 
the diversity of scientific problems and approaches, notably in Europe”,37 - they are chosen 
following rigorous assessment of their scientific excellence in their field of competence. Their 
independence is guaranteed through the strict application of declarations of interests.38  
The Scientific Committees may draw the EU Commission’s attention to a specific or 
emerging problem falling within their remit, which they consider may pose an actual or 
potential risk,39 however, the final result would only be submitted as a scientific opinion of 
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particular relevance in cases laid down by Community law.40 For its part, the Scientific 
Committees, acting on their own initiative and in agreement with the Commission, may 
decide to set up thematic workshops in order to review data and scientific knowledge on 
particular risks or on broad risk assessment issues41 or invite associated members, other 
scientific advisors from the Pool, specialised external experts from other Community bodies 
that they consider to have the relevant scientific knowledge and expertise, to contribute to 
their work.42  
 It was highlighted that a sound, timely, rapid and flexible scientific advice is required 
by the EU Commission, however, the created Scientific Committees, on the continued lack of 
capacity in the system to deal with crisis, could only manage an effective scientific opinion by 
putting on hold other issues.43 The solution to this issue was proposed by the creation of an 
independent European Food Authority (EFA), however leaving risk management, comprising 
legislation and control under the supervision of the Commission, “if it is to discharge the 
responsibility placed upon it under the Treaties”.44 EFA has been seen to become the most 
authoritative body within the created scientific administrative networks,45 though a new 
Regulation on the general principles and requirements of food law was formed.46 The new 
Regulation has established the European Food Safety Authority,47 setting out the mission, 
which includes “the provision of scientific advice and scientific and technical support for the  
[Union’s] legislation, collecting and analysing of data to allow the characterisation and 
monitoring of risks which have a direct or indirect impact on food and food safety, the 
                                                 
40
 ibid Article 2, paragraph 1. 
41
 ibid Article 2, paragraph 5. 
42
 ibid Article 7. 
43
 Keith Vincent (n 16) 513. 
44
 White Paper on Food Safety (n 38) paragraph 33. 
45
 ibid paragraph 55. 
46
 Regulation 178/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 January 2002 laying down the 
general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying 
down procedures in matters of food safety [2002] OJ L 31/1. 
47
 ibid Article 1. 
 133 
provision of scientific opinions which will serve as the scientific basis for the drafting and 
adoption of  [Union] measures.”48 
 The established scientific institutional bodies were partly complemented by regulatory 
and even operational EU-level committees and agencies, as well as privileged expert and 
scientific expertise, which have been congregated around the European Commission.49 One 
more [Union] body, intended partly for collection and management of scientific advice, which 
should be analysed in this context, is an autonomous (regulatory) agency. It is established 
under the Commission and the Council auspices, some of which have executive, regulatory, 
and management tasks and are composed of both European civil servants – and some 
nationals on secondment.50 The need was also supported by the European Commission51 
flagging the fact that “in its view there was (in addition) a need for more independent and 
autonomous structures in the form of European regulatory agencies that would be delegated 
with certain specific (discretionary) regulatory functions”, where “regulatory” does not 
necessarily mean inaction of legal acts or binding legal norms – it might “involve measures of 
a more incentive nature, such as co-regulation, self-regulation, recommendations, referral to 
the scientific authority, networking and pooling good practice, evaluating the application and 
implementation of rules etc.”52 However, in 2002 the European Commission has defined the 
concept of European Regulatory Agencies, which sets that the agencies are “required to be 
actively involved in exercising the executive function by enacting instruments which 
contribute to regulating a specific sector”.53  
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Agencies were separated from the Commission and the Council with a formed 
internal management structure, which is equated to some degree of agency independence, 
though it does not necessarily follow that agencies are de facto independent from their 
primary “principals”. Though, “an actual transfer of responsibility might be considered to 
have taken place, de facto, from the Commission to the agencies in question, albeit with the 
explicit approval of the EU legislator”.54 This statement should not be understood directly, as 
to the CJEU’s case-law in Meroni55, only some degree of delegation, but under restricted 
conditions, is allowed. The Commission uses Meroni case legal principles to defend unity and 
integrity of the executive function under its responsibility, in order to retain the institutional 
balance principle ensuring unity and integrity of the executive function as well as avoiding the 
danger of excessive Member States influence through membership in the administrative or the 
regulatory board.56  
Pursuant to the Meroni case-law, “the following conditions would apply for the 
admissibility of the transfer of sovereign powers to subordinate authorities outside of the  
[EU] institutions”57: a delegating authority cannot confer on another body powers different 
from those possessed by the delegator under the Treaty and not subject to the same duties; and 
it’s not possible to delegate power involving a wide margin of discretion between many 
different objectives and tasks, so shifting responsibilities and escaping continuing oversight – 
in particular the obligation to state reasons and judicial control of decisions.58 Additionally it 
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should be noted that accountability should be retained as well as institutional balance between 
the EU institutions must not be distorted. 
If the established agencies were not subject to the constraints and protections offered 
in the treaties59 – there was no direct remedy and no access to justice for individuals to 
challenge the decisions of such agencies as they were “not one of the bodies referred to in 
Article 230 EC, whose acts may be challenged”,60 the situation has been completely changed 
by the entrance into force of the Treaty of Lisbon,61 where the  CJEU shall “review the 
legality of acts of bodies, offices or agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects 
vis-à-vis third parties”.62 Making the analyzed regulatory agencies responsible for their taken 
decisions, provides the affected individuals more trust in those institutional bodies, as any 
negligence or erroneous decision might be redeemed by a judicial remedy and access to 
justice. 
 There is no sense to analyze all the established regulatory agencies in the EU in a 
more detailed way, as the main participation and/or representation principles would be the 
same, however it would be valuable to overview one of the regulatory agencies, directly 
related to environmental policy and its implementation – the European Environment Agency, 
dealing with environmental issues and which could be treated as one of the EU instruments, 
established partly for collection and obtainment of scientific and other kind of data, involving 
external experts as well as national bodies from each Member State, which are entrusted with 
the task of cooperating with the Agency. The previously made overview of the EU regulatory 
agencies explains the administration of the created bodies, which is similar to comitology 
committees, as well as the transfer of powers, requiring to be “actively involved in exercising 
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the executive function by enacting instruments which contribute to regulating a specific 
sector”, the legality of which will be reviewed by the CJEU. The regulation of responsibility 
has impelled the transfer of powers from national authorities to EU level. 
 The establishment of the European Environment Agency was not due to an aftermath 
of the BSE crisis, the consequences of which were described earlier in the chapter. The need 
has evolved from the increasing Union concern for environmental protection resulted in four 
action programmes, each of which has highlighted some concerns and important issues, i.e. 
the Second Environmental Action Program sought to encourage compliance by establishing a 
decentralized information system that would enable member states to access a range of data 
sources to obtain the necessary information; the Third Environmental Action Program 
established the goal to obtain consistent and comparative information on the state of the 
environment and natural resources (implemented through CORINE program), followed by the 
Fourth Program, which identifies the need for better research on the environment, better 
environmental impact assessments, wider access to environmental information, and increased 
efforts regarding public education on the environment.63  
 The European Environment Agency is considered to be a “second – generation agency 
emerged in the mid-1990s in the context of the completion of the internal market. This agency 
was more sophisticated in institutional/management terms and was entrusted on the whole 
with tasks of a scientific/technical nature”.64 
 The main objective of the EEA is to provide member states with “objective, reliable, 
and comparative environmental information which will enable the  [Union] and the Member 
States to take the requisite measures to protect the environment, to assess the results of such 
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measures and to ensure that the public is properly informed about the state of the 
environment”.65 The tasks of the Agency are covered in Article 2 of the Regulation 1210/90, 
authorizing the Agency to: (1) collect, process, and analyze the data of priority areas of 
environment; (2) provide the Commission with information that it needs to successfully carry 
out its tasks of identifying, preparing and evaluating measures and legislation in the field of 
environment; (3) draw up expert reports on the quality, sensitivity and pressures on the 
environment; provide uniform assessment criteria for environmental data applicable to all 
member states; and (4) encourage improved harmonization of environmental measurement 
methods.66  
 The Regulation also implements that institutions or other organizations from each 
Member State, which are entrusted with the task of cooperating with the Agency,67 will 
function as the Agency’s basic information sources. It is also foreseen that an entrusted 
institution should be in a position to conclude an agreement with the Agency to act as a topic 
centre of the network for specific tasks in a precise geographical area.  
 The Agency’s management board consists of one representative from each Member 
State and two representatives from the Commission.68 Concerning scientific expertise, the 
European Parliament may designate two scientific personalities particularly qualified in the 
field of environmental protection.69 However, this intention was treated as a struggle of the 
European Parliament for voice, significantly shaping the politics of agency design.70 The 
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European Parliament has often fought for this right to designate members of the Management 
Boards, alongside the Member States and other EU institutions (Council and/or Commission). 
 The Agency itself might be assisted by a scientific committee, made up of nine 
members particularly qualified in the field of environment, which shall deliver an opinion to 
the management board. It should be noted that the participation on board is strictly limited to 
the parties mentioned in the regulation, however environmental data supplied to or emanating 
from the Agency shall be made accessible to the public as well as to third countries.71 There is 
no other information how external participants could provide their possessed scientific know-
how or expertise. 
 There is also a discussion on the lack of powers, attributed to the Agency, as it 
remains limited to an advisory and collection role rather than to an active enforcement body.72 
“One of the major shortcomings of the EEA is its lack of monitoring powers.”73 The Agency 
cannot control the way Member States apply or interpret environmental directives. This 
function can only be conferred on the Commission by the Parliament and the Council, and the 
latter cannot delegate its powers to external independent bodies. This issue is discussed in 
more details in the Chapter “External participation through comitology”. 
 Even though the CJEU has jurisdiction over the contract provisions, concluded by the 
Agency, however the Agency cannot bring the Member State, which has misapplied or 
misinterpreted a directive, against the CJEU.74 Though, it is suggested that under Article 7, 
the EEA has a legal personality, and it may have the ability to bring suit against a Member 
State as though it were a private individual.75 However, pursuant to the TFEU, only the 
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Commission is entitled to take offending Member States before the CJEU following the 
implemented procedures.76 
One more issue to be highlighted, is that even though the European Environment 
Agency is a legally separate institution, it does not necessarily follow that the agency is de 
facto independent from the Commission and the Council and able to exercise decision-making 
autonomy within its mandate.77 It was found that the DG Environment in the Commission has 
tried to influence the running of the European Environment Agency in the past on matters 
which “have gone well beyond legitimate differences of view as to the EEA’s priorities and 
the way in which it interprets its mission”.78  
 
4.4. Commission Policies on Collection and Use of Scientific Expertise. 
 
Some authors believe79 that scientific experts and their provided advice have been 
treated80 as being risky due to a number of different reasons. The risk might be related to the 
fact that an advice may be provided by small closed groups of scientific experts including 
drawn from industries and the firms whose products are regulated; another risk factor is that 
there is no clear separation between regulation and sponsorship; policy-makers are keen to 
hide behind the expert scientific advisors, even though those decisions necessitated political 
rather than purely scientific judgments; none of the scientific analyses are subject to peer 
review; it is believed that scientific uncertainties are typically understated, glossed over or 
concealed, and the taken decisions are based on incomplete, uncertain and equivocal 
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evidence. The list of the reasons might be continued. Those reasons, as well as the not listed 
ones, might have urged the Commission to take some actions to be implemented in this field. 
Especially in the wake of the BSE crisis, when the issue of the Commission’s credibility was 
at stake,81 as policymakers, regulators, and, increasingly, scientists are no longer believed.82 
 
4.4.1. Science and Society Action Plan. 
 
 First of all, the Commission has decided to implement an action plan83 regarding 
science and society dialogue in EU, focusing on scientific and education culture in Europe, 
bringing science policies closer to citizens and putting responsible science at the heart of 
policy making in order to provide both scientific and democratic legitimacy.  
 The three mentioned policy areas, especially the third area, where it aims to put 
responsible science into policy making, will be discussed further in the Chapter in order to see 
their input on science and society in Europe. It is understood that science and society 
dialogue, and bringing responsible science policies closer to outside society as well as to 
policy- and decision-making is not possible without active cooperation with the EU Member 
States, and third countries, and international organizations, involving numerous players: local 
and regional public authorities, the general public, civil society, industry and others. “The 
catalyst” role is foreseen for the EU Commission, using all the means available at the EU 
level and especially its research policy instruments,84 and with an additional obligation in 
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order to make this initiative work – it is expected that Member States as well as external 
participants will support the EU Commission’s decisions in a joint, coordinated approach.   
                                                                                                                                                                    
 The first pillar of the Commission’s action plan is based on scientific and education 
culture in Europe. It is highlighted that in order to make the present scientific and 
technological progress understandable for citizens of the EU, they will need to have 
information that is understandable and of a high quality, as well as ready access to this 
specific culture.85 This role should be referred to media, researchers, research institutions, and 
especially to universities, which should be capable of communicating and engaging in debate 
the public on scientific issues in a comprehensible professional manner.  
 In a knowledge society, democracy requires citizens to have a certain scientific and 
technical knowledge as part of their basic skills,86 which have to be implemented with 
application of the open coordination method on the three priority objectives concerned: the 
development of skills for the knowledge society, access to information and communication 
technologies for all; and increased recruitment to scientific and technical disciplines.87 Apart 
from this general knowledge, Europe needs a pool of scientists to ensure socio-economic 
development, who additionally have a strong background in project management, law and 
communication areas. 
   
 The second pillar of the action plan is based on bringing science policies closer to 
citizens. Science and technology activities first of all should centre on the needs and 
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aspirations of Europe’s citizens to a greater extent. A regular flow of information to the public 
from experts is not in itself enough to enable people to form an opinion. A true dialogue must 
therefore be instituted between science and society: consensus conferences,88 citizens’ 
juries,89 national and regional consultations, on-line forums, participative foresight 
programmes and etc.,90 which aim to provide a space for scrutiny and informed debate on 
important issues of public concern, bringing together the public, interest groups and policy 
makers. This kind of communication must be supported at all levels: European (involves close 
cooperation between a wide range of stakeholders from research organizations, public 
authorities, media, citizens, civil society, enterprises and etc.), national, regional and local 
(when the issues raised are of direct interest to citizens – environment, sustainable 
development, health, safety, urban transport and etc.). 
 Moreover, it is not enough to keep the public informed, they must be given the 
opportunity to express their views in the appropriate bodies. It could be done through 
systematic and structured participation through EAGs (expert advisory groups), advisory 
bodies as well as institutional bodies (comitology committees, agencies and similar). Ad hoc 
arrangements such as platforms, workshops or other dialogue mechanisms are also used to 
enable interested parties to express their views, however, they need to be widened and 
deepened to systematically include other sectors of civil society at all stages.91 One of the 
possibilities for the civil society as well as other external participants to get involved in 
environmental decision-making process is implemented by the Århus Convention, which is 
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analysed in the Chapter “Participation in environmental issues – primordial rights of external 
participants”.  
 The responsible institutions should also consider a possibility to allow the public to 
observe certain expert meetings, particularly on sensitive policy issues, as well as to promote 
an informed and structured debate between policy-makers, experts and interested parties (e.g. 
workshops, consensus conferences and etc.); however it should be restricted during any part 
of the meetings dealing with confidential information. The common guidelines, prepared by 
the European Commission also foresee that the “sharing of information must safeguard the 
legitimate interests of third parties. In particular, scientific data provided by business operator 
may not be used to the benefit of another applicant (…), unless provided by law or by the data 
owner himself”.92 
   
 Science and society dialogue also covers the specific needs of women to be 
represented in science. If society as a whole is to better understand and identify with 
developments in science and technology, specific measures must be taken to address both the 
under-representation of women in science, and the lack of attention paid to gender differences 
within research.93 For this specific purpose, the Commission has taken a decision94 relating to 
gender balance within committees and expert groups established by it (it should be striven 
that groups are composed of at least 40 percent of each sex). 
 Monitoring progress in the field of gender equality can be achieved with application of 
the following key policy objectives: increasing the number of women in science; reducing 
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both horizontal segregation (whereby women are concentrated in certain sectors or 
disciplines) and vertical segregation (whereby women tend to be in lower hierarchical 
positions); eliminating pay gaps; and ensuring fairness and equity.95 
  
 And the third pillar implements “putting responsible science at the heart of policy 
making”. Innovation improves quality of life, and is essential for economic growth, which can 
bring concerns and questions, as well as the risk of new hazards and dangers to our 
environment, health and lifestyle. Most policies have a scientific and technological dimension 
and decisions must be supported by transparent, responsible opinions based on ethical 
approach, in order to help identify and assess the posed risks, as the rapid pace of scientific 
and technological progress can give rise to serious ethical questions of concern to all 
Europeans. It is vital important to make research functional and clearly supported as European 
society is a rich cultural tapestry, made of divergent ethical, religious, historical and 
philosophical backgrounds.96  
 This initiative could be achieved through a more systematic information facility on 
ethical issues in science, providing access, in various languages, to information on legislation, 
codes of conduct, best practices, and debates taking place in different European countries.  
 An open dialogue should be established between NGOs, industry, the scientific 
community, religions, cultural groups, philosophical schools and other interested groups, 
stimulating an exchange of views and ideas on a range of critical issues, such as the ethical 
impact of new technologies on future generations, human dignity and integrity, “infoethics” 
and sustainability.97 This could also help to raise awareness among researchers on the ethical 
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dimension of their activities, including research integrity and the key elements of European 
legislation, conventions and codes of conduct.  
 
4.4.2. Guidelines on the Collection and Use of Expertise. 
 
 One of the documents, which were created as a respond to the identified need as well 
as the aftermath of the crisis, was the White Paper on European Governance – it committed 
itself to publish “guidelines on collection and use of expert advice, (…) which could form the 
basis for a common approach for all Institutions and Member States”.98 These guidelines were 
set and started to be applied from 1 January 200399 and they are not legally binding. It means 
that the guidelines cannot be applied to the formal stages of decision-making as set in the 
primary legal acts. “Therefore, both formal legislative procedures and the formal exercise of 
the Commission’s implementing powers with the assistance of “comitology” committees are 
excluded”.100  The activities of comitology committees as well as the use of their produced 
expert advice is regulated by different legal acts (which are obligatory in order to use the 
provided scientific advice) and applied rules, which are already discussed in the Chapter 
“External participation through comitology”. 
 Further in the text the identified guidelines will be analysed, emphasizing the actions 
decided to be applied whenever the Commission’s departments collect and use advice of 
experts coming from outside the responsible department. The delivery of advice from various 
external sources (it is considered to be external as soon as it goes out of the responsible 
department) should be done strictly following the set guidelines, especially when such advice 
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forms a major input to a sensitive policy question.101 Additionally, the weaknesses and 
limitations of the set system will be highlighted due to the already invoked practice. 
 The described guidelines also stress the importance of the core principles, which 
should follow the activities of the Commission whenever they collect and use expert advice.  
 First, the Commission should ensure that the sought advice is of high quality, which is 
distinguished by three determinants: excellence, the extent of acting in an independent manner 
and pluralism. The quality of scientific expertise is based on the excellence of scientists and 
taking into account of indicators such as the number and impact of refereed publications as 
well as possession of practical knowledge. It is also highlighted in the guidelines the 
importance of endorsement of the excellence of scientists by the judgement of peers, which is 
believed102 to be important in the EU institutions decision making process. Experts should 
also be expected to act in an independent manner by minimising “the risk of vested interests 
distorting the advice proffered by establishing practices that promote integrity, by making 
dependencies explicit, and by recognising that some dependencies – varying from issue to 
issue – could impinge on the policy process more than others”.103 And the final determinant of 
quality – pluralism – should be implemented via “diversity of viewpoints, resulting from 
differences in scientific approach, different types of expertise, different institutional 
affiliations, or contrasting opinions over fundamental assumptions underlying the issue (…) 
as well as different geographical, cultural and gender perspectives”.104 
 Other factors may also be mentioned, which are considered to be important, such as 
geographical, cultural and gender perspectives,105 however, they might also have negative 
result, having in mind that “scientists may be picked because of where they come from rather 
                                                 
101
 ibid. 
102
 Ragnar Lofstedt and Robyn Fairman (n 82) 29. 
103
 COM (2002) 713 final (n 99) 9. 
104
 ibid. 
105
 ibid. 
 147 
than based on scientific expertise that they can bring to the table” or operating gender quotas 
“with the expectation that no less than 40 percent of experts will be either male or female”, as 
well as having in mind that “the selection process of those scientists who participate is not via 
peer nominations (…) but, rather, scientists are asked to apply via advertisements in select 
publications to possibly take part in the scientific committees”.106 
A selection jury composed of members of the Scientific Steering Committee (which 
co-ordinates the scientific committees)107 will give “preference” to candidates:108 professional 
experience in the field of consumer health and more specifically in the areas covered by the 
field of consumer health and more specifically in the areas covered by the field of competence 
of the committee concerned; experience in risk assessment; experience in delivering scientific 
opinion at national or international level; professional experience in a multidisciplinary and 
international environment; attested scientific excellence; experience in scientific management.  
The guidelines do not clearly specify how the qualification and experience of a chosen 
scientist should be defined. Also it does not provide advice on the need to involve a person in 
a decision-making process with a deep scientific knowledge in a specific area, but also being 
able to manage the provided tasks, communicate the possessed or acquired scientific 
knowledge both to outside interested parties, as well as to internal authoritative bodies, 
interrelate its core scientific field with related other areas and similar.  
 
 Second, the Commission should be open in seeking and acting on advice from 
experts. In order to ensure openness, transparency is the key instrument to do that. 
“Transparency is required, particularly in relation to the way issues are framed, experts are 
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selected, and results handled. It also implies a strategy for proactive communication in which 
the Commission should constantly seek ways to better publicise and explain its use of 
expertise to interested parties and the public at large.”109 Additionally the Commission should 
take all the responsibility for its initiatives without striking a wrong note that it hides behind 
expert advice. It must be capable of justifying and explaining the way expertise has been 
involved, and the choices it has made based on advice. However, there might be cases when 
openness might be detrimental to the quality of advice or even damage the legitimate interests 
of those concerned with the process. Nevertheless, each case should be analysed separately by 
keeping transparency for reasons for not being open.  
 And a third core principle to be followed is effectiveness. Implementation of this 
principle covers methods for collection/obtainment and usage of expert advice which aims to 
use limited resources effectively by weighing short-term costs against anticipated longer-term 
gains. “This means that arrangements for collecting and using expertise should be designed in 
proportion to the task in hand, taking account of the sector concerned, the issue in question, 
and the stage in the policy cycle. (…) In any case, a system of routine monitoring, evaluation 
and review will be needed to help improve methods on a continuous basis. Such a system 
should focus both on process and outcome. (…) This needs to be done with an active 
participation of the Commission departments, the experts, and interested parties, having in 
mind that these different stakeholders may not judge effectiveness using the same criteria.” 110 
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The White Paper on European Governance identifies five action lines regarding 
expertise:111 
1) an inventory network on expertise – improving access to and transparency of the sources 
by providing continuity over time and ensuring that “institutional memory” is maintained 
within the administration. The Commission has compiled an inventory of comitology 
committees, consultative bodies, civil society organisations and as a second step, it has 
planned to involve the establishment of a network of inventories of EU bodies providing 
expert input into the EU policy making; 
2) guidelines on expert advice – the product was prepared by the Commission’s services, 
with early consultation of other EU institutions, Member States and a variety of providers 
and users of expertise. The guidelines aim at identifying the issues requiring expertise and 
enhancing openness and transparency, accountability and plurality as well as quality in the 
way experts are selected and expert advice is used; 
3) procedures to guarantee access and participation – in order to ensure effective decision - 
making procedure, open meetings of committees where expert advice is provided or 
special hearing should be organised, and regular access to publications of expert advice 
and of any evidence used for policy formulation, evaluation and etc. should be guaranteed; 
4) “extended peer review” – knowledge used for policy-making and public debate should 
not only be excellent from a scientific point of view; it also needs to be “socially robust”, 
responding to policy, social, economic needs or concerns; 
and integrated procedures for risk governance – risk governance takes not only risk 
assessment and risk management, but also risk identification, evaluation and communication, 
by involving all actors. 
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 The Commission has set internal guidelines to be applied by the Commission 
departments, so it means that the required actions are applicable providing expertise and 
know-how only to the EU institutions. It does not oblige EU civil servants to apply the same 
rules and actions in cases of initiated public debates or other sensitive issues arising.  
 It should also be noted that the actions to be taken are only of a voluntarily origin and 
they are not obligatory for the civil servants to be applied. The rules sound to be easy-to-do 
way to get external know-how to be applied in the EU policies. On the other hand, the 
question remains, however, whether the Commission has put its primary attention on the 
scientific peer-review process, i.e. to ensure that the process is transparent, efficient, and of 
high quality.112 
  
 In order to formalise the incoming expertise and knowledge from external sources, a 
heap of stages of planning this procedure should be implemented, or at least be followed. 
 Planning procedure. Even though it is agreed by lots of academics as well as by civil 
servants themselves that maintaining an adequate level of in-house expertise is quite 
expensive, however a minimum level is still required in order to be able to organise, collect 
and monitor external expertise, as well as in order to act as an “intelligent customer” of 
external advice. This could be solved if external “peers” could be convened to help to select 
suitable experts. 
 The three principles should be reinforced as the basis of the good performance of the 
scientific committees is the excellence of their members, their independence and the 
transparency of the provided advice.113 
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 If departments lack an adequate level of expertise, internal sources (other departments’ 
resources) should be used first, then it is advised to invite national experts on detachment to 
play a role and only at the very outside cases external expertise should be invited. Before 
involving external advice, the pertinent knowledge accumulated in European research 
programmes, relevant information tools as well as the institution’s own knowledge-base 
readily available in an understandable form should be evaluated. Regarding this need, the 
European Commission has established common guidelines114 on the sharing of scientific data 
between the scientific committees, agencies and other EU institutions. The common interest 
of the established agencies, scientific committees/panels is to improve cooperation in order to 
develop synergies and share knowledge. The need to exchange the possessed data and/or 
scientific knowledge especially arises when a scientific committee/panel has to assess a 
substance which is being, or has already been considered by another scientific body 
(particularly important, if the scientific body is coming to conclusions or recommendations 
which are different from those of the previously published ones or it is planned to make 
evaluations of the same substance for different users).115 
 Policy issues that require expert advice should be identified as early as possible and 
also an evaluation of an effect to the institution’s “corporate memory” and perceived 
independence should be carried out. If to consider the matter of making the process more 
cost-effective, the inviting institutions should check if the information on previous expert 
input is relevant to the issue in question been exchanged, and if the arising issues could be 
grouped in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of experts. And taking the final decision, 
the inviting institution has to make sure that the inclusion of external expertise would enhance 
the credibility of the process. However, the already discussed common guidelines “do not 
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concern the exchange of information and relation with third countries or with Member States 
and their agencies and are without prejudice to the requirements, criteria and arrangements in 
that respect”.116 
 It should be noted that the advised planning procedure is formed in a way an internal 
expertise and the possessed knowledge-base is preferred against external expert advice. 
Following this procedure, the external expertise is only sought in cases when internal 
expertise is verified, national experts on detachment, related knowledge accumulated in 
European research programmes, EU institutions’ own knowledge-base and other resources are 
checked, only then external expertise is invited. This policy might have a couple of shortages, 
i.e. inviting only national experts on detachment might be limited to choice, as the actual 
competence in certain instances can actually be found in third countries, for example, Japan or 
the United States. Keeping in mind the urgency of the needed expertise in some cases (i.e. the 
already discussed BSE crisis case), this procedure might take too long until the non-possessed 
internally expertise can be found and acquired.  
 Additionally, having in mind the fundamental changes, implemented by the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the Commission is simply allowed to use another form of group for discussions rather 
than comitology committees (Delegated Acts regime), i.e. expert groups (the Commission 
will still need to consult with Member States) and EU agencies, by abolishing comitology 
committees. If participation of external participants in decision-making was very limited 
under the “old comitology system”, the new changes ensure the increase of the number of 
actors involved, meaning that information will be more accessible117 and possibility to get 
involved in the decision-making process will be more feasible. 
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 Preparation for the collection of expertise. First of all the manner of involvement of 
experts should be identified (in-house, consultancy, expert group, conference, individual 
approach and etc.). Secondly, the criteria for selection (e.g. level of academic achievement or 
practical experience) should also be set. The determinants for selection could be urgency, 
complexity and sensitivity of the policy issue. It should be noted that this step is taken only in 
such cases, if the consultation of specific scientific committees was not foreseen under 
existing legislation.118  
 The scope and objective of the experts’ involvement, and the questions they will 
address, should have all the facets of the problem been correctly analysed, different sectors 
and disciplines been involved, and be set out clearly on the framed questions and underlined 
assumptions.119 Therefore, it should also be estimated the science’s position towards 
environmental risks – if science has a poor proficiency in predicting environmental risks, or if 
avoidance of certain types of environmental harms is very important to society, decision-
makers shall take those circumstances into account in making their best judgement resolution 
of uncertainty. The decision itself shall be made by giving due weight to important 
environmental values, risk aversion, limitations in knowledge and concerns about ecosystem 
fragility. 120 
 One of the most important steps in this part of collection of expertise is to decide who 
should be involved in the scoping exercise to determine the range of expertise required: 
whether it is enough only to involve internal participants, or would it be beneficial to invite 
external participants from different disciplines and sectors. 121   
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However, the European institutions are not bound by an external scientific advice, 
what was also supported in the General Court’s decision – “the [Union] institutions took the 
conclusions and recommendations in the various reports from international, [Union] and 
national bodies into account only as supplementary material”.122 It was acknowledged that the 
provided scientific advice did not provide the primary justification and the only opinion used 
for the EU’s ban was the committee’s opinion. 
 Having in mind that the Commission is advised to keep the minimum level of in-house 
expertise due to its effectiveness versus costs, it might be hard to fill the gap in knowledge or 
organize a further research to tackle significant gaps in knowledge due to limited resources 
and possible limited knowledge-base to be able to take a well-timed and up-to-date scientific 
decision. This is especially important for assessment the risks on different policy issues, 
ensuring that all plausible hazards are considered and reflected in questions put to experts – 
the in-house expertise have to possess sufficient knowledge to be capable to evaluate in order 
to ensure that if a broad–based approach is chosen, resource limitations might increase and 
another challenge should be taken into account that the final results might be hard to monitor 
and use for future references. Especially if the chairing institution decides to involve multiple 
experts through interactive and collegial discussions within carefully constituted expert 
panels, where multidisciplinary and multi-sect oral groups encourage a cross-fertilisation of 
ideas, stimulate debate and lead to sharpened opinions, as well covering a position, where 
adherents to different schools of thought as well as those with “maverick” views enter a 
dialogue and are represented among the experts.123  
 The EU Institutions seek to hold an optimum level of in-house expertise; however as a 
condition for success it is also necessary to be able to have contacts with external experts. The 
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required knowledge might range from natural or social sciences scientific assessment up to 
controversial aspects where expertise is expected to state what is unknown or uncertain with 
differing degrees of probability. The provided expertise might also differ depending from 
which source it originates – academic, possessing practical knowledge or those who have 
direct stakes in the policy issue. None the less it is also important that interested parties and 
the public in general are convinced that the taken decisions chosen from some options are 
sound.124  
 
 A completely different situation has been noticed in practice. For example, Lord Lucas 
in his speech125 has “identified the requirement by politicians and government for a “single 
clear recommendation” from expert committees as a factor that ensures that only those from 
within the accepted middle-ground of science were invited onto committees”. It means that 
politicians and governments expect a decision to be based on consensus, which might exclude 
extremes or innovative views.126  
 However, the inviting Institution should also have possibility to withdraw or exclude 
the involved external experts in policy shaping procedure due to a possible conflict of interest 
or possible affection by an eventual policy decision. Analysis of practical situations and 
application of the above described guidelines, have showed that “experts have been drawn 
from government, academia and industry, though not from organizations representing 
consumers. In many cases industrial scientists have been drawn from the same industries and 
firms whose products were regulated. Members of the expert advisory committees who were 
not directly employed by industry could, and often did, act as paid consultants to the 
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companies whose products they were evaluating, even though those links were often not 
disclosed”.127    
 On the other hand, it has been identified that a consideration of the circumstances, 
where it is appropriate to withhold the identity of experts in order to protect them against 
undue external pressures or to protect the legitimate interests of those concerned with the 
process, should be taken into account. 
 
 Involvement of experts. After all the provided discussion, it seems obvious that experts 
are needed to reassure, warn and shed the light for consumers on complex and often 
controversial issues arising on a day-to-day basis. As the decision is taken to involve experts, 
the record of the terms of reference and the main contributions of different experts or groups 
of experts should be maintained. 
 The EU institutions, consulting experts, and with help of the involved experts should 
determine whether the assembled expertise covers the topics to be addressed and whether 
sufficient pertinent background information and data are available and ensure that there is a 
clear understanding of the mandate and the tasks assigned.128 It needs also to be considered 
what actions should be taken if conflicts of interest emerge and some of the involved experts 
might leave the group. 
 When experts start working, the internal responsible staff of the EU Institutions have 
to be ready to deal with any modifications to the suggested work plan due to any recent 
scientific developments or other unanticipated issues, e.g. due to a change in the plan because 
the formed expert group is able to perform only part of the proposed work or even go beyond 
the framed issue. Inviting Institutions need to evaluate its human resources in order to arrange 
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all the necessary administrative issues related to the proposed changes or to make other 
arrangements be made to investigate the questions not covered. It also needs to be decided 
what actions should be taken if experts need additional data or information – whether this 
information should be provided by the EU Institutions or experts are expected to seek and 
collect the missing information themselves by expanding the attributed tasks.  
 The above provided information is based on the guidelines, prepared by the 
Commission. However, again, there is quite a lot of faulty practice in reality. It has been 
identified, that “[e]xpert advisory committees, at all levels of governance, often judged 
dossiers of information that were mainly or entirely assembled by the companies whose 
products were being judged.”129 There were also problems with the property of the 
information, which most often was the property of the companies concerned, and due to that 
in most cases it was refused to be published or disclosed.  
 Even though it is advised to make the main documents, associated with the use of 
expertise on a policy issue and especially the data on the advice taken, available to the public, 
making sure that all commercially sensitive information is suitably protected, however, there 
are no implemented actions for risk communication if the possessed information gets 
disclosed and unintended negative has or might have influence on public.  
  
 However, the guidelines have not provided any advice on the proper use of a received 
scientific expertise by the politicians and staff of the EU institutions. It was noticed130 that 
“decisions about the scope of risk assessments, i.e. which kinds of effects to deem as risks and 
which to exclude or discount, and about the trade-offs between risks and benefits were 
frequently taken within scientific committees and misrepresented as purely scientific, 
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ministers and officials could, and did, hide behind the advice of the scientists, displacing 
responsibility for policy to committees of experts”.131 Therefore, it is targeted that decision-
makers acted as representatives of society, by making their best estimation of the probability 
distribution for the uncertain risk in question through a process that invites public and expert 
input and making explicit and public the relevant uncertainties and the bases for the 
regulators’ determinations.132 
 There is a risk to misrepresent policy decisions as “having been based on, and only on, 
“sound science”, while in practice they might be based on implicit and covert economic and 
political considerations and judgements”.133 However, Christian Joerges advocates that 
market integration and risk regulation cannot be left to scientific and market actors alone but 
require political guidance.134 Actually, “in many cases the expert groups avoid discussing and 
handling issues that are extremely controversial; the push is not to reach an agreement at all 
costs if there are heavy political commitments involved”.135 
 There is also a niche to abuse the formed situation for the benefit of EU officials – 
expert committees might sometimes be set up in ways favouring particular policy outcomes, 
and later construing the provided scientists’ decisions as if they are purely scientific and 
independent judgements. It is also noticed an “increasing reliance of the [Union] legislator on 
private standard-setting organizations” by delegating regulatory competencies136 to some very 
specialised sectors. The delegation of regulatory decision-making powers to private-law 
bodies “completely outside of the institutional processes laid down in the EU Treaty, with no 
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institutional link or framework ever having been laid down for them”.137 As the origins and 
nature of a scientific decision differ from regulation in a number of fundamental ways,138 the 
taken decisions may not even meet the rule of law, and be biased towards private interests 
rather than yield “public interest”. On the other hand, legal decision-making is made by 
officially elected and publicly accountable officials, and any delegation of rulemaking power 
should be traceable to the superiors source of legitimacy.139 
 On the other hand, it may happen, those in highly adversarial regulatory proceedings, 
experts other than the ultimate decision makers (for example industry experts and 
environmental advocacy experts, experts from different disciplines and backgrounds) may 
hold sharply opposed views as to the nature and extent of the uncertainty and the decision to 
be made.140  
The prevailing majority opinion might lead to favouring a limited group of powerful, 
well-organised, well-funded and professionally represented actors in any given policy area, 
representing often quite narrow interests. This might result a situation where it is easy for 
European action to be portrayed as not being properly accountable and as lacking 
legitimacy.141 Due to the legitimacy crisis of the EU institutions and of the Commission in 
particular, the involvement of interest groups and civil society has become part of the 
Commission’s attempt to legitimate itself and its functions. It includes contacts with private 
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firms, its interaction with scientific experts or with national administrations in order to avoid 
forming of cartels of representation and consultation, exerting a covert stranglehold on key 
stages of policy process.142 
There is always a risk of balancing between an attempt to involve as many participants 
as possible into the decision-making process, and an attempt to avoid dominance of narrow 
interests. In order to ensure the best involvement of external participants in the decision-
making process, the question of accountability needs to be addressed. The goal is to open up 
policy-making in order to make it more visible and understandable for ordinary people and 
more acceptable for those, concerned with the decisions, because with higher involvement 
comes greater responsibility. The legitimacy of decision-making today depends on the 
involvement and participation, as well as on the transparency of decisions. First of all, the EU 
institutions should work on “a general policy of transparency”, with a more systematic use of 
range of media, especially information technology, and on “a general policy of inclusion” 
which could guarantee the systematic involvement of representatives of all affected interests 
at all stages of the policy process from the framing of problems to the evaluation and revision 
of policies.143 
 There are some suggested solutions to the described examples of the already noticed 
faulty practice. One of the main suggestions to this situation – to separate regulation from 
sponsorship,144 for example, it is expected scientific advisors to be entirely independent of 
commercial and industrial interests or whether such links remain – to be more transparent 
than hitherto. Expert advisors are expected to be “independent”; however nobody knows upon 
whom they may previously have been dependant. They might be independent of commercial 
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interests; however, it should be ensured that scientists are independent also of political 
pressures from politicians and officials.145 
 Another issue, which is not much discussed in the published guidelines – the ways in 
which scientific advice should be procured. Following the EU legislation on public 
procurement, most of the above suggested actions might be considered to be illegal. On the 
other hand, if a collection in the form of consultancy work (studies following open calls for 
tender) is chosen, a consultation of interested parties on the framing of the questions and 
underlying assumptions, particularly on sensitive issues, might not be considered appropriate 
due to public procurement legal procedures. 
 
4.5. Use of Scientific Expertise in Decision-making Process. 
 
 It is emphasized by the General Court that the consultation with the relevant scientific 
committee is mandatory,146 given that the Commission cannot assess for itself the safety or 
efficacy of the product, consultation is necessary to give the Commission the scientific 
evidence from which it could make a reasoned opinion.147 
Additionally, it needs to show how input from experts has been taken into account by 
explaining it in the explanatory memorandum, or in an annex to the proposal and also 
informing experts of the outcome of the process to which they have contributed. However, the 
CJEU has supported the general principle, that “the measures (…) need not be completely 
consistent with the scientific advice and the absence of such advice or the fact that it is 
inconclusive cannot prevent the Council from adopting such measures as it deems necessary 
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for achieving the objectives,”148 which means that the authoritative institutions do not always 
need to possess full available scientific data to make a decision. 
The Commission is also obliged to put stating that “all Commission legislative 
proposals respect all the fundamental rights concerned in the course of normal decision-
making procedures”. Consequently, it has decided that “any proposal for legislation and any 
draft instrument to be adopted by it would, as part of the normal decision-making procedures, 
first be scrutinised for compatibility with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union”.149    
On the other hand, not all decisions, taken by an expert advisory committee and 
approved by the Commission, might be also approved by the CJEU. For example, 
notwithstanding the decisions of the Commission, which have been taken based on the 
opinion of an expert advisory committee that the drugs should be taken off the market 
acknowledging a new consensus in the medical community that the drugs should no longer be 
prescribed, the General Court has decided that “the competent authority makes a detailed 
acknowledgment that it had incorrectly assessed a medicinal product”, which had to be 
justified “only where a new potential risk or the lack of efficacy is substantiated by new, 
objective, scientific and/or medical data or information”.150 The General Court’s decision in 
this case was uphold by the CJEU151 “principally because under the relevant EU legislation 
the Commission did not have the competence to make the contested decisions”.152  
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The control over the decision-makers was asserted in an earlier General Court’s 
decision – “the [Union] judicature may be called upon to review, first, the formal legality of 
the CPMP's scientific opinion and, second, the Commission's exercise of its discretion”.153 
Though, the asserted control is not unconditional – the General Court cannot substitute its 
view with the one, provided by the relevant scientific committee, - “it is only the proper 
functioning of the CPMP, the internal consistency of the opinion and the statement of reasons 
contained therein [as well as a comprehensible link between the medical and/or scientific 
findings and its conclusions] which are subject to judicial review”.154 The General Court may 
request to prove references of the relevant scientific committee “to the main reports and 
scientific expert opinions on which it relies and to explain, in the event of a significant 
discrepancy, the reasons why it has departed from the conclusions of the reports or expert 
opinions supplied by the undertakings concerned”.155 
It should also be noted that the European Commission might refuse to follow the 
provided scientific advice. For example, in Pfizer’s case156 the General Court had rejected an 
argument of the applicant that the contested Regulation was tainted by factual errors.157 It 
found that the Commission and the Council have not ignored the findings of the scientific 
committee; nevertheless they have not accepted the final conclusions, as they may disregard 
the conclusions drawn in the committee opinion, even though, in some places, it relies on 
certain aspects of the scientific analysis in the opinion.158 This finding was further explained 
by the General Court, justifying on grounds of principle relating to the political 
responsibilities and democratic legitimacy of the Commission, by the Parliament's political 
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control. The members of scientific committee, although they have scientific legitimacy, have 
neither democratic legitimacy nor political responsibilities. Scientific legitimacy cannot be 
treated as a sufficient basis for the exercise of public authority.159 
However, this decision was harshly criticized as it did not accord sufficient weight to 
the expert scientific opinion. “The line between the political responsibility of the institutional 
decision-makers and the scientific tasks of the expert committee can be difficult to maintain. 
Though, it is neither defined “whether the political institutions have sufficient alternative 
material to base their judgment on when they choose not to follow the committee’s 
opinion”.160 
It is also worth noting that General Court has hold that neither the Commission, nor 
the Council have an obligation to undertake a second consultation if a new study comes out 
after a scientific opinion has been provided to the competent authorities, since the legislation 
confers a discretion161 on the Commission and any judgments taken in that regard do not 
constitute authority. The obligation to carry out of further studies following the granting of 
authorization may be adopted only for objective and verifiable reasons that are in particular 
where in the present state of scientific knowledge the applicant cannot provide comprehensive 
information on the efficacy and safety of the medicinal product in question under normal 
conditions of use.162 However, the General Court has allowed the withdrawal of a marketing 
authorization only where a new potential risk or the lack of efficacy is substantiated by new, 
objective, scientific and/or medical data or information.163  
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In CEVA case164 the Commission has refused to approve veterinary medicinal 
products, which were confirmed by a positive opinion from the Committee for Veterinary 
Medicinal Products, claiming that “a high level of human health protection may be achieved 
only if assessments made by committees such as the CVMP are balanced by the competent 
institutions against all the scientific information available, taking into account scientific 
uncertainty, consumers' concerns, ethical or moral considerations or other legitimate factors 
and the precautionary principle”. In this case the CJEU has decided that the Commission 
acted unlawfully by refusing to follow an advice of its own expert scientific committee.165  
This position was also supported in another General Court’s decision, where it has 
stated that “the Commission set up [the scientific committee] specifically with the aim of 
ensuring that  [Union] legislation is founded on objective and sound scientific findings”.166 
The main aim of the established scientific committee is to provide a thorough advice in order 
for “the  [Union] institutions [to] show, first, that the contested regulation was adopted 
following as thorough a scientific risk assessment as possible, (…) and, second, that they had 
available, on the basis of that assessment, sufficient scientific indications to conclude, on an 
objective scientific basis”.167 “Just like the Commission with regard to the content of the draft 
decisions agreed upon by committees of scientific experts with the explicit and detailed 
technical expertise in a given area,168 one cannot easily imagine that the Council is in a 
position to second-guess or change the content of detailed and specific negotiations with a 
third state”.169 
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4.6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The designed policy documents are mainly intended for identification of the need as 
well as collection of technical and scientific advice. They were drafted in order to formalise 
the procedure of obtainment of scientific expertise and use of it in further decision-making 
process. However, the described procedures were only implemented in the soft law and no 
further developments have been noticed after. The guidelines are only of recommendatory 
nature and the EU institutions are obliged to apply them in their everyday practice – these 
policy documents are not obligatory for EU Member States or other bodies. It seems to be 
agreed that scientific expertise is vital for the EU decision-making; however the practice of 
scientific participation and the amount as well as the level of scientific interference has been 
left as an optional alternative to be decided in order to make a final regulatory or political 
decision by EU institutional authorities.  
 The Commission stated that regarding the reorganization of the work of the 
obtainment and use of scientific expertise “[it] will concentrate efforts to build a reliable and 
flexible structure which shall enable high quality and independent scientific advice, to ensure 
transparency and consideration of the scientific advice in the legislative activities of the  
[Union] Institutions”.170 However, the development of systems to provide scientific advice, 
are closely related to an obligation to use “risk analysis”. “The use of risk analysis by the 
European Commission in assessing the need for legislative or administrative action involves 
the European Commission in the evaluation of large quantities of complex and often 
contradictory scientific data”.171 Decision makers are constantly faced with dilemma of 
balancing the freedom and rights of individuals, industry and organizations with the need to 
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reduce the risk of adverse effects to the environment, human, animal or plant health. There are 
quite a lot of discussions, both in the EU and international arena, that in cases of scientific 
uncertainty, science cannot dictate decisions, however it must remain a foundation of any 
precautionary measure.172 
 The analysis of this Chapter has showed that the EU institutional structure 
acknowledges, especially after the BSE crisis, the importance of up-to-date scientific 
expertise in the legitimate decision-making processes. However, there are still quite a lot of 
weaknesses by attempting to formalize it and apply in everyday practice. Scientific expertise 
might be one form of possible external participation, which allows professional advice to be 
implemented in regulatory decision-making process. However, as it was stated by the 
Commission, the core of a new political departure towards the new policy, should be clearly 
based on the three general principles, which state that legitimate responsibility should be 
separated from scientific advice and the latter should be made transparable and widely-
available. The core principles are followed in the drafted guidelines and policies; however the 
scientific participation itself is still applied on ad hoc basis. The guidelines on collection and 
use of expertise have comprehensively described how it should be included into the decision-
making process; however those were the only documents which have tried to legitimate the 
possible external participation.  
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V. CHAPTER 
 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN COLLECTION AND USE OF SCIENTIFIC 
EXPERTISE 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION. 
 
The previous Chapter “Collection and use of expertise” has analysed the political and 
legal instruments, which have followed the establishment of the need to involve scientific 
expertise in most EU legal activities. It has defined the ways both external and in-house 
expertise shall be obtained in the decision-making process and an obligation to use it in the 
taken decisions. At a certain point, the Commission must make a judgement on the advice and 
views it has received, whether to seek yet further advice, to commission further research or to 
make a provisional proposal in line with the precautionary principle.1 The use of the 
precautionary principle under the set requirements, which will be discussed in more details 
later in the Chapter, is dependent on available scientific knowledge, which is not always 
available at the in-house level. “When a scientific process is at issue, the competent public 
                                                 
1
 Commission, “The collection and use of expertise by the Commission: principles and guidelines: Improving the 
knowledge base for better policies“ (Communication) COM (2002) 713 final, p.19. 
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authority must, in compliance with the relevant provisions, entrust a scientific risk assessment 
to experts who, once the scientific process is completed, will provide it with scientific 
advice”.2 It is not specified whether this advice ought to be internal or obtained from external 
sources, as it is analysed in the Chapter “Collection and use of expertise”. Though, the sought 
scientific advice has to be based on the principles of excellence, independence and 
transparency, and it is assumed to be an important procedural guarantee which ensures the 
scientific objectivity of the measures adopted and preclude any arbitrary measures.3  
 In cases, where the scientific basis is insufficient or some uncertainty exists, the EU 
Commission should be guided in its risk analysis by the precautionary principle,4 which is one 
of the key elements for risk management, as it as intervention goes to the heart of regulation 
of hazardous activities and their place in society, giving full weight to economic, social and 
environmental factors. “Absence of evidence of risk” should never be confused with, or taken 
as, “evidence of absence of risk”.5 Clearly care is needed in making judgments on whether 
there is a good reason to believe that harmful effects might occur, and on the extent of 
scientific uncertainty. 
There is no crucial discussion on whether scientific expertise should be implemented 
into a regulatory decision-making process. However, the normative procedure becomes more 
and more complicated; more unknowns need to be covered in order to assess the need for 
legislative or administrative action and also the need for inclusion of supportive expert advice. 
One of the main factors, especially in the area of environmental policy, to be used in 
evaluating a large quantity of complex and in most cases contradictory scientific information, 
is risk analysis based on the precautionary principle. As decision-making increasingly takes 
                                                 
2
 Case T-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council [2002] ECR I-2211, § 157. 
3
 ibid § 159 and 172. 
4
 Commission, “Consumer Health and Food Safety” (Communication) COM (1997) 183 final, p. 20. 
5
 Interdepartmental Liaison Group on Risk Assessment, The Precautionary principle: policy and application, 
September 2002, p.7; 
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place at the [Union] level and since risk regulation is recognized as being a matter which 
requires flexible and speedy decision-making, this principle becomes the foundation for the 
taken decisions to be based on, if there is a lack of information or a doubt that the provided 
obligatory scientific advice is not fully examined or there is a risk of adverse effect.  
The analysis of the Chapter begins by a review of the development of the 
precautionary principle, which has become of increased importance in the EU law. On the one 
hand, the precautionary principle is recognised as a main principle of the EU policy, though, 
on the other hand it is still used in a concealed form.  
 It will cover constituent parts of the precautionary principle and the set guidelines on 
the application, which were confirmed by the [Union] judicature. The further analysis will be 
extended into the evolution of this principle into the general principle of EU law and the 
implemented freedom for decision-makers to acknowledge that they “do not know” what shall 
be the right decision to be ruled upon. The analysis will also cover the obligation of the EU 
institutions to involve scientific independent expertise into the risk assessment stage and the 
procedures to be applied to it. It will also focus on the possibilities for external participants to 
define the regulatory or market failure (potential danger) where a public intervention may be 
necessitated in order to provide reliable and cogent information to be decided upon. The final 
part of the chapter will deal with the criticism the application of this principle needs to 
manage. 
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5.2. HISTORY AND DEFINITION OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE. 
 
In academic literature, as well as primary legal sources, there are various definitions of 
the precautionary principle, which are often similar in form and substance, yet they contain 
seemingly minor wording differences with potentially major policy implications.6 The most 
noteworthy and extraordinary observation could be highlighted – even the judicial system of 
the EU has not attempted to define the precautionary principle in its decisions.7 
The precautionary principle has its beginnings in German national law, where in 
1970s the “Vorsorge” (a foresight) principle was developed into a fundamental principle of 
German environmental law (balanced by principles of economic viability), based on a belief 
that a society should seek to avoid environmental damage by careful forward planning, 
blocking the flow of potentially harmful activities.8 Later, the idea of the developed 
“foresight” principle was implemented into a number of international environmental 
agreements and treaties both over Europe and in international arena.9 “At international level, 
recognition of the precautionary principle has been a long process, starting with the 1982 
World Charter for Nature”.10 Later on, the principle was developed and introduced in 
international statements of environmental policy and in 1984 it was introduced at the First 
International Conference on Protection of the North Sea.11   
                                                 
6
 Gary E. Marchant and Kenneth L. Mossman (2005), Arbitrary and Capricious. The Precautionary Principle in 
the European Union Courts; published in Great Britain by International Policy Press, a division of International 
Policy Network; p. 10. 
7
 “After a detailed analysis of more than sixty EU judicial opinions through February 2004, none of the opinions 
attempts to define the precautionary principle (with perhaps one exception)”. ibis 31. 
8
 J. Tickner, C. Raffensperger and N. Meyers (2000), The Precautionary Principle in Action: A Handbook; 
Science and Environmental Health Network, p. 2. 
9
 Gary E. Marchant and Kenneth L. Mossman (n 6) 5. 
10
 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on “Use of the precautionary principle“ (2000/C 268/04) 
[2000] OJ C 268, p. 8. 
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 J. Tickner, C. Raffensperger and N. Meyers (n 8) 2. 
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In the 1990s most academics could not define the precautionary principle and called it 
in general “an idea”.12 More recently, even though there is no universally accepted definition, 
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development13 was the first source to define the 
precautionary principle, as an urge “where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
environmental damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost effective measures to prevent environmental degradation”. Right on the spot, 
it is worth mentioning that the suggested definition is limited only to “environmental 
degradation”, without suggesting other areas for application, such as public health and similar, 
and it does not impose any affirmative duty to act – it simply states that uncertainty shall not 
preclude the possibility of regulation.14                                                                                                                             
In 1998 this principle with a similar content was defined in the “Wingspread 
statement” – “when an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, 
precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause-and-effect relationships are not 
fully established scientifically”, however the definition, suggested in this legal source, makes 
no mention of economic considerations and the content of the statement is broader than in the 
previously mentioned definition, applying to actions that would harm either the environment 
or human health and imposing a positive obligation to act.  
It is also worth denoting that there are various models of the precautionary principle to 
be accepted worldwide, e.g. the EU has accepted a “political” model of the precautionary 
principle under which uncertainty is a normative principle that triggers precaution, and, in 
                                                 
12
 Integrating Scientific Expertise into Regulatory Decision-Making: National Traditions and European 
Innovations (1997), C. Joerges, K.H. Ladeur and E.Vos (eds.); O. Godard, (1997), “Social Decision-Making 
under Conditions of Scientific Controversy, Expertise and the Precautionary Principle”, Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verl.-Ges., p.65. 
13
 Rio Declaration on environment and development, made at UNCED 1992, ISBN 9 21 100509 4. 
14
 Gary E. Marchant and Kenneth L. Mossman (n 6) 12. 
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comparison, the U.S. model is based on “rationalist” weighing of probabilities and the costs 
and benefits of various alternatives.15 
There is a lot of discussion on the two versions of the precautionary principle, 
introduced by R.B.Stewart,16 who suggests separating the precautionary principle into the 
weak version and the strong one. The “weak” version asserts “that uncertainty regarding the 
adverse environmental effects of an activity should not automatically bar adoption of 
measures to prohibit or otherwise regulate the activity”, though it always sets up a threshold 
or a margin of safety, and once it gets triggered, a regulation cannot be denied. However, just 
the existence of uncertainty regarding risks does not make a mandatory or distinct basis for 
imposing regulatory controls.17  
The “strong” version asserts “that uncertainty provides an affirmative justification for 
regulating an activity or regulating it more stringently than in the absence of uncertainty”, 
what means, that whenever there is an uncertain but serious risk of harm “the activity in 
question should not be undertaken at all until it is proven to be safe by the proponent of 
activity”. Following this version, regulation is mandatory, and regulatory compliance costs 
are not included as a factor to be considered in the regulatory decision. 18  
This position has been demurred as it was “paralysing, forbidding all courses of 
action, including inaction”.19 Sunstein20 maintained the balance between the level of risk and 
the type of the chosen regulatory decision, having a possibility to consider the “entire range of 
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 Tim O’Riordan,  James Cameron and Andrew Jordan (eds.) (2001), The Evolution of the Precautionary 
Principle, in Reinterpreting the Precautionary Principle. 
16
 Richard B. Stewart (2001), Environmental Regulatory Decision Making under Uncertainty, University 
College London Symposium on the Law and Economics of Environmental Policy, September 5-7 2001, p.7. 
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 ibid 9. 
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 ibid 1, 9-10. 
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 Cass R. Sunstein (2003), Beyond the Precautionary Principle, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 
151:1003, p. 1018-1029; and Paul Craig (2012), EU Administrative Law, Oxford University Press, p. 661. 
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possibilities”. It is believed that the EU has adopted the weaker version of the precautionary 
principle. 
Further in the text, the constituent parts of the precautionary principle as well as the 
main principles of its application will be analysed endeavouring to understand the use of this 
principle in the EU policies, activities and legislation. 
 
5.3. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE. 
 
The TFEU itself does not define the constituent components of the precautionary 
principle – it has been left to the community institutions to define and apply the precautionary 
principle. The obscurity, regarding the application or decision-making, including reliance on 
the precautionary principle, is challenged in the Courts of the EU, when EU regulators are 
forced to explain and justify the meaning of the precautionary principle.21 
In 1999 the Council asked the Commission “to be in the future even more determined 
to be guided by the precautionary principle in preparing proposals for legislation and in its 
other consumer-related activities and develop as priority clear and effective guidelines for the 
application of this principle”.22 That was a good impetus for the European Commission to try 
defining and explaining a possible definition of the precautionary principle in the issued 
Communication on the precautionary principle in 2000, covering “those specific 
circumstances where scientific evidence is insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain and there 
are indication through preliminary objective scientific evaluation that there are reasonable 
grounds for concern that the potentially dangerous effects on the environment, human, animal 
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 Gary E. Marchant and Kenneth L. Mossman (n 6) 29-30. 
22
 Use of the precautionary principle (n 10) 6. 
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or plant health may be inconsistent with the chosen level of protection”,23 which “requires 
intervention to maintain the high level of protection chosen by the EU”.24  
It shall be noted that “the precautionary principle is relevant only in the event of a 
potential risk, even if this risk cannot be fully demonstrated or quantified or its effects 
determined because of the insufficiency or inclusive nature of the scientific data”, and “under 
no circumstances be used to justify the adoption of arbitrary decisions”.25  
Another issue to be highlighted is the variation of types of risks subject to the 
precautionary principle. In one opinion, it was stated that “the [Union] must take action even 
in cases where there is not an existing, but a potential risk to the environment”.26 In this 
opinion, the frame of defining a risk is broadened up to a potential risk. In another opinion, 
the Advocate General states that “the objective of the precautionary principle is to protect the 
environment, as well as human life and animal and plant life, when no concrete threat to those 
resources has yet been demonstrated but initial scientific findings indicate a possible risk”,27 
i.e. the type of risk is also widened up to a possible risk, but not a “defined”, “existing” or 
similar type of risk. This opinion was supported in another CJEU’s decision, where it was 
stated that if “there is scientific uncertainty, a risk assessment cannot be required to provide 
the  [Union] institutions with conclusive scientific evidence of the reality of the risk and the 
seriousness of the potential adverse effects were that risk to become a reality”.28 Furthermore, 
“where there is scientific uncertainty as to the existence or extent of risks to human health, the  
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 Commission, “The precautionary principle” (Communication) COM (2000) 1 final 9. 
24
 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, World Commission on the Ethics of 
Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST); The Precautionary Principle; March 2005, p. 13; 
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[Union] institutions may take protective measures without having to wait until the reality and 
seriousness of those risks become fully apparent”.29 
The constituent parts of the precautionary principle may be distinguished between the 
political decision to act or not to act, which is linked to the factors triggering recourse to the 
precautionary principle; as well as to the decision how to act, defining the measures resulting 
from application of the precautionary principle.30 
The precautionary principle should be considered within a structured approach to the 
analysis of risk which comprises three elements: risk assessment (based on the existing body 
of scientific and statistical data), risk management (a process, which weighs policy 
alternatives in consultation with interested parties and selects appropriate prevention and 
control options)31 and risk communication (an exchange of information at all stages of risk 
analysis between all interested parties)32. The utmost attention will be paid for the analysis of 
risk assessment, which is considered to be a scientific process, further in the text. 
In the Pfizer case33 the General Court has defined a risk which must be assessed when 
the precautionary principle is applied. The “risk” associated with the product, the reality and 
the seriousness of which are in dispute, is the possibility that the use of a specific product will 
give rise to adverse effects on human health. It constitutes a function of the probability that 
the use of a product or a procedure will adversely affect the interests protected by the legal 
order, implemented by EU legislation, because of the insufficiency, inconclusiveness or 
imprecision of the results of the studies conducted, comprising the need to assess the degree 
of probability of a certain product or procedure having adverse effects on human health and 
                                                 
29
 Case T-334/07 (n 28) §116; Case C-180/96 United Kingdom v. Commission [1998] ECR I-2265, §99; Case T-
13/99 (n 2) §139. 
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 Paul Craig (n 19) 663. 
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the seriousness of any such adverse effects should the risk materialise34 or there is a likelihood 
of the risk is such that the best available scientific advice cannot assess the risk with sufficient 
confidence to inform decision-making35 and due to that there are indications through 
preliminary objective scientific evaluation that there are reasonable grounds for concern36 
where the EU Commission considers that the  Union has the right to establish the level of 
protection by applying the precautionary principle. 
For example, “in the domain of human health, the existence of solid evidence which, 
while not resolving scientific uncertainty, may reasonably raise doubts as to the safety of a 
substance, justifies, in principle, the refusal to include that substance”.37 The defined risk is a 
constituent part of the risk assessment, which is believed to be a scientific process, in its turn, 
entails hazard identification, hazard characterization, and appraisal of exposure and risk 
characterisation.38 
However, the CJEU has held that the precautionary principle requests “to prevent, 
reduce, and, in so far as is possible, eliminate from the outset, the sources of pollution or 
nuisance by adopting measures of a nature such as to eliminate recognised risks”.39 Here, the 
definition of risk is limited to a “recognised” risk. This opinion seems to be supported in 
another case,40 where the General Court has stated that “the precautionary principle can 
therefore apply only in situations in which there is a risk, notably to human health, which, 
although it is not founded on mere hypotheses that have not been scientifically confirmed, has 
not yet been fully demonstrated”. It suggests that the precautionary principle can be applied in 
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cases in which a risk has to be not only recognised, but also “scientifically confirmed” 
possibly not “fully demonstrated”. This position was also supported in another CJEU’s 
decision, claiming that the “real risk” needs to be “sufficiently established on the basis of the 
latest scientific data available at the date of the adoption of such decision”.41 Anyways, 
“[j]udges repeatedly insist that decisions must be based on a prior scientific assessment/ on a 
risk assessment ground for if zero-risk can be a political choice, it cannot be a scientific 
basis”.42 Even though there can be an objection that a thorough risk assessment is not possible 
due to a scientific uncertainty, “[CJEU] and WTO both answer that scientific uncertainty is 
rarely high enough to prevent from carrying out a risk assessment and rarely affects the 
capacity to reach concrete decisions, especially as it is always possible to adopt provisional 
measures, without having to take a yes or no immediate and final decision”.43 
 
So far, there are two constituent parts defined regarding the precautionary principle – 
the potentiality of the risk and the risk to be assessed in the decision-making process. 
Possessing this information, the political decision whether to act or not shall be triggered. It 
shall take into account the potentially negative effects of a phenomenon through a thorough 
scientific examination of the data relevant to the risks. It shall be followed by the scientific 
evaluation of the potential adverse effects, including the extent of possible damage, 
persistency, reversibility and delayed effect, having in mind the possible scientific uncertainty 
existing in relation to each of these components.44 However, it shall be kept in mind, that 
uncertainty itself does not justify regulation of an uncertain risk.45 
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The CJEU has maintained that “a correct application of the precautionary principle 
presupposes, first, identification of the potentially negative consequences for health of the 
proposed use of processing aids, and secondly, a comprehensive assessment of the risk to 
health based on the most reliable scientific data available and the most recent results of 
international research”.46 
The third constituent part of the precautionary principle is an obligation to obtain 
scientific evidence to base the political decision on. Thus, in a situation in which the 
precautionary principle is applied, a risk assessment cannot be required to provide the  
[Union] institutions with conclusive scientific evidence of the reality of the risk and the 
seriousness of the potential adverse effects were that risk to become a reality.47 It is 
acknowledged that it is not possible in all cases to complete a comprehensive assessment of 
risk.48 “If it was necessary to wait until the research was completed before adopting such 
measures the precautionary principle would be rendered devoid of purpose”.49  
It shall be kept in mind that “the precautionary principle does not replace or challenge 
a rational, scientific procedure. It can be implemented only if scientific data show serious risk, 
and the measures adopted must include new evaluations to permit their adaptation”.50 
Though the EU Institutions are required to carry out technical and scientific 
assessment, based on their responsibility,51 and especially needs to be noted that it needs to be 
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done before any preventive measures are taken.52 Further in the reasoning, the General Court 
defines a scientific risk, which needs to be evaluated while applying the precautionary 
principle: “a scientific risk assessment is commonly defined, at both international level […] 
and [Union] level […], as a scientific process consisting in the identification and 
characterisation of a hazard, the assessment of exposure to the hazard and the characterisation 
of the risk”.53 It was also complemented by the CJEU in the Gowan’s case54 that a 
comprehensive assessment of the risk to health shall be based on the most reliable scientific 
data available and the most recent results of international research.  
However, a preventive measure cannot be based on a purely hypothetical approach to 
the risk, founded on mere conjecture which has not been scientifically verified.55 It follows 
that “a preventive measure may be taken only if the risk, although the reality and extent 
thereof have not been 'fully' demonstrated by conclusive scientific evidence, appears 
nevertheless to be adequately backed up by the scientific data available at the time when the 
measure was taken”.56 In the Monsanto case57 the CJEU held that if dangers are identifiable a 
more comprehensive risk assessment should be required, taking also into account the 
precautionary principle to be compatible with proportionality. For example, the CJEU has 
decided58 that the EU Commission cannot be considered to have applied “the precautionary 
principle in a manifestly erroneous manner in attaching restrictions on use to the authorisation 
of that substance” in the light of evidence (put forward by certain Member States during the 
work of the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health, as well as the 
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Communication59 from the Commission and other studies and reports on the question), which 
tends to show that there was still some scientific uncertainty regarding the assessment of the 
effects. It can only be examined whether the applied restrictive measures are consistent with 
the principle of proportionality. 
It is very important to note that the results of the concluded scientific evaluation could 
result from the variable chosen, lack of data received or existing at the concrete moment, the 
measurements made, the samples drawn, the models used and the causal relationship 
employed, limitations in scientific understanding of causal relationships, the complexity of 
the circumstances to be analysed, and “trans scientific” gaps in the capacities of science.60 It 
may also depend on existing data or lack of some relevant data as well as on qualitative or 
quantitative elements of the analysis.61 The right to choose between the named uncertainties 
provide a wide discretion for the involved scientists or experts to base their opinion on, as 
well as to influence the desired outcome, which were already discussed in the Chapter 
“Collection and use of expertise”. 
 
Having defined the scope of the risk to be assessed during the decision-making 
process when the precautionary principle is used, the General Court had set “the two 
complementary components of risk assessment: ascertaining what level of risk is deemed 
unacceptable and conducting a scientific assessment of the risks”.62 One more of the 
constituent parts of the precautionary principle to be defined are the level or a margin of 
safety acceptable to the society.  
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Determining what level of risk is deemed unacceptable “it is for the [Union] 
institutions to define, observing the applicable rules of the international and [Union] legal 
orders, the political objectives which they intend to pursue within the parameters of the 
powers conferred on them by the Treaty”.63 It has to be a political decision on the level of 
protection both the EU Institutions and/ or national competent authorities deem to determine 
as appropriate to the society. There is no dispute that a “zero-risk” could exist in the particular 
circumstances of each individual case when a preventive measure has to be decided upon, 
however the EU Institutions can legitimately decide to ensure a high level of environment, 
human health and consumer rights protection. “It is by reference to that level of protection 
that they must then, while dealing with the first component of the risk assessment, determine 
the level of risk — i.e. the critical probability threshold for adverse effects on human health 
and for the seriousness of those possible effects — which in their judgment is no longer 
acceptable for society and above which it is necessary, in the interests of protecting human 
health, to take preventive measures in spite of any existing scientific uncertainty”.64  
It is also acceptable, that in some cases even a decision to do nothing may be a 
response in its own right, and decision-makers are not always expected to adopt final 
instruments designed to produce legal effects, which are subject to judicial review.65 Even if 
scientific advice is supported only by a minority fraction of the scientific community, due 
account should be taken of their views, provided the credibility and reputation of this fraction 
are recognised.66 As well as the possessed specific data cannot be only constituted by new 
scientific data from experimental trials, but also when a consensus within a community, 
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reflected in reports by specialists, calls into question the effectiveness of a specific product to 
be used.67 
In its decision,68 the CJEU has supported the Commission’s position that “the 
precautionary principle, which guides its actions, does not have the effect of obliging it to 
follow every scientific opinion without any power to carry out its own assessment, be it an 
opinion issued by a Member State body or by minority members of a Community working 
party”, and has ruled against application of the precautionary principle. In conclusion it could 
be noted that there is “no coherent relationship in the judiciary’s opinions on the appropriate 
relationship between scientific advice and the precautionary principle”.69 
The General Court has also highlighted that, although a full scientific risk assessment 
is not possible to be achieved, it shall not repel the competent public authority from taking 
preventive measures even at very short notice if necessary.70 The competent public authority 
must therefore weigh up its obligations and decide either to wait until the results of more 
detailed scientific research become available or to act on the basis of the scientific 
information available.71 
Returning back to experts role in the decision-making procedure by applying the 
precautionary principle, it shall be denoted that “where experts carry out a scientific risk 
assessment, the competent public authority must be given sufficiently reliable and cogent 
information to allow it to understand the ramifications of the scientific question raised and 
decide upon a policy in full knowledge of the facts”. Based on the received available risk 
assessment, even embodying scientific uncertainty, the received information must “enable the 
competent public authority to ascertain, on the basis of the best available scientific data and 
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the most recent results of international research, whether matters have gone beyond the level 
of risk that it deems acceptable for society”.72  
The final decision on the level of protection, as well as on the measures to be 
appropriate and necessary to prevent the risk from materialising, is taken by a political body, 
implementing its rights and obligations within the parameters of the powers conferred on 
them by the Treaty. The Union institutions are obliged to show that the contested regulation is 
adopted following as thorough a scientific risk assessment as possible, and as the result of this 
assessment the EU Institutions have available, sufficient scientific indications to conclude, on 
an objective scientific basis.73 Notwithstanding, the basis for a decision is formed using a 
scientific evaluation of the particular circumstances of a present case by a committee of 
experts, which has to be provided with the factual questions which need to be answered 
before a competent institution can adopt a decision and assessed the probative value of the 
provided opinion.74 The more detailed analysis of this issue is provided in the Chapter 
“Collection and use of expertise” and Chapter “External participation through comitology”. 
Summarising the study of this principle, some substantive elements should be 
identified. The major attention is provided to the evaluation of a possible hazard or possessed/ 
missing scientific data, which might be elaborated into the following components. 
First, there should be identification of potentially negative effects, if there is a good 
reason to believe that harmful effects might occur, even if the likelihood of harm is remote.75 
Second, the precautionary principle might be applied if scientific uncertainty exists - resulted 
from the variable chosen, the measurements made, the samples drawn, the models used and 
the causal relationship employed. Third, if a scientific evaluation of a risk which because of 
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the insufficiency of the data, its inconclusive or imprecise nature, makes it impossible to 
determine with sufficient certainty the risk in question,76 the final decision-making should be 
left for the political decision-makers to be taken. As it was already mentioned, the final 
decision in no way should be taken based on scientific opinion. 
So, in other words, whenever a situation is faced with potentially “dangerous effects 
deriving from a phenomenon, product or process have been identified, and preliminary 
scientific evaluation does not allow the risk to be determined with sufficient certainty, it is up 
to political decision-makers to judge what is an acceptable level of risk for society”.77 
 
The European Commission believes and implements in its Communication78 that the 
precautionary principle is particularly relevant to the management of risk and should start 
with a scientific evaluation and where possible, identify at each stage the degree of scientific 
uncertainty to be taken into consideration.  
However, there is a controversy as to the role of scientific uncertainty in risk analysis, 
and notably as to whether it belongs under risk assessment or risk management. The European 
Commission considers that measures applying the precautionary principle belong in the 
general framework of risk analysis, because application of the precautionary principle is part 
of risk management, when scientific uncertainty involves a full assessment of the risk and 
when decision-makers consider that the chosen level of protection in the event of a potential 
risk (even if the risk cannot be fully demonstrated or quantified or its effects determined 
because of the insufficiency or inclusive nature of the scientific data) may be in jeopardy.79 
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There is no doubt that the precautionary principle is mainly used for risk assessment 
and/or management, however “risk assessment must be conducted by independent specialist 
scientists or must at least be open to independent examination;” and “risk management is a 
matter for decision-makers, and it is also up to them to decide whether there is a need for 
recourse to the precautionary principle and how that principle is to be applied”.80 In other 
words, the decision-makers mainly take responsibility at the second and third levels, that is, at 
risk management and risk communication levels – the first level is mainly left for the different 
participants to decide on the matter based on the available scientific information and 
providing fresh results needed to ensure ongoing objective risk assessment. 
 
5.4. APPLICATION OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
 
One more issue should be cautioned regarding the application of the precautionary 
principle – it is believed81 that measures based on the precautionary principle must meet a 
series of conditions, including the position that this principle should be applied in conjunction 
with other fundamental principles, e.g. the proportionality principle (the appropriate level of 
protection must be envisaged, such as appropriate treatment, reduction of exposure, tightening 
of controls, adoption of provisional limits, recommendations for populations at risk, etc); non-
discrimination – measures should not be discriminatory in their application; consistency – 
measures should be consistent with the measures already adopted in similar circumstances or 
using similar approaches; examination of the benefits and costs of action and lack of action 
(an economic cost/benefit analysis should be concluded when it is appropriate and feasible as 
well as taking into account non-economic considerations, such as the protection of health, 
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having in mind that the protection of public health must take precedence over economic 
considerations82); examination of scientific developments – the measures shall be maintained 
as long as the scientific data remain incomplete, imprecise or inconclusive and as long as the 
risk is considered too high to be imposed on the society. It should also be noted that 
“regardless of its form, the precautionary measure chosen must be revisable and subject to 
periodic re-examination in the light of new scientific data”,83 suggesting that “precautionary 
measures should have a temporary character before more thorough scientific evidence is 
collected (…) [and] additional evidence [is obtained] that is needed for a more objective risk 
assessment”.84 
Though, it seems that there is no firm position regarding application of the 
precautionary principle – the Advocate General, quoting the Communication on the use of the 
precautionary principle of the European Commission, defines that “conclusive scientific 
evidence of the reality of risk is not required (…) even where cause for concern is based on 
preliminary scientific findings”,85 however the next paragraph does not uphold this position: 
“not every claim or scientifically unfounded presumption of potential risk to human health or 
the environment can justify the adoption of national protective measures. Rather, the risk must 
be adequately substantiated by scientific evidence”.86 Further, the opinion of the Advocate 
General does not provide the more detailed explanation, so it stays unclear whether 
“preliminary scientific findings” might qualify in a decision-making process or the risk “must 
be adequately substantiated by scientific evidence”. Nevertheless, “judges are more than ever 
repeatedly placed in a position where they have to check the scientific basis of such or such 
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precautionary measure that is submitted to them – […] the Courts are more and more drawn 
in the heart of experts’ battles, […] where they are asked to verify if the contested measure is 
scientifically justifiable, if the state of scientific knowledge justifies this measure, if all 
relevant scientific data have been taken into account, or if weak data have been used as a 
simple alibi”.87  
The General Court has set significant guidance as to how the rules of evidence should 
be interpreted taking into account the precautionary principle.88 “The competent authority, 
when considering an application for authorisation of a medicinal product, in principle 
exercises its discretion in weighing up the benefits and risks of that medicinal product — 
reserving the right subsequently to revise its assessment of that benefit/risk balance in the 
light of new scientific data”.89 The undertaking, which seeks for an initial authorization to 
market a medicinal product, in its turn, needs “to prove, first, the efficacy of the medicinal 
product and, second, its safety”.90 It shall be emphasized that “in cases of scientific 
uncertainty reasonable doubts as to the efficacy or safety of a medicinal product are capable 
of justifying a precautionary measure cannot be treated as equivalent to a reversal of the 
burden of proof”.91 
 It shall also be noted that the shift in the burden of proof on risk has also been on 
criticism, as the requirement to prove that an activity or a product is “safe” depends on how 
safety and its proof is defined. It is suggested that regardless of “which party bears the 
ultimate [burden of proof] regarding safety, the standard of proof must be defined in a 
reasonable and workable fashion in order for a regulatory program to function successfully”, 
                                                 
87
 Christine Noiville (n 42) 1-2; 
88
 Paul Craig (n 19) 650. 
89
 Cases T-74, 76, 83, 84, 85, 132, 137 and 141/00, Artegodan GmbH v. Commission, [2002] ECR II-4948, §187. 
90
 ibid § 188. 
91
 ibid § 191. 
 189 
as in some cases the regulated party is better able to generate the relevant data, and in other 
instances, the regulator may have superior capacity.92 
The burden of proof lies with the EU Commission, though the  General Court has held 
that the precautionary principle is relevant in discharging this obligation. The EU 
Commission has enshrined the principle of prior approval or fair notice before the placing on 
the market of certain products, - it will no longer be the user, a private individual, a consumer 
association, citizens or the public authorities complaining about possible damage that will 
have to bring forth reasonable proof of the nature of a danger and the level of risk posed by a 
product or a process before a regulation is made. Rather it is up to the business community 
(the regulated) to carry out the scientific work needed to evaluate the risk and as a minimum 
should provide the information needed for a decision-making, and until it is not proved to the 
contrary, the legislator is not legally entitled to authorize the use of substances.93 
One more criteria needs to be highlighted in this scope – whether and how costs are to 
be considered in making regulatory decisions. The European Commission has stated in its 
Communication that the precautionary principle incorporates the principle of proportionality, 
in that “[m]easures based on the precautionary principle must not be disproportionate to the 
desired level of protection and must not aim at zero risk, something which rarely exists”.94 
The CJEU has supported the Commission’s position by stating that “[i]t is never possible to 
prove conclusively that (…) anything created by modern technology represents a zero-risk to 
public health now or that it will do so in the future. To apply such a test would quickly lead to 
the paralysis of technological development and innovation”.95 The analysis of the taken 
decisions, based on the precautionary principle, it is possible to sum up that “[j]udges refrain 
                                                 
92
 Richard B. Stewart (n 16) 35-36. 
93
 Use of the precautionary principle (n 10) 10. 
94
 COM (2000) 1 final (n 23) 18. 
95
 Case T-13/99 (n 2) § 130. 
 190 
from defining a risk threshold below which a precautionary measure would be considered 
unfounded”.96  
 
5.5. THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF EU LAW 
 
It is believed97 that the biggest supporter of this principle is the European Union. It has 
formally committed to implementing environmental policy in conformity with the 
precautionary principle. It might be affirmed, that EU Institutions have used this principle as a 
specific decision rule rather than “mere policy guidance”98. The first attempts were made in 
the 1992 Maastricht Amendments to the Treaty, which incorporated the principle in a new 
Article 130r (2) (later renumbered Article 174(2)), and now implemented in Article 191 of 
TFEU) with the same wording, stating that “[t]he community policy on the environment… 
shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive actions 
should be taken”. The quoted legal provision of the TFEU refers to the precautionary 
principle only in the context of environmental protection (similar to the definition, proposed 
by the Rio Declaration). However, a single mention in relation to a specific area is a very 
courageous decision to base a new general principle on.99  
There are quite a number of various legal studies and other regulatory decisions, trying 
to explain the precautionary principle, as “the EU institutions generally provide no 
explanation or insight as to why the precautionary principle applies in that case and what it 
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specifically requires”.100 The definition of the precautionary principle offered by EU courts 
does not contribute to a better understanding of the meaning of the latter. Thus, there is no 
clear definition of this principle provided by the EU Institutions. 
The General Court has looked further for legitimation and stipulated that 
“environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of the Union's policies and activities”,101 meaning, that it should be closely 
integrated into other EU policies by extending the frames of application of the precautionary 
principle. It was acknowledged in the Artegodan case102 that “although the precautionary 
principle is mentioned in the Treaty only in connection with environmental policy, it is 
broader in scope. It is intended to be applied in order to ensure a high level of protection of 
health, consumer safety and the environment in all of the [Union’s] spheres of activities”, by 
providing reference to the Article 174(1) (renumbered to Article 191(1) of TFEU), where it is 
implemented that despite a wide range of environmental protection, “Union policy on the 
environment shall contribute to pursuit of the following objectives: […] protecting human 
health, prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources […]”.103  
Following this line, Article 191(1) of the TFEU implements that one of the objectives 
of environmental protection is public health. In order to ensure the requisite level of 
protection “a high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and 
implementation of all Union policies and activities”.104 The same injunction to ensure high 
level of consumer protection is also implemented in Article 12 “consumer protection 
requirements shall be taken into account in defining and implementing other Union policies 
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and activities” and Article 169 of TFEU aiming to integrate such protection into the definition 
and implementation of other Union policies.105 
After recognizing this principle as a general principle of EU law, the  General Court 
has also framed the obligation of its use. In the Pfizer case106  it was emphasized that “under 
the precautionary principle the  [Union] Institutions are entitled, in the interests of human 
health to adopt, on the basis of as yet incomplete scientific knowledge, protective measures 
which may seriously harm legally protected positions, and they enjoy a broad discretion107 in 
that regard”. Later decision in the Artegodan case108 seems to limit “the level of protection 
chosen by the competent authority in the exercise of its discretion” to comply with “the 
principle that the protection of public health, safety and the environment is to take precedence 
over economic interests, as well as with the principles of proportionality and non-
discrimination”. The further development of case law moves to a tighter direction – “the 
precautionary principle constitutes a general principle of  [Union] law requiring109 the 
authorities in question, in the particular context of the exercise of the powers conferred on 
them by the relevant rules, to take appropriate measures to prevent specific potential risks to 
public health, consumer safety and the environment, by giving precedence to the requirements 
related to the protection of those interests over economic interests”.110  
The General Court has rendered the precautionary principle into an explicit general 
principle of EU law, drawing on cases where the CJEU had made implicit use of the 
precautionary principle.111 This was first noticed when the CJEU has used this principle as an 
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interpretive tool when construing a directive.112 It shall be recalled that “the validity of a  
[Union] act cannot depend on retrospective assessment of its efficacy”, and it is “open to 
criticism only if it appears manifestly incorrect in the light of the information available to it at 
the time of the adoption of the rules in question”.113  
Having in mind that the EU Institutions are granted the broad discretion of the Union 
legislature and also being required to ensure the high level of protection of human health 
which is to be ensured in the definition and the implementation of all  Union policies and 
activities,114 and the right of the  CJEU to construe a secondary legal act using this principle 
as an interpretive tool, the importance of the precautionary principle is implemented in the  
Union secondary legislation as a concurrent part, for example, it is stated in a legal act that 
“the precautionary principle has been taken into account in the drafting of this Directive and 
must be taken into account when implementing it”.115  
However, the more significant use of the precautionary principle was identified in the 
BSE case,116 when the CJEU stated that “where there is uncertainty as to the existence or 
extent of risks to human health, the institutions may take protective measures without having 
to wait until the reality and seriousness of those risks become apparent”.117  
If the principle is left just as a principle, incorporated in soft law, it might stay vague 
without any restrictions. However attempts are being made for it to be translated into 
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operational and binding rules,118 in order to make it to achieve its purpose. “The decisions of 
the EU courts leave no doubt that the precautionary principle is a binding rule of law in the 
EU”.119 Even though the CJEU did not explicitly mention the precautionary principle itself, 
“it was clearly implicit in the legitimation of protective measures when there was scientific 
uncertainty”.120 Scientific uncertainty was also the core, allowing member states to set a 
threshold above which exposure to the material used poses a serious risk to humans, “given 
the present state of research, there is no evidence […] to justify a conclusion”.121 However, 
this principle does not predetermine the decision.122 
As E.Fisher123 has noted, “the explicit recognition of the precautionary principle 
within EU law has led to increased judicial emphasis on scientific method as a means of 
ensuring non-arbitrary decision-making”.124 This will also mean a parallel increase in the need 
of expert advice to be involved into the process of forming EU policies and drafting 
legislative acts. 
It can be assumed that the precautionary principle, being one of the general principles 
of the EU law, is used for the revision the legality of Union activities.  
 
5.6. MEMBER STATES COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
 
The European Union needs to deal with risk assessment of specific products or 
substances (measuring the risk associated with specific products/substances) and risk 
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management (deciding what to do about the risks which the assessment reveals). Hence, risk 
regulation sees “objective” scientific values intertwined with more normative 
considerations.125 The acceptability of risks must therefore be weighed against normative 
values which are often strongly rooted in national traditions and cultures. Committee 
structures of risk regulation must therefore address the tensions arising from the opening up of 
markets on the one hand and the need to respond to “legitimate” regulatory concerns on the 
other.126  
First of all, it should be identified that the applicable EU legislation has a prerogative 
right over national provisions, especially if Member States adopt regulations more protective 
than the community actions that themselves supposedly observe the precautionary 
principle.127 “[A] Member State cannot unilaterally invoke the precautionary principle in 
order to maintain derogating national provisions. In an area where Member State legislation 
has been harmonised, it is for the [Union] legislature to apply the precautionary principle”.128 
However, “[…] in the absence of  [Union] provisions, Member States are free to chose the 
modes of proof of the various matters defined in the directives which they transpose, provided 
that the effectiveness of  [Union] law is not thereby undermined”.129 
 Another noteworthy criteria should be taken into account, is the level of responsibility 
of a Member State. The Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the use of the 
precautionary principle130 states that “under this principle, the State must act in line with 
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certain hypotheses”, as the precautionary principle is only the State’s responsibility. The 
French Republic has argued131 with the EU Commission that in accordance with the 
application of the precautionary principle, “it is for the Member States to establish the risk 
which the use of processing aids may pose, but they are not obliged to establish precisely and 
scientifically the existence of the risk which they pose”. It was supported by the CJEU that a 
Member State may “base justification on the precautionary principle where it proves 
impossible to determine with certainty the existence or the scope of the alleged risk”, though 
the Member State is obliged to show the existence of “the potentially negative consequences” 
and “a comprehensive assessment of the risk to health based on the most reliable scientific 
data available and the most recent results of international research”.132 
 “The precautionary principle also makes the State responsible for abstention from 
action. Such failure to act jeopardizes the State’s own national procedures in relation to other 
EU and non-EU countries, which can then take advantage of the situation. The precautionary 
principle is a principle of action, not inaction”.133 
Additionally, it should be emphasized that both primary and secondary Union law 
recognize the responsibility of Member States for human health and safety,134 which are the 
core areas for the application of the precautionary principle. So, it is “for the Member States, 
in the absence of harmonisation and to the extent that there is still uncertainty in the current 
state of scientific research, to decide on the level of protection of human health and life they 
wish to ensure”.135 It is also for the competent national authorities to carry out a new 
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assessment of the benefit/risk balance of the substances in question in the light of the most up-
to-date scientific data available at the time of that assessment.136 
And the ensured broad discretion shall be complied with the principle of 
proportionality, to be more precise; the revealed degree of scientific and practical uncertainty 
influences the extent of the discretion of the Member State and thus has an impact on the 
means of applying the proportionality principle.137 
Another difficulty lies in the left ambiguity and tension in the precautionary principle by 
the political authorities and regulators, who “enjoy a broad discretion” under the 
precautionary principle “to adopt, on the basis of as yet incomplete scientific knowledge, 
protective measures which may seriously harm legally protected positions”.138  
The General Court has stated that the decision will be affected by the general principles 
of judicial review, if this type of case will be taken to court to challenge: “the [Union] 
judicature is not entitled to substitute its assessment of the facts for that of the [Union] 
institutions, on which the Treaty confers sole responsibility for that duty”.139 It has to limit 
itself to “ascertaining whether the exercise by the institutions of their discretion in that regard 
is vitiated by a manifest error or a misuse of powers or whether the institutions clearly 
exceeded the bounds of their discretion”.140 And any determination of such errors must be 
made having in mind “that the assessment made by the [Union] institutions can be challenged 
only if it appears incorrect in the light of the elements of fact and law which were available to 
them at the time when the contested regulation was adopted”.141 The Union judicature is not 
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able to review “a large number of arguments of a scientific and technical nature, based on a 
large number of studies and scientific opinions from eminent scientists”.142 
And the CJEU is also only granted a discretion to review “whether the Council, by 
adopting the Regulation, committed a manifest error of appraisal regarding the conditions for 
the application of Article 130r of the Treaty”143 (now Article 191 of the TFEU) in order to 
keep a balance between certain objectives and principles – to be more precise, to keep the 
balance between the precautionary principle and the criteria identified in the same section, 
including “polluter pays” principle and the requirements to “take account” of “available 
scientific and technical data”, “the potential benefits and costs of action or lack of action”, and 
the “economic and social development of the  [Union]”.144 
Moreover, pursuant to the legal provision of Article 267 of the TFEU, “it will normally 
be for the national court to decide whether the conditions mentioned in the [CJEU’s] 
judgment were met. Thus it will be for the referring court to determine whether scientific data 
was taken into account when the national legislation was adopted, whether that data showed a 
real risk, and whether in the event of scientific uncertainty the precautionary principle 
justified the state action”.145 The CJEU may only give guidance or preliminary ruling to some 
of these matters. And for the matters based on Article 258 of the TFEU – only the CJEU can 
make these assessments. 
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5.7. CONTROVERSY ON THE USE OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
 
Even though the EU Commission “represents the most detailed description of the 
precautionary principle by any official government body anywhere in the world to date”,146 
there are still some serious limitations to be mentioned, such as serious lack of a more specific 
interpretation of the precautionary principle, as well as no “clear, usable factors or criteria to 
determine when the precautionary principle applies or when it does not”.147 It is believed that 
“the Commission Communication provides only limited guidance”.148 This position is mainly 
supported by G.Majone,149 arguing that the “precautionary principle is deeply ambiguous”, 
which is “abetted by a lack of clear definitions and sound logical foundations”, embodying a 
defective decision-making logic in the official institutional documents. 
However, the precautionary principle has been criticized on a number of grounds 
including its potential for overregulation of insignificant or even nonexistent risks, its 
disregard for scientific evidence, and its failure to adequately consider the economic costs and 
risk-risk trade-offs inherent in risk regulation”.150 G.Majone maintained that the EU 
Commission has failed in its Communication to consider the costs of precautionary measures, 
such that “the attempt to control poorly understood, low-level risks necessarily uses up 
resources that in many cases could be directed more effectively towards the reduction of well-
known, large-scale risks”.151 However, the EU Commission does not assess “the substantial 
uncertainties regarding the costs of prohibiting or otherwise regulating the activity in 
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question”.152 It is believed that the attention of regulators is mainly focused on only particular 
events and losses concerned, rather than the entire picture.153 This may also be a “side-effect” 
of the provided expert advice, which is focused only to one specific risk in the field of the 
expert’s competence, which makes difficult to see a wider picture, covering various fields of 
science. 
E.Fisher154 notes, “those who promote the precautionary principle tend to argue that 
regulatory regimes that place too much faith in scientific method and crude understandings of 
acceptable risk are inadequate to deal with the challenges created by scientific uncertainty.” 
“Even if regulators do have some ability to discriminate among uncertain risks of varying 
magnitude, they will fail to impose adequate regulatory requirements on activities that pose 
significant risks of harm as a result of institutional capacities and incentives, as well as 
political pressures”.155 
Opponents of the precautionary principle argue that “in practice the precautionary 
principle will block economic initiative and all scientific and technological innovation; at the 
end of the day, it would cost the society dearly”.156 This is supported by the fear that 
“considerable resources will be spent to protect against risks that may turn out to be 
negligible, while other risks, better known and much more serious, may not receive adequate 
attention”.157 However, a study, made by the European Environment Agency, was not able to 
find any examples in which significant additional costs resulted from a negligent application 
of the precautionary principle.158 
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The main criticism on the use of the precautionary principle is the notion that there is 
an inadequate establishment of the probability and extent of the risk to be regulated and that 
the indefinite “possible risk” requires “a certain threshold of scientific plausibility”.159 The 
need for establishment of safety limits was also favoured and supported by the CJEU, which 
has ruled that without setting the upper safe limits, a regulated measure may only be justified 
in accordance with the precautionary principle, if a scientific risk assessment reveals that 
scientific uncertainty persists as regards the existence or extent of real risks to human 
health.160 
However, it is quite popular with the mere fact of uncertainty in the risks of activity to 
justify the automatic introduction of an additional and extreme degree of risk aversion in a 
decision-making process.161 Due to that, the application of the precautionary principle is 
socially undesirable regulatory result, as it leads to unnecessarily stringent and costly 
regulation in most of the cases as well as to a disproportionate allocation of limited regulatory 
resources to those activities which may never eventuate in significant harm. The 
precautionary principle is also “incapable of dealing with risk-risk tradeoffs and setting 
intelligent regulatory priorities”.162 
There is not much discussion regarding the potential causes of the uncertainty, which 
might be raised due to “lack of data, limitations of scientific understanding of causal 
relationships, medical and eco-system complexity, and “trans scientific” gaps in the capacities 
of science”.163 R.B.Stewart does not even believe in the predictive capacity of the science at 
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all, as science has often been unable to predict the occurrence of serious environmental harms 
(e.g. asbestosis or stratospheric ozone depletion).164  
There is no much consideration regarding “cases in which the views of experts are 
sharply divided, for example on issues such as the ecological effects of widespread 
application of GMO crop plants”.165 
It shall be noted that critics of the precautionary principle do not want to diminish or 
waive the precautionary principle. There are a number of suggestions, how it could be used in 
order to avoid the disadvantages it has. If a scientific uncertainty exists, a regulator “may 
justify an initial decision to prohibit an activity or to allow it to proceed only under certain 
limitations in order to gather information that will enable regulators to revisit the decision in 
the future with the benefit of the additional information”, “provided that affirmative steps are 
taken to develop the new information so as to permit timely reconsideration of the regulatory 
decision with the benefit of such information”.166 Although the later amendments get 
authorized and a regulatory program is undertaken, “it becomes very difficult alter to 
eliminate or relax the program even though it is no longer justified”.167 
There is also an opinion168 that uncertainty and the related risks shall be regulated 
under the same decisional framework as well-defined risks. In case of uncertainty, decision-
makers usually collect available evidence, scientific theory, expert judgements, and guidance 
from analogous regulatory problems and experience with them, so using this data they may 
resolve the existing uncertainty as best as it is possible in this situation, and treat the received 
results equivalent to risks where the probability distribution is well known. 
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Another very important consideration which shall be taken into account is the 
limitations imposed by the political process on their budgets and authority and on other 
regulatory resources, which has a direct link to the number of risks that can be taken into 
account and the intensity of such regulations.169  
 
5.8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The aim of this Chapter was to identify the place of the precautionary principle in the 
EU policies, activities and legislation. It also aimed to analyse how the use of this principle 
may influence the collection and use of expertise. The idea of the principle was taken from the 
German national law as well as from international environmental agreements and treaties. The 
principle targeted activities raising threats of harm to human health or the environment 
without an affirmative duty to act at the very beginning; later getting imposed a positive 
obligation to act.  It is believed that the biggest supporter of this principle is the European 
Union, as it has developed it into the general principle of EU law, leaving to define the 
constituent parts to the Union Institutions. The analysis of the EU policy documents and the 
case law has rectified the following constituent parts of the precautionary principle: 
• the decision, based on the precautionary principle, has to be in the interest and 
protection of environment, human health and consumer safety; 
• there shall be reasonable grounds for potentially dangerous effects; 
• the decision needs to be taken on the basis of as yet inconclusive, insufficient or 
uncertain scientific data though a preventive measure cannot be based on a purely 
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hypothetical approach – it needs to be backed-up by the most reliable scientific data 
available or most recent results of international research; 
• the final decision ought to be taken by a political body rather than by a scientific one; 
• the EU Institutions enjoy a broad discretion regarding the application of the 
precautionary principle though they are required to prevent specific potential risks to 
public health, consumer safety and environment by giving precedence over economic 
interests; 
• the level of protection deem to be appropriate to the society – “margin of safety”, 
though it cannot be expected that a “zero-risk” may exist in the decision-making 
process. 
 
The precautionary principle is considered in a structured manner, and the Courts of the 
EU have established that the decision-making shall be based on the most reliable scientific 
data available. It has to be done at the “risk assessment” stage where external and independent 
scientific expertise is mainly involved. Political bodies shall entrust a scientific risk 
assessment to experts who shall provide sufficiently reliable and cogent information to base a 
political or regulatory decision upon. Though, the final decision shall be taken only by a 
political body.  
It can be assumed that scientific expertise and advice is obligatory to be obtained 
whenever there are reasonable grounds for concern, though EU Institutions are not obliged to 
follow every scientific opinion without any power to carry out its own assessment. It means 
that there is no coherent relationship between scientific advice and the precautionary principle 
– EU Institutions have a broad discretion to refuse to accept and implement the provided 
scientific advice without even being challenged at the Courts of the EU. There is also another 
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risk regarding involvement of scientific expertise is the setting of a certain threshold of 
scientific plausibility.  
It was also considered in this Chapter that the results of the concluded scientific 
evaluation may be influenced by the chosen methods to be used for collection of expertise and 
scientific advice. There might be cases where the provided scientific advice may be opposed 
by a completely opposite expert view - there are not many considerations regarding such 
situations. The EU policy documents and guidelines which were discussed in this Chapter 
identify it as a risk, though there is no solution how to deal with the situation where the 
provided scientific advice has a completely opposite expert view. It seems that EU Institutions 
do not deal with such situations, so in some cases it may raise suspicion that the Commission 
and other EU Institutions as well tend to avoid conflict of expert views collecting and using 
expertise. 
The defined main constituent parts of the precautionary principle seem to ease the 
application process, though there is a lot of criticism towards the principle itself and the set 
guidelines by the EU Commission. First of all, there are no explicit criteria on application of 
the precautionary principle. The criteria are still left to be decided by the Community 
judicature or the EU Institutions, so the decision-making process in the future may still be 
vague and each time leaving a place for a challenge.  
Another issue to be criticised is the failure to adequately consider the economic costs 
and ability to deal with the risk-risk trade-offs. The EU Commission has been continuously 
attacked for its attempt to control risks of using up the allocated limited resources without 
clearly defining the level of risk which is appropriate for the society. By taking such a 
position, it may get depleted in face of well-known large-scale risks.  
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The EU Commission is not ready either to deal with scientific uncertainty. Both the 
Communication170 on the precautionary principle and the Communication171 on the collection 
and use of expertise have not considered circumstances whether they are adequate to deal 
with the challenges created by scientific uncertainty. There is no discussion regarding the 
costs of prohibition or a possibility to take an alternative decision regarding an activity to be 
considered.  
The main issues, which were raised in the previous Chapter “Collection and use of 
expertise” and this one, will be used in analysing the involvement of external expertise in the 
drafting phase of delegated and implementing acts conferred on the Commission and 
especially emphasizing the comitology framework.  
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VI CHAPTER 
 
EXTERNAL PARTICIPATION IN THE EU DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
THROUGH MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE 
 
 
6.1. INTRODUCTION.  
 
 The new developments at EU level, initiated and supported or sometimes, even required, 
by Member States make a new turn in EU policies. The first attempts to formalize and regulate 
the structure of EU governance and its legal regulation dates from the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. 
The attempt was not completely successful. However, multi-level partnership or multi-level 
governance has not disappeared from academic discussions and publications; these will be 
analysed further in this Chapter. However, the rapid changes in public life lead to the appearance 
of new forms of governance as does the dispersion of decision making away from the centralised 
decision-making bodies into multiple centres of authority. Centralising national authorities in a 
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European super-state is not on agenda, but still pro-Europeans support a more coherent system of 
governance. 
 This approach could help to increase the degree of regulatory harmonisation and reduce 
the possibility of Member States restrictions. On the other hand, multiple enforcements are likely 
to lead to more innovation in the interpretation and application of the law. This may have been 
the impulse for the reforms of the Treaty of Lisbon1 - to be more precise, the new task of the 
national parliaments’ to “contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union.”2 This is done 
by getting national Parliaments to perform a subsidiarity check. 
Based on this, the Chapter will focus mainly on defining multi-level governance as a new 
form of governance in the EU and on determining ways to promote external participation in 
various phases of the decision making process. On the other hand, the research will aim to 
establish whether the instruments established by the EU institutions have any legal power in the 
decision-making process; or are they just a political instrument for declaring the existence of a 
vague participation and representation of external participants. 
 The analysis will start by defining multi-level governance and identifying its constituent 
parts. This will play a key role in forming the paths for more effective participation in the 
decision-making process. Having identified key actors and techniques, the analysis will attempt a 
typology of participation through the newly formed governance. The types of governance are 
based on the identification of new possible forms of participation and their legal enforcement. 
The analysis will also focus on the different nature of multi-level participation in comparison 
with participation at the EU level.  
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6.2. DEFINITION OF MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE. 
 
The complexity of problems, the need for new knowledge and the diverse settings of all 
twenty-eight Member States, has led to the creation of new forms of policy making such as power 
sharing, participation, management by objectives and experimentation.3 It is also influenced by 
traditional conception of law, which posits hierarchies, and places courts at the centre of systems 
of accountability as well as makes a clear distinction between rule making and rule 
implementation. While the new approach posits heterarchy, looks outside of the courts to secure 
real accountability and accepts new challenges for the resolution of unexpected problems.  
To begin with, it should be mentioned that “governance” is not a legal term.4 The United 
Nations Commission on Global Governance suggests a vague definition of “governance”, stating 
that “governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, 
manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse 
interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken. It includes formal 
institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that 
people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest”.5 Another possible 
identification is suggested by C.F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin,6 stating that “governance is not a political 
rule through responsible institutions, such as parliament and democracy – which amounts to 
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government – but innovative practices of networks, or horizontal forms of interaction”. This 
“horizontal form of interaction” is developed into the regional participation and governance, 
which will be discussed later in the Chapter. The new form of governance might be also defined 
as a response to major political, economic and social changes, including globalization, 
Europeanization, urbanization, and could be described as a “system of continuous negotiation 
among nested governments at several territorial tiers – supranational, national, regional and 
local”,7 changes to the composition, orientation and sophistication of citizens.8  
An understanding of the system of governance itself is necessary to clarify both the 
organisational and structural choices. In fact, it is not clear which legal mechanisms and/or 
standards should be applied to the EU governance techniques, structures and decisions, as they 
are neither rooted in a single legal source or structure, nor are they formed or implemented by a 
single administrative entity, be it the Commission, or the national administrations,9 especially as 
national governments and administrations are made accountable through the work of the courts 
and the application of the Rule of Law. It should also be noted that the legitimacy of the 
European governance seems “more dependant on its transparency, the integration and 
participation of affected interests, rather than on the judicial control by courts”.10 Whatever the 
legal form that the present the EU governance possesses, “an integrated administration does not 
threaten the very existence of the EU Member States, [as they are] of an evolutionary nature and 
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represent a patchwork, rather than a coherent structure, and this holds especially true with regard 
to institutional structure, with its sometimes confusing variety of European Agencies and 
Comitology committees.”11  
 So, the aim of this part of the Chapter is to identify the place and the structure of the new 
kind of the governance and its constituent parts; this in turn will help to identify the place of 
external participants at the local and regional level. 
 
6.3. EU GOVERNANCE V. NATIONAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES. 
 
First of all, it would be convenient to distinguish all the possible modes of governance in 
EU from the perspective of power, and to define how different institutional and external actors 
share the decision-making power in the process. J. Weiler12 suggests three modes of governance:  
1) intergovernmental or international, where the key players are the States, and governments 
are the principal actors with the privileged power, focusing on negotiation, 
intergovernmental bargaining and paying less attention to institutionalisation;  
2) supranational, originating from public law and comparative constitutionalism and forming 
the most structural, formal and rule-bound mode of governance, where the key powers are 
provided for State governments, including legislative and judicial branches; and  Union 
institutions, which are critical actors and fora of decision-making; 
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3) and infranational mode of governance comes from domestic policies and regulatory 
states, where different level of actors both at the European Union and a Member State 
level – administrations, departments, private and public associations, corporate and 
interest groups are involved. 
 
The supranational and infranational modes of governance are closely interlinked with the 
regional and local representation as well as to external participation, which are the core of this 
Chapter.  
The Commission has been aiming to enhance its credibility, which shall be judged by “its 
ability to add value to national policies and address people’s concerns more effectively at 
European and global level”.13 In order to form an “adequate interaction in a multi-level 
partnership; a partnership in which national governments involve their regions and cities fully in 
European policy-making”,14 the Commission needs to ensure that “regional and local knowledge 
and conditions are taken into account when developing policy proposals”.15 The EU Commission 
is often criticised that it does not fully exploit the role of regions and cities as an elected and 
representative channel interacting with the public on EU policy.16 Though, “[t]he principal 
responsibility for involving the regional and local level in EU policy remains and should remain 
with national administrations”.17  
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It may also be linked to the decision taken by the CJEU in the case Regione Toscana,18 
where it was concluded from the general scheme of the Treaties that the term “Member State” for 
the purpose of the institutional provisions refers only to government authorities of Member States 
and does not include the governments of the regions or autonomous communities: “(…) it would 
undermine the institutional balance provided for by the Treaties, which determine the conditions 
under which the Member States, that is to say the States party to the Treaties establishing the 
[Union] and the Accession Treaties, participate in the functioning of the [Union]”.19 It means that 
the Commission is not empowered to oblige Member States to involve regional and local 
authorities in the EU decision-making process. It neither has the power to impose on Member 
States uniform rules of territorial development governance. The Commission shall provide 
enough space for regional and local authorities to create rules and adjust them to regional 
peculiarities.20 If a “higher” government tries to impose any rules downwards, it can face a 
resistance from domestic actors seeking to redefine the imposed requirements.21 As Member 
States enjoy broad policy discretion in the implementation of directives, they are also constrained 
in terms of the manner in which they exercise their implementation choices through consultation 
requirements, reporting obligations and transparency concerns.22 
Furthermore, the need for participation of Member States stems from the specific 
character of the EU. The European Union is not a state.23 Instead, it can be identified as a system 
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of multi-level or transnational governance. In such a system, governance with a non-hierarchical 
structure can only be accomplished through co-operation among power holders, which are both 
Member States and the EU institutions.24 The multi-level approach perceives decision-making at 
different levels of government and with shifting fields of competence.25 It appears to be 
compatible with the conversation of national administrative powers and the assumption of 
national powers by the EU. 
If the elected representatives are obliged to use the instruments that are monitored by 
national administrations, the involvement of non-elected external participants is reserved to the 
EU institutions at EU level. This process was developed as a response to the changes of 
participation, representation and sophistication of EU citizens. It encourages participation of civil 
society in policy making, sometimes even offering a greater degree of power sharing as it is 
believed that policy making is a process of mutual problem-solving among stakeholders from 
government and the private sector, and from different levels of government, rather than 
autonomous regulation. This core feature is more effective in cases, where individuals who share 
some geographical or functional space and who have a common need for collective decision-
making can be a member of several such groups.  
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6.3.1. Supranational governance. 
 
 The Treaty of Lisbon introduced a major innovation in the EU decision-making process 
by equipping national parliaments with a de facto power to veto the Commission’s legislative 
proposals before they are subject to adoption by both legislative bodies, - the Parliament and the 
Council.26 Article 12 TEU specifies that the main engagement of national parliaments’ in the EU 
is to “contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union”. It may take the following forms: 
national parliaments are informed by the EU institutions, have access to all draft legislative acts 
of the Union,27 and enjoy the right to influence the EU decision-making process at an early stage. 
National parliaments may also establish subsidiarity checks on the basis of their own laws 
and procedures and communicate this information to the EU institutions within eight weeks. 
However, Protocol No. 228 does not provide a precise definition of subsidiarity, it can be worked 
out either by the national parliaments themselves or agreed with the Commission. Additionally, 
“there is a lack of clarity regarding the potential procedures for monitoring subsidiarity in the 
later stages of negotiations when the draft law enters the decision-making process in the 
Parliament and the Council”.29 Of course, the right to challenge EU laws before the CJEU on the 
basis of a breach of subsidiarity principle is available.30 
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It is expected that the more active involvement of national parliaments in the EU 
decision-making process from the drafting phase should enhance the legitimacy of the EU laws.31 
Moreover, the new mechanism creates additional possibilities for both regional and local 
representatives and external participants to get involved at the early stage of the EU decision-
making process through the national bodies – either actively lobbying a national parliament or 
getting involved in activities of scrutiny of a draft legislation run by a national government. 
Supranational governance could also cover the possibility for each Member State to 
choose the jurisdiction to which it would belong,32 as the “European governance extends to the 
field of legislation to a much higher degree than governments do within the framework of the 
nation-state, especially in the form of the Comitology structure and the emerging concepts of 
regulation following the Lamfalussy procedure.”33 The latter procedure is composed of four 
levels, each focusing on a specific stage of the implementation of legislation and is more linked 
to implementation of technocratic details and standards. The choice of jurisdiction is usually 
analysed on the grounds of the terms of supply and demand for jurisdictions, which might be 
conceived as “voluntary coalitions for financing, choosing, and enjoying excludable public 
goods”,34 which leads to a basic postulate that “dispersion of governance across multiple 
jurisdictions is more flexible than concentration of governance in one jurisdiction”.35 
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Governments, which focus on function – specific policy regimes by providing a particular 
local service (managing a local pool resource, setting a technical standard, managing an urban 
service, or shipping hazardous waste), could be identified as another form of the new governance. 
The number of created jurisdictions in such a governance system is potentially vast, varying 
highly on demand for governance change.  Jurisdictions in this alternative multi-level form are 
the opposite – they operate at numerous territorial scales, in which they are task-specific and 
flexible. This is kind of governance system where “each citizen is served not by “the government, 
but by a variety of different public service industries (…). We can then think of the public sector 
as being composed of many public service industries including the police industry, the fire 
protection industry, the welfare industry, the health services industry, the transportation industry, 
and so on”.36  
This type of governance allows to put  the burden of mobility and change on jurisdictions 
rather than on citizens: “functional, overlapping, and competing jurisdictions are flexible units 
which are established when needed […and they] discontinued when their services are no longer 
demanded as more citizens and communities exit and the tax base shrinks”,37 and it can be 
described as a polycentric system, where various centres of decision-making exist that are 
formally independent of each other and the hierarchical centre of the system is replaced by 
functional networks.38 
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6.3.1.1. National governance. 
 
There is currently a lack of clarity regarding the ways an external participant or an elected 
representative can get involved in the EU decision-making process, especially as an obligation to 
involve external participants and representatives is reserved to the Commission and other EU 
institutions. In fact, it may be complicated for external participants to understand the structure of 
EU governance. 
The exceptional features of the EU governance can be compared with the existing 
national governance structures in this way: the same decision-making procedures; the same laws; 
making national governments to be responsible for policies at lower territorial levels; the 
diffusion of decision making to informal and overlapping policy networks.39 However policy 
networks are non-hierarchical, fluid, mostly non-governmental and often non-territorial.40 
Additionally, they “do not respect the traditional “rules of the game” but instead occur as 
“negotiated, non-hierarchical exchanges between institutions at the transnational, national, 
regional and local levels”.41 This governance uses the “classical nation-state model, with its 
features of democratic representation, constitutional rights, accountable administration and 
                                                 
39
 Christopher Ansell (2000), „The Networked Polity: Regional Development in Western Europe“, in Governance 
12: p.303-333; Beate Kohler-Koch and Reiner Eising (n 38), John Peterson (2001), „The Choice for EU Theorists: 
Establishing a Common Framework for Analysis“, in European Journal of Political Research 39: 289-318. 
40
 James N. Rosenau (1997), Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier. Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
41
 G.B. Peters and J. Pierre (2001), “Developments in Intergovernmental Relations: Towards Multi-level 
Governance”, in Policy and Politics, 29, 2, 131-136. 
 219
independent courts, all embedded in a constitutional framework, as a blueprint and a normative 
reference point.”42 
The initial attempt to identify the characteristic features of the European governance, 
leads to another possible characteristic of the system. “Multi-level” decision-making is believed 
to blur the distinction between centralised and decentralised decision making by connecting 
national administrations, supporting their local fragmentation, with each other and EU without 
establishing a hierarchy between them.43 It also blurs national borders, as significant territorial 
boundaries between national and international politics;44 by “enlarging the scope of the relevant 
unit of policy-making”,45 and encouraging greater multi-level territorial interaction.46  
The multi-level governance defines the necessity to coordinate actions and actors at many 
levels of governance, as well as between government and private actors (localities, subnational 
regions, national, European), in order to bring actors together in ways that facilitate dialogue and 
coordination via multiple, overlapping arenas characterized by loose coupling47 and including 
different actors, whose interests diverge. 
The blurred boundaries of the centralised and decentralised national administration 
decision–making has evolved into regional decision–making, where the involvement of 
subnational actors in the complex system of the European decision-making process drew 
attention to policy-making across the levels by enlarging the territorial scope for political action 
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“beyond the nation-state”. It incorporates Member States into a complex transnational, multi-
level system of decision-making.48 It accepts the possibility of coordinated diversity and the 
advantages of leaving final policy making to the lowest possible level in order to support and 
coordinate Member States policies than to create uniformity across the Union. The characteristic 
feature of regionalism and the leverage of the final policy making should also be counted into the 
EU governance constituent parts as one of the core items.  
The definition of “multi-level”-ism will be used through the whole analysis as the core 
key word, describing the relation between regional and local level, national governments and 
administrations, and the EU governance structure. Multi-level partnership is usually related to 
accountability, which will be discussed later in the Chapter. 
 
6.3.1.2. Participation in EU governance through constitutional power and administrative 
enforcement. 
 
To start with, “formalised procedures, - i.e. the way in which administrative decision-
making is carried out according to constitutional principles, statutes or judge-made law – are 
determined by three main rationales, rationality and efficiency on the one hand and individual 
protection on the other”.49 The constitutional power is usually protected as an individual 
fundamental right by a State when substantive policy decisions are taken. “From this perspective, 
the formality of the administrative decision-making process combined with the opportunity for 
the participation of individual parties – who adduce important information either by making use 
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of their procedural rights or by fulfilling their duty to co-operate – are considered necessary 
preconditions for administrative efficiency as well as the rationality and […] the legitimacy and 
acceptance of the final outcome”.50  
Although both rationales – administrative performance and individual protection, - are 
closely intertwined, they have different legal roots. The first one derives from the basic 
requirements of procedural fairness, while the latter has its origin in the democratic principle.51 
While it is true that participatory rights, understood as a potential counterweight to the 
democratic deficit of the EU, are accorded a democratic dimension, the intense participation in 
the decision-making process requires the administration to give a detailed account of the relevant 
issues of fact and law.52    
Administrative law is increasingly concerned with the provision of a surrogate political 
process to ensure the fair representation of a wide range of affected interests in the process of 
administrative decision-making.53 Such additional measures include greater democratic and 
judicial control, increased transparency, greater expertise and stronger participation of citizens in 
the decision-making process, by means of representative interest groups, open hearings and 
public debate. Not a state, but a system of multi-level governance, the EU is beset by additional 
difficulties inherent in the need to respect the regulatory concerns of Member States and the 
differing linguistic and cultural systems and the “representativity” of socio-economic interests. 
Therefore, contrary to the non-majoritarian approach to market integration which holds that the 
market can be managed in isolation from political concerns by non-majoritarian technical experts, 
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in particular independent agencies54 for risk regulation to be legitimate, it cannot be left to 
technocrats/experts alone but needs to be decided by political (national representatives) and 
socio-economic actors. Although this contribution does not go so far to attempt to resolve the 
“pressing problem” of what weight to attach to the various interests (national,  Union, public and 
private interests), it does aim to emphasize the need for the participation of and deliberation with 
such interests.55  
Based on the various rationales, it should be decided whether a commitment to devolution 
is embedded in the formal constitution of the governing institutions or it should take place in 
response to local needs, as this development should be described in and measured on 
constitutional terms and norms (with regard to doctrines of separation of powers, of popular 
sovereignty, or of constitutional rights), or whether it should be described in terms of 
administrative law and administrative accountability, with its own distinctive set of normative 
expectations (following the doctrines of rule of law).56 Formalising a constitution, a number of 
dimensions are suggested to be distinguished. First of all, a constitution contains basic rules of 
design of society, constituting the “power map”, including the framework of government and a 
                                                 
54
 G. Majone (1996), Regulating Europe, Routledge: London/New York: “Agencies can be distinguished from 
committees in that they possess legal personality and, supported by their own administrative structures, have a 
degree of administrative independence. The agency model, foremost advocated by G. Majone, is based upon non-
majoritarian thinking, preferring administrative market integration to be carried out by fully independent agencies; 
and bringing together technical and economic expertise. However, the agencies currently operating within the 
Community structure are not (yet) independent regulatory agencies in the American sense. The agency model 
adopted in the Community does, by no means, exclude resorting to committees. On the contrary, most agencies are 
actually based on committees or require resort to committees. Just as scientific committees, they produce 
information, which potentially leads to more informed decision-making, although they are more visible than 
committees, which possibly facilitates the political oversight and transparency of their activities. In general, decision-
making is (formally) left to the Commission together with policy-making/implementation committees”. 
55
 E.Vos (1999), “EU Committees: the Evolution of Unforeseen Institutional Actors in European Product 
Regulation”, EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics, Christian Joerges and Ellen Vos (eds.), Hart 
Publishing: Oxford-Portland, p. 32. 
56
 Rainer Nickel (n 4) 7. 
 223
body of rights operating according to the rule of law, which is called institutional dimension.57 It 
concerns the “handling and managing power in a world where states are highly interdependent 
and are not only loci and foci of political activity and processes” (emphasis in the original).58 
Another dimension to be mentioned is the geographical one, which “relates to the nature and 
structure of communities and the reflection that, in respect to questions of attribution, identity and 
affinity, issues of political community should more accurately be described in plural rather than 
singular terms, with the increasing emergence or re-emergence of local, linguistic or cultural, 
regional, national and even supra-state identities, in each case outside the formal framework of 
the state”.59 
“Procedural approach alone gives no simple solutions to enduring problems such as 
ensuring “inclusiveness” and belonging in divided societies. […] [It might imply that the legal 
rules can] confer legal rights to be heard or rights to information which go beyond the veneer of 
transparency which currently characterizes the EU’s approach to this question and gives rise to 
relationship of clientelism which so often links the EU institutions with many associations and 
NGOs.”60 
Identifying accountable administration as well as accountable implementation and judicial 
accountability, it should be replied “who is accountable to whom (the regulators to the citizens; 
the private participants of regulatory processes to the market forces; Member States officials in 
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Comitology committees to the European polity), to what extent, and what are the legal and 
factual consequences of a violation of accountability benchmarks and rules?”61 
 
6.3.2. Participatory democracy and governance.  
 
Participation should be understood as an inclusive, not exclusive process, possible 
“throughout the policy chain from agenda-setting to implementation and monitoring – and in all 
fora: committees subordinate to the Council formations, indicators’ working groups, and peer 
review process”.62 It suggests that there is a connection between the degree of participation and 
the degree of politicization,63 having it as a key vision of democratic deliberation,64 which might 
as well embody technocratic deliberation.65 “Under what is often termed a “deliberative 
democracy” model, the role of government is to provide a space which allows people (or citizens 
or civil society) to be involved in decision making. […] The participants, each seeking not to 
further their own selfish interest, but to foster the public interest or the common good, indulge in 
reasoned argumentation”.66 This idea seems to be fostered by the EU institutions, and this 
approach has been increasingly influential in the decision-making process of the CJEU, 
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comitology and agencies.67 However, there is also a negative dimension of this approach – 
“although it “maximises the access of “outside” interest groups to the government decision-
making process”, it may also undermine democracy, quite simply because when “public policy 
decision-making is diffused among various government and nongovernment actors in an 
amorphous, non-rule-defined manner, democratic accountability is destroyed”.68 
Participatory democracy is a “continuing risk of fundamental inequality between the two 
sides of the bargaining process”,69 that “the use of bargaining to achieve legislation could well 
entrench these inequalities which would be more likely to be evened-out through the normal 
legislative process.”70 It is still premised on input from interested parties, with the final decision 
still residing with traditional legislative bodies, or administrative institutions such as agencies.71  
Participatory governance is not meant to replace democratic representation, as situated 
between co-decision powers and mere consultations, the principle of participatory governance 
can be filled with context-sensitive contents, reaching from notice and comment provisions and 
transparency regulations, through rights to a hearing by regulatory institutions and networks, up 
to procedural involvement that stops short of a veto position.72  
It is believed that recent years have seen an expansion of civil society’s role in the 
decision-making processes starting from ad hoc to highly institutionalised civil society’s 
dialogue, however “these possible reforms seem to break with classic methods used by the 
Commission, or with the philosophy which underpins it – i.e. that participation is initiated only 
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by the institutions, is limited to non-decision [namely consultation rather than shared 
responsibility for decision-making], and is directed mainly towards sectoral actors”.73 With 
appropriate support (e.g. civic education, capacity building), it can be achieved by mobilizing and 
engaging citizens in the governance process. Through participation, citizens gain an appreciation 
of the wider public interest and of the needs and contributions of all sections of the community.74 
Following this approach, it is assumed that individuals and/or smaller political entities are 
more likely to be better represented, to have greater opportunities for participation, to be better 
able to hold policy makers to account as well as to possess regime legitimacy than larger political 
entities and/or communities (such as the EU).75 It is believed,76 that national polities are no longer 
able to control participation and representation of all those who are affected by their decisions. 
And “in relation to policies of transnational scope, European level decision-making seems to be 
better able than national to ensure the participation and representation of those affected, and may 
also offer performance legitimacy advantages as regards the making and implementation of 
policy”.77 
However, the General Court insists that it is incumbent upon the EU institutions 
concerned to ensure the collective representativity of the parties to the social dialogue, conceived 
in both procedural and substantive terms.78 “As regards the former, it entails an obligation to take 
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steps to verify representativity; compliance on this occasion being evidenced by the terms of the 
preamble to the contested directive, and by information and evidence presented by the 
Commission and Council to the General Court, including extracts from documents relating to the 
relevant Council meetings, and a Commission study.”79 
Formalization or empowerment. The embedded new form of institutional changes within 
the EU has to establish processes of institutionalisation in daily routines of policy formulation 
and implementation or in acceptance of dominant belief systems.80 It might be done in a way, 
when “representatives of the Member States in consultation with the Commission set broad “non-
binding” goals and metrics, to be implemented through national action plans or strategies, and 
periodically revised following peer review of implementation experience”.81 
Another option could be implemented - relying less on formal rules and “hard law” than 
on open-ended standards, flexible and revisable guidelines and other forms of “soft law” making 
it easier to revise strategies and standards in light of evolving knowledge. This approach might be 
used in cases where the legal authority of the EU is limited or non-existent; it may be the only 
way the Union can play a role in a particular domain.82 
The identified elements of the described process can be imposed by treaty revision and 
formal intergovernmental agreement affecting the formal organization of the political system. It 
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may be done by involving the provided channels of access and participation as well as 
incorporated principles in programmes affecting the patterns of interaction.83  
If the empowerment procedure is not followed, the described differences might end up 
with non-compliance of the obligatory legislative provisions, which might impose additional 
administration costs on the EU institutions as well as burden on the CJEU. Encouraging the 
change of information and experience and organising mutual cooperation and assistance among 
national regulation authorities in order to develop common principles, objectives, and evaluation 
methods, based on preventative and multi-disciplinary approach.84 
Representative democracy ensures “a system of judicial review being in place, along with 
formal acknowledgements of the rule of law, the importance of justice, the separation of powers 
amongst institutions, and respect for human rights and democracy”.85 The more detailed analysis 
of representation is discussed in the Chapter “EU Law and policy on participation in EU 
governance”. 
 
6.3.3. Types of governance. 
 
Europeanization 
“Europeanization” defines “a process whereby European ideas and practices transfer the 
core of local decision-making to the supranational level. The European function is a means 
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whereby public authorities can innovate and initiate policies and programmes in the context of 
transnational co-operation and European policy-making”.86 
 
External “trans” networks 
Focusing on another kind of participants in the Europeanization process, the 
“transnational networks of experts” have occupied a position in the political arena, and they are 
increasingly sought after by governments and international organizations for the delivery of 
public goods.87 It is even believed that “supernational and international entities or arrangements 
play an increasing role in the shaping of national law”.88 Despite pessimistic evaluations of the 
earlier times, as the power of transnational participants has been constantly increasing, the 
Commission has also been advised to make use of co-operative networks and partnerships, where 
national and European regulators could co-operate in regulatory policies implementation, which 
is more often “served by governments and private-party networks and not by parliaments”.89  
This view is not new in analysis of EU policy and law, especially speaking about law, 
which is “not necessarily the product of procedures within parliaments and of governments 
enforcing it and courts applying it, but can also be produced within networks of governments 
and/or private parties, outside the nation state and in many variations.”90 The dissolution of 
territorially delineated democracy and the production of binding rules outside the institutional 
design of national parliaments is no longer an exception but is actually becoming the norm.91 The 
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starting point here is that governments and non-state actors play a significant role in pre-
formation of legal rules by representing highly aggregated entities with an enormous potential of 
resources, manpower, knowledge assessment, and experience as well as being the primary source 
and filter for legislative proposals.92 In order to legitimize an embedded norm as a “law”, the 
functional equivalent should be set: “participatory arrangements ensuring the involvement of civil 
society actors, stakeholders, and the public, in the arguing, bargaining, and reasoning processes 
of transnational regulation, procedural rights safeguarding these procedural positions, and courts 
or court-like institutions that flank these arrangements.”93 Such position “would call for some 
form of juridification of participatory governance, not necessarily as another form of an 
overarching “constitution” in a single text, but as a juridification of deliberative structures within 
the regulatory islands of international law and international regulation”.94 The procedural right of 
affected interest groups and civic associations to participate comprehensively in regulatory 
processes is already formed as an integral part in most domestic administrative laws. 
The second issue is that parliaments do not act in a social vacuum, but within a societal 
sphere influenced by aggregated interests and conflicting positions, which is constituted by a 
patchwork of unions, employer associations, political parties, NGOs, religious groups, 
participating in public debates about, amongst others, market regulation and social regulation.95 
Private standard-setting bodies, agreements on technical norms, and other forms of regulative 
activities suggest a shift from state regulation and international law regulations to private 
international regulations, where national governments try to regain control over the issues that 
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cannot be dealt with at national level by increasing their efforts at international level.96 It is quite 
hard to achieve, as procedural rules of participation are transformed into much higher level “than 
within the national constitutional framework, where decision-making procedures in governmental 
regulatory regimes or private societal spheres are still controlled by both parliaments and by a 
genuine democratic process, and are embedded in a constitutional setting of administrative rules 
and judicial control.”97 
In private standardisation issues, “private transnational governance is linked to the law via 
national courts: law “constitutes” private governance through an ex-post process of measuring the 
regulatory processes on standards borrowed from concepts of due process of law”.98 If we are 
facing a comprehensive global regulatory machine under the control of (semi-) autonomous 
private regimes, we have to seek for more than just a vague form of mutual observation of global 
law regimes and ex-post litigation. Procedural safeguards which bring civil society back in – not 
only as outside protesters, but as legitimate voices – may not be last word, but may be an 
essential beginning.99 However, there is another position, regarding the strengthening of the role 
of the civil society. It is believed that as “the civil society idea actually suggests a “corporativist” 
approach to international decision-making, it is dramatically troubling for democratic theory 
because it posits “interests” (whether NGOs or business) as legitimate actors along with 
popularly elected governments”.100 This position was criticized straight away. “It firstly envisions 
a concept of civil society that reflects a market-place model of competing organised interests, 
thus rejecting the notion of deliberative decision-making within public spheres; it secondly 
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presupposes that “international decision-making” is exclusively managed by governments alone 
and not by a joint co-operation with certain business interests, and thirdly, it tries to shield a 
process of vastly executive decision-making that is only remotely connected to democratic self-
government”.101 
Such formations are understood “as arrangements (other than EU committees) consisting 
of actors based in various Member States that receive logistical and/or financial support from the 
EU to pursue common goals linked to influencing the creation, the review and/or the 
implementation of an EU regulatory policy.”102  
They might be divided into two types of networks: EU-centred transgovernmental, which 
link up authorities operating at the national or sub-national level of Member States, and EU-
centred transnational networks, linking up private actors, with a specific focus placed on non-
governmental “civil society” actors.103 Further on, transgovernmental networks might be 
distinguished into three sub-types: first, there are networks of national authorities supporting 
several of the EU-level agencies with information tasks; second, there are networks of national 
regulatory authorities; and third, there are networks of national bodies with an ombudsman 
function in dealing with complaints from citizens.104 
Reading the distinguished types of network tasks105 by S. Bugdahn,106 a conclusion could 
be made, that the networks are established to monitor the work of civil servants, as well as the 
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established comitology committees. The activities which are prescribed for the Commission are 
duplicated for networks, which seem to replace comitology committees after they have agreed on 
decision concerning a specific regulation. On the other hand, the networks might be required to 
police and report infringements.  
In the event that national authorities object to the implementation of an EU policy, the 
Commission usually lacks the power to replace the transgovernmental networks with alternative 
national institutions that might not be available in any case. It may be slightly different in the 
case of transnational networks, which are typically built around a set of shared values, and the 
Commission funds only those “advocacy” networks that supports the objectives of EU policies,107 
but such networks are limited in their achievements, since they cannot issue guidance for sub-
national authorities or ombudsmen, and they cannot easily have a strong impact on the 
development and review of EU policies. Also, transnational networks might be used preferably in 
cases when an EU policy creates new rights for citizens and/or groups so as to mobilise these 
citizens and/or groups (especially as national authorities might fear costs for governmental and 
economic actors).  
In addition, transnational networks have fewer inhibitions if they need to implement 
watchdogs and inform the Commission of non-compliance by Member States – provided that 
they can obtain enough information.108 On the other hand, infringement procedures are usually 
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“slow, secretive, inflexible, complex and dominated by states and the Commission.”109 Also the 
watchdogs are normally excluded from the subsequent negotiations between member states and 
the Commission,110 and interest groups cannot normally influence the “complex process of 
bargaining and the complicated trade-offs behind the closed door of a Council meeting”.111  
The promises on “working with key networks, to enable them to contribute to decision 
shaping and policy execution”, defined in the White Paper on European Governance, are yet to be 
fulfilled. So far, the funding and strong network loyalty does not provide any tangible results, as 
maybe only the “informalization” function. However, semi-formalised networks might useful to 
the EU institutions, as they are readily identifiable and more transparent than totally informal 
public-private policy networks; the latter might be enhanced by publicising details on the 
membership of the, network and minutes of meetings or by assigning formal functions.112 
However, “issues and perspectives voiced by civil society are hardly represented within global 
regulatory networks – a single government representative per country in such a regulatory 
network simply cannot be understood as an agent of a whole constituency and its internal 
diversity”.113 
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Open method of coordination114  
It implies mechanisms for monitoring and supplementing existing EU legislative 
instruments and authority based on common European objectives, where the EU has few if any 
legal powers. This method was envisaged as a “third way” for the EU governance between 
regulatory harmonisation and fragmentation, as in the years to follow it appeared “to have 
become the governance instrument of choice for EU policymaking in complex, domestically 
sensitive areas, where diversity among the Member States precludes harmonization but inaction 
its politically unacceptable [...] when faced with the perceived need for joint action in politically 
sensitive, institutionally diverse policy fields, from improving regulation and reducing 
administrative burdens to promoting local and regional clusters”.115 
  
Neighbourhood governance 
The “neighbourhood governance” is linked very closely to the characteristic feature of 
regionalism, where the leading actors are national and beyond-national governments and/or 
administrations. Neighbourhood governance is more focused on internal participation and 
decision-making, which refers to arrangements for collective decision making and/or public 
service delivery at the sub-local level […] through the devolution of political and/or managerial 
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authority from “higher” to “lower” level actors”.116 It is a response to particular local 
circumstances, i.e. an active neighbourhood movement into the city.117 It may also be a new 
orientation of political elites keen on direct participation of citizens and other stakeholders in 
local decision making. It shall be combined with a neighbourhood approach.118 
Neighbourhood governance defines four rationales: civic, social, politic and economical. 
Each of them favours political devolution. 
Neighbourhood partnership takes a client or community-centred approach to developing 
integrated services through public service boards or strategic forums by bringing together the key 
service providers and decision makers in the community.119  
“Community representatives, appointed or elected by a variety of means, face the dual 
challenge of establishing their legitimacy with citizens and also with the more powerful and 
experienced stakeholders with whom they sit”.120 The aim is to pool resources, risks and rewards 
with the aim of achieving “collaborative advantage”121 – that is, the improved delivery of each 
stakeholder’s objectives and the creation of new opportunities – which can be both a source of 
strength and conflict. It is a system that binds the representatives of different interest groups into 
a process of collective decision making.  
It is also a place, where local government (and other agencies) are able to establish new 
routes for citizen engagement and to improve accountability. It shall be done in an entirely 
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reorganized system of local government that combines strategic capacity with local decision-
making.122 In other words, government statements link to “double devolution” – the shifting of 
power from central to local government and beyond to neighbourhood.123 It embodies in an 
institutional form the civic rationale by stressing opportunities for direct citizen participation in 
the context of declining public involvement in conventional local politics and increasing citizen 
“voice” by developing forms of participatory democracy at the neighbourhood level.124 
 First of all, neighbourhood units of governance provide more opportunity for citizens to 
participate effectively in decisions: it is easier to distribute information about opportunities for 
participation and to communicate with citizens about options and outcomes as well as to address 
“collective action problems” in the presence of small numbers and with the absence of significant 
social or economic cleavages.125 “Increasing citizen interest and competence requires the 
development of a mix of opportunities for participation at the neighbourhood level: these may or 
may not involve election and they may be based upon a single service or issue, or broader 
strategic concerns.”126 
The neighbourhood governance primarily emphasizes representative democracy and can 
be seen as having the potential to revitalize it: the citizen’s role is to elect local councillors and 
hold them to account – their key resource is their vote, - by providing a platform from which to 
rebuild trust and confidence in elected politicians and representative institutions. The 
representative role of councillors can also be enhanced via the ongoing dialogue with their 
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constituents, speaking for their community, and scrutinizing the work of the local authority and 
other service providers on their behalf.127  
 Second, the social dimension is also important when innovating on the design of public 
services and when collaborating on decision making (through multi-agency and community-led 
partnerships).128 At the same time, neighbourhood action can provide a potential basis for 
building associative or stakeholder democracy,129 which may operate outside state initiated 
governance networks, in new politico-social communities that are in contact with, but not 
conditioned by, the state.130 Urban relationship depends mainly on the presence of certain 
conditions – where people are of similar status, have common interests, and are supported by 
institutions that encourage engagement and understanding,131 which might limit the diversity in 
neighbourhood governance. 
From a political perspective, citizens can access neighbourhood governance more easily 
and are more knowledgeable about the issues at stake. Their leaders are usually expected to have 
direct experience and knowledge of the matters at hand, enabling them to make informed inputs 
into policy making and to hold representatives and service deliverers to account. They are also 
more likely to be known to the citizens and they have more opportunities to communicate with 
them on an ongoing basis and to monitor governance outcomes in the locality.132 However, the 
“recruitment of representatives may be harder at the neighbourhood level because party systems 
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are less well developed, there are fewer and less diverse community organizations, and there is 
little media coverage of local politics”.133 It is also noticed that “larger units have a more 
“representative” councillor body (to the extent that it reflects the make-up of the population), 
with councillors also more likely to have been born and still live in the locality”.134   
The political devolution might be “download” – changes in policies, practices, 
preferences or participants within local systems of governance, arising from the negotiation and 
implementation of EU programmes; or “upload” – the transfer of innovative urban practices to 
the supranational arena, resulting in the incorporation of local initiatives in pan-European policies 
or programmes.135 
One more of the core elements in defining a neighbourhood’s concept is a geographic 
dimension (in other words – it would be appropriate to define it as a part of definition of 
regionalism), which circumscribes the built environment that people use practically and 
symbolically – constructing the social meaning.136 Other elements could be noted such as support 
and/or shape of the development of individual and collective identities, facilitated connections 
and interactions with others, only if these features provide positive comfort and support.137 
However, the smaller and more homogenous the unit of governance, the easier it is for elites to 
dominate, and the harder it is for diverging views to be expressed and accommodated.138 
And the final identified rationale – the economic one, - is based upon the proposition that 
neighbourhood governance can make more efficient and effective use of available resources, as 
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in a more closed environment it is possible better to identify and limit waste in organizational 
processes as well as propose the more targeted services. The small-scale communities are also 
more flexible regarding exit options (transfer to another jurisdiction) if they raise their own 
taxes139 and they are more conducive to forms of “bottom-up accountability”. It enables to 
respond better to citizens’ needs and so improve allocative efficiency by accumulating separate 
services, developing new services and even abolishing outmoded modes of delivery.140 It also 
evolves a concept of changing a citizen’s behaviour, with the aim of enhancing a well-being and 
reducing pressure on services. 
  
Networked governance141 
 This type of governance is a win-win arrangement improving the positions of both the 
regions and national governments by strengthening government capacities in directing territorial 
development and making it more inclusive by way of extending its political accountability 
upwards to the Commission, downwards to the regions and sideway to non-state actors.142 The 
networked governance is most often related to the „networked agencies” – the judicial bodies, 
which actually do all the relevant tasks and networking itself. 
 The EU governance through networks is committed to openness, accessibility to 
information, and publicity of decision-making. In this it has developed some identifiable rules, 
such as the right to good administration, the right to remedies against bureaucratic inertia; the 
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duty to notify interested parties that  administrative proceedings have begun, to exercise diligence 
and to conclude the proceedings within a reasonable time.143 
These rules are applied not only to the EU institutions themselves, but also to any 
agencies established by them. However, it should be noted that the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights reflects this choice for a qualitative approach to governance; the citizens are 
granted a “right to a good administration”, 144 albeit limited to “his or her affairs” and focused on 
individual measures instead of on all administrative actions”.145 
The qualitative approach to governance could be seen as a way of organizing 
heterogeneity, integrating in developmental programs interests, values and considerations 
represented by state and non-state actors participating in the making and implementing of 
developmental programs. The responsibility of setting formal legal regulation of the relationships 
among the different constitutive units of regional governance should remain strictly at national 
level. Another possible step in this type of governance is the “creation of independent national 
regulatory authorities, or reinforcement of the autonomy of existing ones, on condition that these 
authorities consult more widely with each other and the European Commission”.146 
On the other hand, “this networked deliberative decision making is widely seen as a 
departure from the norms of representative democracy by which laws are legitimate only if they 
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can exhibit a pedigree extending from a sovereign people assembled in the electorate through a 
legislative act as eventually adjusted by administrative elaboration”.147 
The development of territorial governance is usually about the power to decide in 
planning development and their diverse dimensions - the properties of the rules of making 
binding decisions about the goals and means of sub-national development, and the distribution of 
opportunities for autonomous action for lower levels of the state, - of the distribution of power.148 
The first defined dimension might be hierarchical in retaining the right to take binding decisions 
on issues of regional development to a single unit (i.e. a central state agency), or they might be 
based on distributed authority, as the second dimension might be a case where only the central 
state has room to undertake autonomous room for identifying and solving problems of territorial 
development, but nevertheless, only a government can take binding decisions in issues of 
territorial development.  
 
Networked agencies 
 The already mentioned “networked agencies”,149 which usually involves tripartite 
participants, on one side representing public organisations and/or associations or other relevant 
scientific organizations and/or institutes, private consultants as one part; official representatives 
from the Commission and the Parliament as the second part, and representatives from Member 
States (might be representatives from social partners, NGOs, charities and etc.) as well as 
observers from EEA states as the third part. The constituency part of the “networked agencies” 
strongly reflects the constituency of comitology committees.  
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The “networked agencies” type of governance is closely related to the “principal – agent” 
model, where the principal is the EU and its agents are the national administrative authorities.150 
The principal – agent model works in two ways – the first is, that “agents being what they are, 
each of these will interpret the principal’s instructions (i.e. directives, decisions and similar) in a 
self–serving way; and the principal will of course be determined to minimise this agency “drift”. 
The second, […] it is presumed to have only a vague or provisional idea of its own goals, [where] 
national administrative agencies will reveal possibilities that the principal has overlooked, and 
prefers more than any of the options entertained ex ante”.151 In such a relationship, the principal 
wanting expertise in a sector of policy-making delegates a task to private actors outside the 
political legislative stream of decision-making. And this partnership might be expressed in three 
forms: an exclusive form of self-regulation; partial regulation, which takes form of co-regulation, 
i.e. joint decision-making with public actors; and the third form – no regulation or action at all, 
where the first form is most favourable of governmental institutions and the last form is preferred 
by the private sector.152  
The braver conception could be granting the non-elected public officials the right to 
decide upon the major part of material risk regulation. It shall lead to a virtue of the rule-making 
system, which could preserve democratic legitimacy.153 In other words, it might be said that 
domestic groups pursue “their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favourable 
policies, and politicians are seeking power by constructing coalitions among those groups” in 
order for “domestic actors to put pressure on governments at the national level to gain leverage, 
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and that on the international level governments use negotiations to meet or escape domestic 
actors’ interests.154 
A. Heritier and S. Eckert155 have demonstrated that the partnership is effective, if 
government takes the first steps to regulate an issue or tighten the existing one – in such a case 
the private sector reacts by self-regulation and its ambitiousness is directly linked to the level of 
the legislative threat and NGO campaigns, and on the other hand such a reaction raises more 
rigorous instruments of control over the agent’s performance. Their study has shown that NGO 
campaigns are not always a necessary condition for self-regulation to emerge, and their influence 
is hard to control, as usually after their campaigning has reached any kind of legal regulation or 
agreement, they lose interest once it comes to watching over implementation and monitoring. 
However, it is believed that the described partnership is effective if the legislative threat is 
sustained or if it is prompted by external monitoring and sanctioning. 
The “networked agencies” have the same tasks as the comitology committees – these 
should be undertaken in conditions that respect the virtues of “independence”, “scientific and 
technical quality”, “transparency” and “diligence”,156 ensuring “effective coherence between risk 
assessment, risk management and risk communication”.157 It should only be separated that some 
of the networked bodies that deal with risk analysis but not with risk management, when it is 
exceptionally left to the Commission. The decisions are usually conducted through a network that 
might cover up to a thousand of experts or nominating authorities or more.  
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The main problem for the agencies is to ensure that that the members act in the public 
interest and in an independent manner. The transparency (from a “networked agency” to public in 
general) is even poorer – a very small part of regulatory information is publicly available, which 
usually covers “accompanying documents and data of applications, the assessment and evaluation 
discussions of the concerned regulatory bodies, […] the details of the resulting decisions and 
their justification, including minority positions”.158 Furthermore, the increased transparency and 
accessibility might come at the expense of complexity and possible domination by large states 
and/or related party interests.159 
It might be due to some significant limitations to the effectiveness of networked 
governance, such as weak influence of the latter due to a possible conflict between the compiled 
information supplied by the national authorities, which, it is believed, does not reach a wide 
audience of practitioners within industry, and the Commission’s priorities. Another reason might 
be identified as the burdened participation by Member States themselves. “Many Member States 
do not consider the work of the Agency as a priority, or worse, see it as a possible “intrusion” 
into their administration”.160 The other problem to be mentioned – the dominant position of 
national administrations within the networks, who appear as “both interested party and judge“. 
This kind of dual position might be affected by the fear to provide information on bad 
implementation to the responsible agency, as this information might be used against them. On the 
other hand, Member States are not interested to provide this information as the collector has not 
contributed to improved implementation of EU legislation and it does not ensure the system of 
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monitoring, so due to limited activities on analysis, implementation and monitoring, the activities 
of mediators and external participants is not so effective.161 The possible solution found to this 
problem is “a system of legally binding duties that are controlled and could be enforced with 
sanctions, this strong-soft monitoring system is likely to have a better outcome than the current 
“voluntarily” soft-soft approach of the Agency’s “governance by information”.162  
When an agent is required to explain and justify his/her action to those who have the 
necessary knowledge to understand and evaluate those actions. Such conferred decision-making 
discretion creates accountability for these established legal bodies.163 In some cases, the legal 
bodies, possessing the same knowledge, might be ineffective, as their “deliberations might seem 
to yield only recommendations that can be ignored without penalty by those to whom they are 
addressed; [and] unworkable because in the absence of any sanction or discipline the actors could 
well choose to limit themselves to pro forma participation or worse yet manipulate the 
information they provide so as to show themselves, deceptively, to best advantage.”164 Especially 
it is true when the provided information between agencies is asymmetric.  
 Having in mind the present financial situation in most of the Member States, a new form 
of networking called “shadow of hierarchy” is initiated where the state or public hierarchy is 
limited in its ability to secure the outcomes that it prefers; due to this reason non-state actors are 
endowed with a right of “bargaining in the shadow of the state” and act in some sense as its 
authorised agents or deputies in reaching solutions not directly available to the authorities 
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themselves; while all the time being assured that their agreements will be backed by the authority 
of the state.165 
 The Commission is now also considering the creation of a network of independent 
authorities in Member States, which would share responsibility for enforcement of  the EU rules 
in terms on the issue, while also facilitating the horizontal flow of information and exchange of 
best practice.166 
 
Urbanization 
Today the European city is a local actor and a “player” no longer overwhelmed by the 
state.167  EU element influences the development of a regional identity. This policy usually 
covers four categories, affected by interaction with the EU – policies, practices, preferences and 
participants. The fourth category could be identified as the most important one, as EU-financed 
programmes “force the expansion of the number of players at the local decision-making table, 
bringing non-governmental organizations, representatives from the community and voluntary 
sectors, business leaders, and other social partners into the increasingly complex world of urban 
governance,”168 by encouraging the development of more urban partnerships, widening the 
number of participants involved in the decision-making process. 
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Additionally, it should be noted that different Member States do have different 
institutional context, i.e. British local authorities lack constitutional standing, as the result of 
which it possess relatively few competencies, and are subject to a restrictive ultra vires rule 
which prevents them from taking action outside those responsibilities expressly granted to them 
by the UK Parliament as well as a decrease in their influence due to the fact that private 
companies have taken over many aspects of policy implementation and service delivery over the 
past twenty years.169 While not engaging in European high politics, “more important for UK local 
government is the part they have played in shaping regional plans, such that they have become 
recognised as true if not equal partners in the policy implementation and management processes 
at the regional level.”170 
 However, not all regional institutions and actors are able to dominate sub-national 
development, as weak civil societies in some countries are not able to transform territorially 
sensitive issues into effective local demands. However, central states have weak incentives, lack 
resources and skills which may increase the efficiency of sub-national policy making.  
 The Commission was confronted by those weaknesses and it decided to change its 
priorities in order to push especially new Member States towards a hierarchical mode of 
governance171 by creating problem-solving capacities with a focus on increasing the capacity of 
regional state and non-state actors to participate in integrated developmental policies. However, 
the central state still keeps its role in co-ordinating, helping and monitoring the making and 
implementing of regional developmental policies, that is why the Commission pushed the new 
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Member States towards centralised management. The reasons might be the following: either 
national governments do not provide enough power for regional actors, or sub-national 
stakeholders are not organised enough and lack cohesive regional development partnership or 
finally,
 
the organised non-state actors do not have the skills, motivations and the know-how to 
participate actively and effectively in making and implementing regional development programs. 
On the other hand, despite the fact that Member States were pushed to focus on regional state and 
non-state actors participation in integrated developmental policies, the Commission itself can 
only “create networks and encourage others, involve a wide range of actors, and participate itself, 
but it can do little to shift the long-standing power dependencies between central and local 
government”.172 
 In nearly all new Member States one can find some challenge of the rules of governance 
and/or temporary compromises between central state and regional actors that might lead to what 
historical institutionalism would call “an emergence of a change at the margins implying local 
rule transformation within a basically unchanged institution that does not challenge dominant 
characteristics of the mode of governance” and a “change in continuity”.173 
 
Experimentalist governance 
“Experimentalist governance” focuses on functionalism, such as monitoring and review of 
implementation experience, and setting the possibility conditions, containing strategic 
uncertainty, meaning that policy makers cannot rely on their strategic dispositions to guide action 
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in particular domain; and a multipolar or polyarchic distribution of power, in which no single 
actor has the capacity to impose her own preferred solution without taking into account the views 
of the others.174 It is a method for dealing with political controversies in which actors, political 
and non-political, arrive at mutually acceptable decisions by deliberating and negotiating with 
each other.”175 
 
6.4. CONCLUSIONS. 
 
 The aim of this Chapter was to overview the possibility for external participants to get 
involved in the EU decision-making process at local and regional level. Though, the 
responsibility of involvement of regional and local representatives remains exceptionally with 
national administrations. It means that the Commission does not have any legal power to impose 
any obligations on Member States regarding territorial development governance. 
 As for external participants who are non-civil servant, it is left to the national government 
to create rules and procedures to be involved in the decision-making process. The involvement of 
non-elected external participants is also reserved to the EU institutions at EU level. The main 
instruments have already been discussed in the preceding Chapters.  
 The involvement of external participants is rather a complex process which may be 
related to the multi-level decision-making process, as it covers actions and actors at many levels 
of governance. Moreover it is stated that participation at multi-level decision-making process 
                                                 
174
 Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin (n 6) 274. 
175
 E.O. Eriksen and J.E. Fossum (2004), “Europe at crossroads: Government or Transnational Governance?”, in Ch. 
Joerges, I.-J. Sand, G. Teubner (eds.) (2004), Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism, Oxford and 
Portland/ Oregon: Hart Publishing; p. 120. 
 251
cannot be separated from politicization, and the final decision almost always reside with 
traditional legislative bodies or administrative institutions. 
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VII CHAPTER 
 
PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES – PRIMORDIAL RIGHTS OF 
EXTERNAL PARTICIPANTS 
 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Environmental issues usually cover the five elements – soil, water, air, climate and the 
landscape. Most of the legislation, drafted and implemented by DG Environment is also 
focused on those five elements. Strange to say that human beings are left out of the focus, as  
they should be the centre of all the further legal, technical or scientific developments. Water, 
soil, air, and nature have no voice of their own either, and citizens are usually dependent on 
the Commission to take up their complaints since citizens have practically no access to the 
Courts of the EU in environmental matters.1 
The first steps to implement appropriate legal instruments and procedural rights were 
made by the UNECE Convention, which is considered to be a milestone in environmental 
                                                 
1
 M. Taylor (2005), ”Public involvement in environmental decision-making“, in EU Environmental Policy 
Handbook, EEB, p.160. 
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democracy, granting procedural rights to individuals with respect to access to environmental 
information held by public authorities and public participation in decision-making. It does not 
set standards for environmental quality in itself, but sets out rules for the public’s right of 
access to environmental information held by public authorities and a right of public 
participation in permitting procedures. It is a great tool for campaigners to greatly improve 
government accountability, environmental decision-making, and the involvement of 
stakeholders.2 
This Chapter aims to identify the place of a human being in environmental decision-
making process and its practical obstacles while ensuring participation in environmental 
issues. The right to participate in a decision-making process should be considered as a 
primordial right, of any natural or judicial person. In the last decades, citizens have been more 
willing to participate in an environmental decision-making process. For that role to be 
effective, it follows that citizens must be able to access relevant information and must have 
opportunities to express themselves. The right to participate in the environmental decision-
making process enhances the quality and the implementation of decisions, contributes to 
public awareness of environmental issues, and gives the public the opportunity to express its 
concerns and enables public authorities to take due account of such concerns, by recognizing 
that every person has the right to live in an environment adequate his or her health and well-
being.3  
 Whether this right is correctly ensured, the reply would be provided after the analysis of 
the main omissions faced by participants challenging contravening provisions of legal acts by 
the EU institutions as well as by national authorities would be accomplished. The 
environmental policy and its legislation have been chosen to be provided as an example, 
                                                 
2
 ibid 161. 
3
 Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in 
environmental matters (done at Århus, Denmark, on 25 June 1998), preamble. 
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where a number of legal acts have been implemented. Based on this practice, it would be 
possible to evaluate whether such an instrument could be implemented in other policy areas as 
an example. 
The participation and consultation of external participants has become a good practice, 
but it is still not obligatory. The first step to regulate this issue was tried by implementing an 
Århus Convention.4 The document addresses the relationship between individuals and their 
associations on the one hand, and the public authorities on the other hand.5 This Convention 
could be treated as the most unconventional Convention, due to the fact that it seeks to 
guarantee the procedural rights of the public. Addressing the environment/human rights 
interface there is great attention to the relations between governments and civil society and 
there is an unprecedented involvement of NGOs, both in the negotiation and implementation 
of the Convention.6 It is not ‘only’ an environmental agreement, but it is also about 
governmental accountability, transparency, and responsiveness. The Århus Convention is also 
an instrument that stresses the need for information and provides a means for participation in 
the decision making process.7 
 This document was also ratified by the European Union in 2005.8 By ratifying the Århus 
Convention, the EU “took upon itself the obligation to ensure that members of the public have 
                                                 
4
 ibid – entered into force 30 October 2001. 
5
 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the application of the provisions of 
the Århus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to justice 
in Environmental Matters to [EU] institutions and bodies, COM (2003) 622 final, p. 8. 
6
 J. Wates (2004), Secretary to the Århus Convention, Environment and Human Settlements Division, UN 
Economic Commission for Europe; speech given during the conference “The Århus Convention and the 
Citizen“, on 5-6 July 2004. 
7
 Margot Wallstrom (Environment Commissioner of the EU Commission) opening speech during the conference 
“The Århus Convention and the Citizen“, 5-6 July 2004. 
8
 Council Decision No. 2005/370/EC of 17 February 2005 on the conclusion, on behalf of the European 
Community, of the Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to 
justice in environmental matters [2005] OJ L 124. 
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access to administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions by EU 
institutions which contravene provisions of EU law relating to the environment”.9  
 
7.2. THE TWO PILLARS OF PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-
MAKING PROCESS 
 
The Convention has implemented some general features, which should be discussed in 
order to have a more thorough understanding of some of the evolved terms to be used in this 
context.  
Even though the Convention implements three pillars on participation in the 
environmental decision-making process, namely access to information (thirst pillar), public 
participation (second pillar) and access to justice (third pillar), the first and the third ones are 
chosen to be analysed further in this Chapter. The second pillar will be excluded from the 
analysis, as it only covers public participation in specific projects or activities related to the 
environment. 
 
7.2.1. The definition of the “Public”. 
 
This concept is offered a broad definition and covers any natural or legal person, as well 
as informal groups. The most relevant secondary legislation10 has also identified this concept 
                                                 
9
 M. Pallemaerts (2009), “Compliance by the European Community with its obligations on access to justice as a 
party to the Århus Convention“, prepared by Institutte for European Environmnetal Policy, 2009, p. 6. 
10
 Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the 
application of the provisions of the Århus Convention on Access to Invormation, Public Participation in 
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies [2006] 
OJ L 264, Article 2; and Council Directive No. 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of 
certain public and private projects on the environment [1985] OJ L 175, Article 1. 
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in its legal text – both legal acts have implemented the same definition.11 “Accordingly, the 
concept of “members of the public” can only be interpreted as encompassing any natural or 
legal person, as well as informal groups without legal personality, but the latter only to the 
extent that such groups are recognised as entities in their own right in accordance with the 
internal law or domestic practice of the Parties”.12 
The definition of “public authorities”, which covers all sectors of the government, 
excluding bodies acting in a legislative or judicial capacity, requests an additional 
explanation. The Convention actually covers the “institutions” of the contracting parties to the 
Convention. EU legislation covers a specific legal meaning of the notion “institutions”. 
Pursuant to Article 13 of the TEU, the EU institutions are the European Parliament, the 
European Council, the Council, the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, the European Central Bank and the Court of Auditors. The EU, – signing 
and approving the Århus Convention, - has explicitly referred to „[Union] institutions“, the 
list of which is finite.13 Regulation 1367/2006/EC applies to „[Union] institution or body“, 
which means „any public institution, body, office or agency established by, or on the basis of, 
the Treaty“.14 The question is, whether the CJEU deciding on this issue, would formally be 
bound by the secondary law definition contained in the Regulation. On the other hand, 
whether the legal decisions, taken by functional agencies, established by the EU legislator, 
entrusted with specific tasks of a scientific, technical or even regulatory nature, governed by 
European public law, with their own legal personality, district from the institutions 
established by the Treaty of Lisbon itself,15 fall within the scope of the Århus Convention. 
                                                 
11
 “The public” means one or more natural or legal persons, and associations, organisations or groups of such 
persons”. 
12
 M. Pallemaerts (n 9) 14. 
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 ibid 11. 
14
 Regulation 1367/2006 (n 10) Article 2 paragraph c. 
15
 M. Pallemaerts (n 9) 16. 
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 A recent study, conducted for the Commission by the consultants “Milieu Ltd.”,16 
showed the level of compliance of EU-25 Member States. However, the Commission did not 
get engaged in assessing compliance by the EU itself with its obligations on access to justice. 
The problem of the issue of the EU non-compliance is discussed in this Chapter. 
It should be pointed out that the Århus Convention does not require the Parties to 
provide access to justice to any and all members of the public without distinction.17 First, it 
has to meet the set criteria, if any, laid down in national legislation.18 Further on, it would be 
expedient to define “sufficient interest” and “showing the affected rights”. The wider 
definition is suggested by Article 1 paragraph 2 of Directive 85/337/EEC,19 where it is stated 
that for the purposes of this Directive, “the public concerned” means “the public affected or 
likely to be affected by, or having an interest in, the environmental decision-making 
procedures referred to in Article 2.2.; for the purposes of this definition, non-governmental 
organizations promoting environmental protection and meeting any requirements under 
national law shall be deemed to have an interest”. So, the definition clearly states what can be 
an interest in order to be considered “the public concerned”, or having interest in the matter. 
The definition of “the public concerned” is extended in Article 10a of the same Directive, 
stating that “Member  States shall ensure that, in accordance with the relevant national legal 
system, members of the public concerned: (a) having a sufficient interest, or alternatively, (b) 
maintaining the impairment of a right, where administrative procedural law of a Member 
State requires this as a precondition, have access to a review procedure before a court of law 
or another independent and impartial body established by law to challenge the substantive or 
                                                 
16
 “Inventory of EU Member States' measures on access to justice in environmental matters“, a study conducted 
by Millieu Ltd. in 2007. The full text can be found at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/study_access.htm> accessed 15 July 2010. 
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 M. Pallemaerts (n 9) 14. 
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 Regulation 1367/2006 (n 10) Article 9 paragraph 3. 
19
 Council Directive of 27 June 1985 No. 85/337/EEC on the assessment of the effects of certain public and 
private projects on the environment [1985] OJ L 175, amended by Directives 97/11/EC, 2003/35/EC and 
2009/31/EC. 
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procedural legality of decisions, acts or omissions subject to the public participation 
provisions of this Directive”. 
A slightly different definition is also offered by Directive 96/61/EC,20 Article 2 
paragraph 13 and Article 14, where it is stated  “the public concerned” shall mean the public 
affected or likely to be affected by, or having an interest in, the taking of a decision on the 
issuing or the updating of a permit or of permit conditions; for the purposes of this definition, 
non-governmental organizations promoting environmental protection and meeting any 
requirements under national law shall be deemed to have an interest”. 
“While referring to “the criteria, if any, laid down in national law”, the Århus 
Convention neither defines these criteria nor sets out the criteria to be avoided”.21 The Parties 
of the Convention are not obliged to establish a system of their national laws with the effect 
that anyone can challenge any decisions, acts or omission relating to the environment, thus 
they cannot introduce or maintain any strict criteria which may bar all or almost all 
environmental organizations from challenging acts or omissions that contravene national law 
relating to the environment.22  
 
7.2.2. Freedom of Access to Information.  
 
Access to environmental information (either active or passive, as it is defined in 
Articles 4 and 5 of the Convention) held by public authorities is a prerequisite for improving 
the application and monitoring of the EU environmental law. Disparities between the laws in 
force in Member States concerning access to environmental information held by public 
                                                 
20
 Council Directive 96/61/EC of 24 September 1996 concerning integrated pollution prevention and control 
[1996] OJ L 257. 
21
 M. Pallemaerts (n 9) 15. 
22
 ibid. 
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authorities can create inequality within the EU regarding access to information and/or 
conditions of competition. 
Council Directive 90/313/EC,23 which was implemented long before the Community 
signed the Århus Convention, ensures the freedom of access to and dissemination of 
information on the environment. It was repealed by Directive 2003/4/EC,24 because of the 
shortcomings of Directive 90/313/EEC (identified by the stipulated reports on experience 
gained)25 and the obligations arising from the Århus Convention. The new directive imposes a 
number of stricter obligations upon Member States, notably as regards the active 
dissemination of environmental information by public authorities and the extension of rights 
of access to information from citizens of EU to any person, regardless of his or her residence. 
It implements the availability of information to any natural or legal person without having to 
prove an interest. The Directive also obliges Member States to provide for an administrative 
“appeal”, (optional in the Århus Convention) which is a procedure that has the advantage of 
being rapid and free of charge.26 
Progress includes the definition of environmental information, which is very broad 
and includes cost-benefit analysis and other economic analyses and measures, such as policies 
likely to affect the environment. It is also much clearer that health and safety information is 
within its scope. Under Article 6 paragraph 3 of Directive 85/337/EEC, each Member State 
has the power to determine the detailed arrangements for the consultation. That provision lists 
                                                 
23
 Council Directive 90/313/EEC of 7 June 1990 on the freedom of access to information on the environment 
[1990] OJ L 158. 
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 Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public access to 
environmental information [2003] OJ L 41, p. 26. 
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 Council Directive 90/313/EEC (n 23) Article 8. 
26
 See the website of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), Public Participation, 
Århus Convention at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/prtr.ng.htm - accessed 11 July 2005. 
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a number of possibilities open to Member States in this regard, but the list is not exhaustive, 
as evidenced by the words “in particular”.27  
 
7.2.2.1. Availability of Environmental Information. 
 
Information must be made available to the applicant no later than one month after 
receipt of the request. If the volume and complexity of the information is such that this period 
cannot be complied with, a period of two months from the date of receipt of the request is 
allowed.28 But, one should note that environmental information should not be interpreted as 
simply about the state of the environment or just about information held by environmental 
ministries. Where public functions have been devolved or delegated or even privatised, it is 
clear that these secondary bodies cannot escape obligations to provide access to information.29 
Member States shall ensure that public authorities inform the public adequately of the 
rights they enjoy and, to an appropriate extent, provide information, guidance and advice to 
this end. Availability of environmental information in a specific form or format is regulated in 
the same way as in the Århus Convention – the only additions to the Convention are: 
• officials support the public seeking information; 
• lists of public authorities are publicly accessible; 
• the right of access to environmental information can be effectively exercised. 
The foreseen exceptions also correspond to the Convention. In addition, it is regulated 
so that where a Member State provides for exceptions; it should draw up a publicly accessible 
list of criteria on the basis of which the authority concerned may decide how to handle 
                                                 
27
 Case C-216/05 Commission of the European Communities v. Ireland [2006] ECR I-10802, § 31. 
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 Directive 2003/4/EC (n 24) Article 3 §1-2. 
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 M. Taylor (n 1) 163. 
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requests.30 Member States may also exclude bodies or institutions that act in judicial or 
legislative capacities. This includes bodies such as parliaments, courts and tribunals, and can 
also apply to authorities which may have both legislative and administrative functions – the 
authority does not have a blanket exemption – only those areas which are legislative in nature 
should be exempted.31 
 
7.2.2.1.1. Charges for Environmental Information.  
 
Access to any public registers or lists established, maintained and examined in situ of 
the information requested are free of charge. However, authorities may make a reasonable 
charge for supplying any environmental information.32 However, it is also a case that the 
Courts of the EU have noted that high charges would be perverse if they restricted access to 
information.33 If the cost of information is prohibitively high, then a serious inequality is 
created between, for example, corporations with access to large budgets and much poorer 
ECOs.34 The same decision was also taken in the case Commission v. Ireland35 stating that 
Ireland has, actually or potentially, created an obstacle to the exercise of the right, particularly 
for person of low income and it fails to ensure that opinions expressed by members of the 
public who are not able to pay participation fees are taken into account in development 
consent procedures pertaining to projects likely to have significant effects on the environment. 
On the other hand, by making the participation of the public in certain environmental 
impact assessments subject to prior payment of participation fees, it should be treated as 
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 Directive 2003/4/EC (n 24) Article 4 § 3. 
31
 Article 8 of the Århus Convention (n 3) promotes public participation in the preparation of drafts of 
legislation, this being regarded as an executive function. 
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 Directive 2003/4/EC (n 24) Article 5. 
33
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5105. 
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 M. Taylor (n 1) 163. 
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infringement of the existing legislation, as it is not expressly authorised in the Directive.36 
Only access to information is authorised of levying of a fee. The fact that under another 
Directive the levying of fees is expressly permitted cannot found a general presumption that 
the Community legislature has wished to allow fees only when the legislation expressly so 
provides.37 The levying of a fee, seeking to supplement environmental impact assessments 
with appropriate information may have the effect of dissuading members of the public, one of 
the principal sources of information, from participating in the decision-making process or of 
making their participation more difficult.38 The only exception allowed by the case-law,39 is 
the levying of an administrative fee, if the amount of the fee is not liable to constitute an 
obstacle. “Article 5 of each of these directives40 provides that Member States may levy a 
charge for supplying information but that such charge is not to exceed a reasonable amount. 
Those rules show that, for [Union] legislature, the charging of a fee of a reasonable amount is 
not incompatible with the guarantee of access to information.”41 
 
7.2.2.1.2. Format of Environmental Information. 
 
Should information42 be requested in a specific format, the public authority must 
supply it in that format, unless it is already publicly available in another format, or unless it is 
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 Directive 90/313/EEC (n 23) and Directive 2003/4/EC (n 24). 
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reasonable for the public authority to make it available in another format. In this case, the 
reasons for refusal to make it available in the requested format must be provided to the 
applicant within one month. Public authorities must endeavour to keep information in formats 
that are readily reproducible and accessible by electronic means, and ensure it is up-to-date, 
accurate and comparable (it excludes information which was available before the entry into 
force of this Directive). 
 
7.2.2.1.3. Exemptions for Disclosure of Environmental Information.  
 
Requests for information might be refused if it complies with the listed reasons: the 
public authority does not hold the requested information; the request is unreasonable or too 
general; the requested information is in the course of completion, or concerns internal 
communication and disclosure would adversely affect the confidentiality.  
The grounds for refusal have also been challenged in the Office of Communications 
case.43 The reference for preliminary ruling was submitted by the Supreme Court of the 
United Kingdom following proceedings between the Office of Communications and the 
Information Commissioner concerning the interpretation of Article 4 of Directive 2003/4 on 
public access to environmental information. The issue arose as an epidemiologist requested 
access to the precise location of mobile phone base stations, which was denied. The CJEU 
was asked to explain how the exemptions for disclosure had to be weighed against reasons for 
disclosure. The CJEU points out reasons – “a greater awareness of environmental matters, a 
free exchange of views, more effective participation by the public in environmental decision-
                                                                                                                                                        
requested or found; g) environmental impact studies and risk assessments concerning the environmental 
elements or a reference to the place where the information can be requested or found.” 
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 Case C-71/10 Office of Communications v Information Commissioner of 28 July 2011. 
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making and, eventually, to a better environment”,44 which may cumulatively militate to 
disclosure.45 The concept of “public interest served by disclosure“ shall be regarded as an 
overarching concept covering more than one ground for the disclosure of environmental 
information.46 The CJEU held that the concept of “interest served by refusal” is an 
overarching concept as well. It thus found that the competent public authority might, when 
undertaking that exercise, evaluate cumulatively the grounds for refusal to disclose. 
The CJEU has ruled that provisions for disclosure of environmental information under 
Article 4 of Directive 2003/4/EC can override commercial confidentiality.47 It must be 
interpreted that the confidentiality, which is expressly provided in Article 14 of Directive 
91/414/EEC,48 is stated to be without prejudice to Directive 2003/4/EC on public access. 
Though, Member States must grant access if (i) public interest outweighs exception grounds, 
or (ii) relates to “emissions into the environment”. “[T]he balancing exercise prescribed by 
article 4 of Directive 2003/4 between the public interest served by the disclosure of 
environmental information and the specific interest served by a refusal to disclose must be 
carried out in each individual case submitted to the competent authorities, even if the national 
legislature were by a general provision to determine criteria to facilitate that comparative 
assessment of the interests involved“.49 
The same legal obligations are also applied to the EU institutions as well as it is stated 
in the most recent ClientEarth case.50 The General Court had to decide whether studies which 
were made by private contractors at request of the Commission, and which examined whether 
                                                 
44
 Directive 2003/4/EC (n 24) Recital 1 to the Preambule. 
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 Case C-71/10 (n 43) § 25. 
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 ibid § 27. 
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 Case C-266/09 Stichting Natuur en Milieu and Others v College voor de toelating van 
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the national law on hazardous waste and water quality complied with the requirements of EU 
law, could be made available to the public. The General Court has decided that „the 
Commission is entitled to maintain the confidentiality of documents assembled in the course 
of an investigation relating to infringement proceedings where their disclosure might 
undermine the climate of trust which must exist, between the Commission and the Member 
State concerned, in order to achieve a mutually acceptable solution to any contraventions of 
European Union law that may be identified“.51 It is still too early to state whether the 
Commission tends to treat violation of EU law by Member States as confidential information 
without disclosing information to public on governments’ compliance with EU environmental 
law.  
 
7.2.2.1.4. Notification Procedure. 
 
The recent case-law based on implemented secondary legislation has extended the 
“notification procedure”. Article 25 of  Directive 2001/18/EC52 provides that “the 
Commission and the competent authorities shall not divulge to third parties any confidential 
information notified or exchanged under this directive and shall protect intellectual property 
rights relating to the data received”, unless the provided information is related to “general 
description of the GMO or GMOs, name and address of the notifier, purpose of the release, 
location of release and intended uses” as well as to environmental risk assessment. In such 
cases the provided information cannot be considered confidential.53 “Indeed, such an 
assessment is possible only with full knowledge of the proposed release, because, without 
                                                 
51
 ibid § 60. 
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 Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the deliberate 
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[2001] OJ L 106.  
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such information, it would not be possible to validly assess the potential effects of a deliberate 
release of GMOs on human health and the environment.54 The above mentioned Article 
creates a system which precisely defines the confidentiality which can apply to the various 
information that is disclosed in the context of notification procedures and exchange of 
information provided for by that Directive. 
What would be the difference between the notification procedure and the access to 
information in this situation? The established connection suggests that the relevant public may 
request the disclosure of all information submitted by the notifier in the context of the 
authorisation procedure relating to that release.55 
An important loophole in the Convention was the exemption of public participation 
obligations for GMO-related decisions. With an amendment to the Convention, agreed by the 
Meeting of Parties,56 this loophole was partially addressed. The main weakness of this 
amendment is that it does not guarantee access to justice in cases where public participation 
requirements are violated or when contributions from the public are ignored without 
clarification. The amendment will only enter into force when some thirty countries have 
ratified it. 
 
Parties must also make public the reasons and considerations on which the decision is 
based, so decision-makers should respond to each specific point raised by the consultation 
responses.57 The same is also implemented in Article 8 of Directive 85/337/EEC that “the 
results of consultations and the information gathered must be taken into consideration in the 
development consent procedure”. It has to be made clear why environmental impact 
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 Second meeting of the parties to the Århus Convention 25-27 May 2005, 
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assessment on a specific project, which is believed to have a significant effect on the 
environment, has to be determined, as the public cannot assess the lawfulness of such a 
determination independently if the reasons for that determination are not given.58 
 
7.2.3. Access to Justice in Environmental Matters.  
 
It is the right to challenge, in a court of law, public decisions that have been made 
without respecting the two aforementioned rights – access to environmental information and 
public participation in environmental decision-making – or environmental law in general.59 
“The purpose of judicial review is to provide a form of review of decisions made and actions 
taken by courts and administrative bodies, to ensure that the functions conferred on such 
authorities have been carried out correctly and legally”.60 
Within the framework of its national legislation, an access to review procedure before 
a court of law or another independent and impartial body established by law, free of charge or 
inexpensive, where the final decision shall be binding, the public authority holding the 
information, should be ensured to:61   
• any person, who considers that his or her request for information has been ignored, 
wrongfully refused, whether in part or in full, inadequately answered, or otherwise not 
dealt with in accordance (procedures to challenge the handling of information requests); 
• any concerned public (restricted) who considers that the procedures are challenged of 
legality of project-level decisions, requiring public participation; 
                                                 
58
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 Case C-427/07 Commission of the European Communities v. Ireland, as of 16 July 2009, §75. 
61
 Århus Convention (n 3) Article 9. 
268 
 
• any Party who considers that the procedures challenge general violations of national law 
relating to the environment (standing may be established by Parties). 
Access to justice also guarantees procedures to be fair, timely, and not prohibitively 
expensive. Also, in order to make it more transparent, the decisions should be in writing and 
publicly accessible. 
 
7.2.3.1. Access to Justice in EU Law and Policies. 
 
Legal instruments related to administrative and judicial procedures to challenge acts 
and omissions by private persons and public authorities other than the institutions of the EU62 
are still not well developed. The Convention itself provides the minimum standards and any 
country can go further than the Convention.63  
The Commission has drafted a proposal for a Directive64 to fully address the 
requirements of that Convention on access to justice in environmental matters also aiming at 
improving the enforcement of environmental law. “The [Union] will only be able to fulfil 
these obligations if it is able to ensure that citizens and non-governmental organisations have 
the required access to justice as far as the [Union] law is concerned.”65 It shall also be an 
efficient tool for representative associations seeking to protect the environment to have access 
to administrative or judicial procedures in environmental matters. The same point is also 
recognised in the 6th EU Environment Action Programme66 that better access to courts of non-
governmental organisations and individuals would have a beneficial effect on the 
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implementation of the EU law.67 The common minimum framework also needs to be 
established throughout the European Union in order to ensure a harmonised approach in all 
Member States on the same right. 
 
Since signing the Convention in 1998, the EU has taken important steps to update 
existing legal provisions in order to meet the requirements of the Århus Convention by means 
of legislation directed to both Member States and its own institutions. In particular, two 
directives concerning access to environmental information and public participation in 
environmental decision-making (the “first” and “second pillar” of the Århus Convention) 
were adopted by the Parliament and the Council in 2003:68 Directive 2003/4/EC69 on public 
access to environmental information and Directive 2003/35/EC70 on public participation in 
respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the environment and 
public participation and access to justice. 
Regulation 1367/2006 grants citizens the right to initiate administrative or judicial 
procedures against acts or omissions that do not comply with environmental law in order to 
improve it. Member States would ensure that members of the public have access to 
administrative or judicial proceedings against administrative acts or omissions that infringe 
environmental law, if they have a sufficient interest, or if they show that their rights have been 
affected.  
Access to the courts in pursuit of environmental protection of exercise of rights is still 
not well developed. One of the most contentious issues is that of legal standing for ECOs, i.e. 
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the recognition of sufficient status to bring legal proceedings. A totally open system providing 
for “action popularis” was opposed by the Commission on the grounds that this goes further 
than the Convention. Others have objected that enhanced access to the courts would create a 
number of actions, flooding the system.71 However, an analysis of environmental cases 
brought by ECOs in a number of countries where ECOs have broader standing indicates that 
his view is not well-founded. Such actions formed a minuscule proportion of the overall case 
load (0.0148% in one study) and indeed were far more successful on average than other cases, 
emphasising the highly focused and targeted nature of the legal cases fought by ECOs.72 
Members of the public and qualified entities who have access to justice against an act 
or an omission must be able to submit a request for an internal review. This request is a 
preliminary procedure under which the person or entity concerned can contact the public 
authority designated by the Member State before initiating the legal or administrative 
proceedings. It must be submitted within four weeks of the date of the administrative act or 
omission. The public authority then has 12 weeks to take a written and reasoned decision and 
notify it to the party that submitted the request. In the decision, the authority should describe 
the measures necessary to comply with environmental law, or, where appropriate, reject the 
request.  
 
7.2.3.2. Sufficient Interest and Impairment of Right. 
 
What could be constituted as a sufficient interest and impairment of a right might only 
be determined by a national legislation, consistently with the objective of giving the public 
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concerned wide access to justice.73 According to the settled case-law, the transposition of a 
directive into domestic law does not necessarily require the provisions of the directive to be 
enacted in precisely the same words in a specific, express provision of national law and a 
general legal context may be sufficient if it actually ensures the full application in a 
sufficiently clear and precise manner.74 However, those “national rules must not be liable to 
nullify [Union] provisions which provide the parties who have a sufficient interest to 
challenge a project and those whose rights it impairs, which include environmental protection 
associations, are to be entitled to bring actions before the competent courts”.75  
On the other hand, it cannot be concluded that a Member State, which has failed to 
reproduce a precise definition of “the public concerned” in its legislation, has not fulfilled its 
obligation to transpose the provision in question,76 especially when a Member State ensures 
that the relevant rights are already granted to the general public and that a specific definition 
of the public concerned is not therefore needed.77 The definition would stay vague as it is, 
until the Commission establishes to what extent „the public concerned“, understood as the 
public affected or likely to be affected by, or having an interest in, environmental decision-
making procedures, should be the rights deemed to be enjoyed under the implemented legal 
acts.78 
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7.2.3.2.1. The Public Concerned. 
 
It means, that qualified entities (associations, groups or organisations recognised by a 
Member State whose objective is protecting the environment) signal a concept which is not 
found in the Århus Convention and which is opposed by environmental citizens’ 
organisations. Qualified entities may exercise the right to take legal action if they consider 
that an administrative act or an omission by an EU Institution or body is in breach of 
environmental law. This is implemented in Article 10a of Directive 85/337/EEC, which 
provides that members of the public concerned who fulfil certain conditions79 have access to a 
review procedure before the court of law or another independent body in order to challenge 
the substantive or procedural legality of decisions, acts or omissions which fall within its 
scope.80 Directive 85/337/EEC “in no way permits access to review procedures to be limited 
on the ground that the persons concerned have already been able to express their views in the 
participatory phase of the decision-making procedure”.81 The CJEU has precluded in the case 
Djurgården82 that a provision of national law which reserves the right to bring an appeal 
against a decision on projects which fall within the scope of the Directive solely to 
environmental protection associations with the defined number of members. This judgement 
has raised some concerns among the academics that it seems to be up to the CJEU to decide 
“whether national conditions regulating access to justice are compatible with both the Århus 
                                                 
79
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Convention and EU law, at least as far as it concerns the implementation of Article 9(2) of the 
Århus Convention”.83 
The application of Article 10a of Directive 85/337/EEC was extended by the CJEU 
decision in the Trianel case.84 The reference for a preliminary ruling was made between the 
“Friends of the Earth” of the Nordrhein-Westfalen branch in Germany and the 
Bezirksregierung Arnsberg, concerning the authorisation granted by the latter to Trianel for 
the construction and operation of a coal-fired power station in Lünen. The issue of this case 
was whether Article 10a of Directive 85/337 precluded legislation which did not permit 
NGOs promoting environmental protection to rely before the courts, in an action contesting a 
decision authorizing projects likely to have “significant effects on the environment”, on the 
infringement of a rule which protected only the interests of the general public and not the 
interests of individuals. The CJEU has stated that „[i]f those organisations must be able to rely 
on the same rights as individuals, it would be contrary to the objective of giving the public 
concerned wide access to justice and at odds with the principle of effectiveness if such 
organisations were not also allowed to rely on the impairment of rules of EU environment law 
solely on the ground that those rules protect the public interest“.85 The CJEU has decided that 
by providing that the interest of any non-governmental organisation meeting the requirements 
referred to in Article 1 paragraph 2 of Directive 85/337/EEC are to be deemed sufficient and 
that such organisations are also to be deemed to have rights capable of being impaired,86 they 
shall be granted the right to defend the right to rely before the courts, in an action contesting a 
decision authorising projects “likely to have significant effects on the environment“, even 
                                                 
83
 Jan H. Jans (2011), “Who is the referee? Access to Justice in a Globalised Legal Order”, in Review of 
European Administrative Law, Volume 4, No. 1, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1834102> 
accessed 28 August 2013, p. 87. 
84
 Case C-115/09 Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen eV v 
Bezirksregierung Arnsberg (intervening party - Trianel Kohlekraftwerk Lünen GmbH & Co. KG) of 12 May 
2011. 
85
 ibid § 46. 
86
 ibid § 57. 
274 
 
where, on the ground that the rules relied on protected only the interests of the general public 
and not the interests of individuals, national procedural law did not permit this. 
 
It should be noted that the proposal of a Directive excludes the Århus provision for the 
challenge of acts and omissions by private persons, which contravene national law relating to 
the environment (but covers those public authorities).87 It is left for Member States to set up 
appropriate criteria for related access to justice under their national law if there is any action 
against a private person, covered by Article 9 paragraph 3 of the Århus Convention.88 It was 
decided by the consulted experts from Member States89 that “groups without legal personality 
have no legal structure, their objectives are not established in a public, transparent document 
and they have no financial ways of answering for their acts”. Based on these arguments, those 
groups should not be allowed to act in courts and administrative bodies of review. The same 
was decided for “certain groups, previously recognised as such by means of a special 
procedure, [which] could have access to review proceedings without having to claim the 
impairment of a right or having a sufficient interest”.90 Based on this comment, the privileged 
legal standing for local and regional authorities has been removed from the text of the 
proposal for a Directive. 
 
Though, the question “who has the right to have access to justice” is still unclear. The 
case Lesoochranárske zoskupenie91 has been under the controversial discussion. 
Lesoochranárske zoskupenie (VLK) is a Slovak association whose objective is the protection 
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of the environment. It requested the Slovak ministry for the environment to inform on any 
administrative decision-making procedures which might potentially affect the protection of 
nature and the environment. “The dispute concerned the request of the association to be a 
“party” to the administrative proceeding relating to the grant of derogations to the system of 
protection for certain species, such as the brown bear; access to protected countryside areas; 
and the use of chemical substances in such areas”.92 It relied on Article 9 paragraph 3 of the 
Århus Convention. The Ministry refused to do that as it held a status of “interested parties” 
rather than “parties to the proceedings”, which was granted to associations whose objective 
was the protection of the environment. On the other hand, Article 9 paragraph 2 and 3 of the 
Århus Convention do not contain any unequivocally drafted fundamental rights or freedoms 
which would be directly applicable to public authorities. The issue of the case was “whether 
Art. 9(3) of the Århus Convention are directly effective within the meaning of settled case law 
of the [CJEU]”.93 
As the EU acceded to the Århus Convention by Council Decision No. 2005/370/EC,94 
the CJEU concluded that the provisions of that convention now form an integral part of the 
legal order of the European Union.95 Based on the fact that the dispute directly relates to the 
area of environment, Article 192 TFEU implements that EU has explicit external 
competence96 and, furthermore, and it concerns a field in large measure covered by Union law 
(it is feared97 that after such conclusion Article 9 paragraph 3 of the Århus Convention would 
almost always fall within the scope of EU law on environmental protection). The CJEU has 
admitted that the EU has not taken any legislative action with regards to Member States to 
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implement Article 9 paragraph 3. Though it has ruled that the national courts must interpret 
their national law in accordance with the objectives of this provision “in order to enable an 
environmental protection organisation, such as zoskupenie [VLK], to challenge a decision 
before a court following administrative proceedings liable to be contrary to EU environmental 
law”.98 By making such a conclusion, the CJEU enhanced the legal position of environmental 
organisations at the level of the Courts of the EU.99  
It shall be concluded that even Article 9 of the Århus Convention does not have direct 
effect; national authorities as well as courts shall ensure an effective right to challenge before 
a court a decision taken following administrative proceedings liable to be contrary to 
environmental law. 
 
If the qualified entity which made the request considers that the decision of the EU 
institution or body does not guarantee conformity with environmental law or if it fails to 
communicate its decision within the specified period, the qualified entity may institute 
proceedings before the CJEU. 
In order to be recognised (either between preliminary procedure (advance recognition) and 
a case-by-case ad hoc procedure), a qualified entity must meet the following criteria: 
• be independent, operate on a non-profit basis and pursue the objective of protecting the 
environment; 
• be active at Community level (in at least 3 Member States); 
• have an organisational structure enabling it to achieve its objectives; 
• be legally constituted for more than two years and have experience in environment 
protection; 
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• have its annual accounts (for the two receding years) certified by a registered auditor. 
Regular checks are made to ensure that entities continue to satisfy these conditions; 
otherwise it may lead to the cancellation of recognition. 
 
7.3. CONCLUSIONS. 
 
The overview of the Århus Convention is the last point in the analysis of external 
participation in EU decision-making process. This international Convention is the only one in 
the whole analysis and was chosen purposefully. It ensures participation in the environmental 
decision-making process and settles procedures to have access to relevant information and be 
able to express oneself.  
The appropriate legal instruments that will apply the rules of the Convention to the EU 
institutions as well as to Member States to have access to information and justice still need to 
be developed and the omissions need to be corrected. It concerns, in particular, the EU 
institutions, which have not complied yet with their obligations on access to justice. 
It is important to identify who can participate in the environmental decision-making 
process. First of all, the party needs to define “sufficient interest” and “show the affected 
rights”. The case studies show that a standing is usually governed by legislation that required 
the litigant to have an “interest” of some kind, in order to be allowed to bring a court case. 
Only meeting those requirements, external participants may be allowed to have access to 
information and justice. It allows challenging of a broad range of environmental laws, acts 
and omissions by the qualified entities or locus standi. The standing of private persons is 
excluded in the EU and in most of Member States national legislation. 
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It shall also be noted that the present legislation both at the international and EU level 
grant information seekers a right to access to information without a corresponding 
responsibility. There is no obligation on the information seekers to account where and for 
what purposes this information will be used, though the information holders are expected to 
achieve their core functions before issuing the requested information or limiting its disclosure. 
There is no consensus of what kind of information shall be disclosed and which may 
be considered as confidential. In order to preclude such ambiguous treatment, information 
holders ought to make sure that the future legislation gets precise and comprehensive vertical 
disclosure and dissemination regimes in the legislative acts or at least “without prejudice” 
clauses in horizontal legislation. It is also advisable to anticipate vertical information 
management regimes if less predictable horizontal rules get implemented. 
However, if there is a narrow exception implemented in the legislative acts, it needs to 
be ensured that it is properly applied whenever the disclosure of the required information is 
not appropriate.  
The legal provisions, which were implemented under the Århus Convention, are 
mainly in the form of hard law. It means that external access to information and justice is 
regulated under binding legislative acts contrary to other instruments which are established 
for external participation. However, external participation in the environmental decision-
making process confronts a number of rules and restrictions, which limits the frame of 
participation. Thus far, the criteria for defining qualified entities for legal standing are still 
under development in order to create an effective system of judicial safeguards when law is 
challenged or must be applied. 
 
 279
 
 
 
 
 
 
VIII CHAPTER 
 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH OF ENVIRONMENTAL COMITOLOGY COMMITTEES: 
RESULTS AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This Chapter describes the empirical research that was undertaken and its results. The 
first part of the Chapter overviews the chosen methodology and its compound parts. It 
explains how the two empirical researches were performed and the final results obtained. The 
second part aims at ascertaining the main reasons for establishing comitology committees and 
their ability to achieve the tasks for which they were created, which were noticed during the 
period of empirical research. This Chapter also lists the scope of mostly common delegated 
tasks. The set task of this research is to prove that comitology committees are established for a 
definite goal, mainly related to the involvement of external participants with technical and 
scientific experience. The results of the first empirical research were verified and supported or 
rebutted in the second empirical research. 
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 8.2.1. METHODOLOGY OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH. 
 
The aim of this study is to show how external participants can legally participate in the 
EU decision-making process and represent their interests or provide their opinion on the 
relevant subjects. The methodology used to carry out the two empirical studies consisted of 
the application of a number of steps. It was decided to use a qualitative1 research method due 
to a number of reasons, applicable to the chosen target group for this research:2 
1) it is appropriate for gaining “a “holistic” overview of the context – its logic and its 
arrangements, as well as its explicit and implicit rules”; 
2) the best way to gain the most qualitative data is “on the perceptions of local actors 
through a process of suspending or “bracketing” preconceptions about the topics under 
discussion”; 
3) without having much primary information, the “researcher is essentially the main 
“measurement device” in the study”; 
4) the whole research is done through discussions, interviews and other kinds of verbal 
communication. 
 
One of the reasons to treat the second empirical research as a qualitative one was 
mainly due to the fact that only 21 replies were received out of 950 invitations to participate 
in the study on external participation in the EU decision-making process3 sent out to 
                                                 
1
 Keith Fu. Punch (1998), “Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches”, Sage 
Publications Ltd., London, p. 4: “Qualitative research is empirical research where the data are not in the form of 
numbers.” 
2
 M. B. Miles and A. M. Hubermann (1994), Qualitative Data Analysis, 2nd edition, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, p. 6-7; in Keith Fu. Punch (n 1). 
3
 The study was conducted in April – September 2012. 
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Ministries of Environment of twenty-seven Member States as well as to various NGOs, expert 
groups, universities and other stakeholders. The received number of replies is not sufficient to 
treat the research as a quantitative one and treat descriptive statistics (frequencies) as 
representing the whole target group. Opinions and replies provided by respondents will only 
be used to support and exemplify some of the statements throughout the whole analysis on 
external participation. 
 
The entire design of the research utilized the following main principles:  
• the strategy: the aim of the researches was to gain an answer to the already defined 
object: how external participants are involved in the EU decision-making process in 
order to represent their interests and achieve their goals. It is also used as a tool to 
prove or deny the conclusions reached based on the analysis of the secondary 
literature. The results of the research will provide the missing information in order to 
get a “holistic” overview of the context, as well as replies to the previous analysis.  
• conceptual framework: the secondary source research (research of the literature) was 
done before the structuring of the questionnaires – the first one is intended for civil 
servants of DG Environment of the Commission (Annex I) and the second 
questionnaire was drafted for civil servants of national ministries of environment and 
external participants being active in the area of environment (Annex II). It was 
assumed that the questionnaire contained only a small set of questions, which would 
be corrected and/or supplemented after each interview. Also, further questions were 
devised and forwarded to respondents already questioned. The aim of this action is to 
include all the missing information, which was not defined while reading the 
literature, as well as to allow for the addition of all recent developments and updates. 
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The results of the literature research would also be used to explain the meaning of 
some questions and the provided answers. 
• the target group (targeted respondents): includes all the civil servant of  DG 
Environment, working with, in or on behalf of comitology committees in the first 
empirical research. In order to get contacts and general information on comitology 
committees, a civil servant in charge of administrative issues was interviewed or any 
other member of a comitology committee who represents the Commission. The 
information on existing and active comitology committees in DG Environment was 
provided by a civil servant.  This information was also checked at the Comitology 
Register.  
The second empirical research aimed to cover all civil servants of ministries of 
environment in all 27 Member States as national representatives and external 
participants representing environmental NGOs, consultancies, stakeholders, 
universities and similar on the other side. The search for contacts was carried out 
through various random databases and other sources (lists of members of various 
working groups, conferences, projects, programs and similar).  
• the used tools: the target respondents were contacted by e-mail to explain the aim of 
the research and to set a convenient meeting time. The designed questionnaire (Annex 
I) was used as a leading tool to give directions for the answers for the respondents. 
Each respondent was giving different information and primary data on the provided 
questions. The second research was implemented using two tools – the drafted 
questionnaire (Annex II) was sent by e-mails stating that the replies can be submitted 
 283
in two ways – either returning the replies by e-mail or filling in a questionnaire on the 
database.4 
 
8.2.2. COLLECTING DATA 
 
In this research, multiple methods of data collection and multiple sources of data were 
used. 
 
The interview 
The interview is one of the main data collection tools in qualitative research.5 In this 
research, an open-ended research methodology was used.  
The interview questions were marginally pre-planned and standardized. General 
questions helped initiate the interview. Specific questions were provided only when the 
interview unfolded, depending upon the direction the interview took. The possible responses 
to pre-established categories were prepared, but these were not provided to the respondents. 
The possible responses were primarily used as examples, in case the respondent did not 
understand the question or did not know how to formulate the answer. The respondent was 
provided a lot of space for flexibility and variation while answering the questions. 
In the beginning, general questions were asked and the object was not strictly defined, 
due to the lack of practical information. During the first interviews, respondents were asked to 
tell all they knew about the subject. The interviews were recorded and more focused 
classifications and categories were developed in the field notes. So, developing the research 
further, the nature of observation sharpened in focus, leading to clearer and more 
                                                 
4
 The questionnaire was also provided in an on-line version on www.manoapklausa.lt/apklausa/355398536/. 
5
 S. Jones (1985), “Depth interviewing“, in R. Walker (ed.) (1985), Applied Qualitative Research, Aldershot: 
Gower, p. 45-55. 
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comprehensible questions, which required more selective observations. In the second half of 
the research, the respondents were asked a larger number of questions, which were corrected 
and added after the previous interviews. The questions, which were added during the process, 
were asked to the first respondents additionally, to complete the relevant questionnaires.6  
Before starting an interview, several main issues were considered: 
• Who will be interviewed and why? At the beginning, a civil servant responsible for 
comitology procedures and data submission, in the administration Unit was interviewed. 
Based on the list, a responsible person of the chosen comitology committee was 
contacted. Only those respondents, working on the subject area of the committee, could 
explain the Unit’s7 policies and the committee’s working procedures as well as covered 
policy areas. Thus, participants are usually representatives of the same experience or 
knowledge. In other words, they are not selected because of their demographic reflection 
of the general population, but according to some predetermined criteria relevant to a 
particular research objective.8 
• How many will be interviewed, and how many times will each person be interviewed? 
There were 36 registered comitology committees in DG Environment. The initial plan was 
to contact and interview every single responsible person of the registered committees. But, 
the interviewing process depended upon the willingness and availability of the 
respondents. In total, 20 interviews were held.  
                                                 
6
 D. Silverman (1993), Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analyzing Talk. Text and Interaction. 
London: Sage. 
7
 According to the information, received from the administration Unit (A.4), each Unit works with one up to 3-4 
committees constantly. The number of committees changes constantly - some of them disappear as the basis of 
their establishment expires, as the others get created due to the implemented new policy. 
8
 A. M. Huberman and M. B. Miles (1994), “Data Management and Analysis Methods“, in Norman K. Denzin 
and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds.) (1994), Handbook of qualitative research, Thousand Oaks (CA) etc: Sage 
Publications: “This is called purposive sampling, a commonly used form of nonprobabilistic sampling 
techniques“. 
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• When and for how long will each respondent be interviewed? All the interviews were held 
from May to July of 2005. The time for the discussions was suggested to be up to 1 hour, 
but, depending on the available information, interviews lasted up to 2 hours. Hand-written 
notes were taken during all of the interviews and the analysis-summary of the interview 
was sent to each respondent; they checked the accuracy of the recorded information. 
• Where will each respondent be interviewed? All of the respondents were interviewed 
during the working hours in their offices. The language of the interview was English. 
• How will access to the interview situation be organized? After contacting each 
respondent, they suggested the meeting time and place. Most of the interviews were held 
in respondents’ offices, as it was more convenient for them to show the relevant websites, 
information material and other examples, mentioned during the interview, and also to save 
time on moving to different locations. 
 
There is also a specific linguistic issue for the interviews: all of them were held in 
English, as most of the respondents come from non-English backgrounds and it was the most 
appropriate language to be understood by both sides. Most of the provided material was in 
English, but there were cases when material was given in French. 
 
Observation 
During direct observation, where observers watch participants closely, they neither 
manipulate nor stimulate the behaviour of those whom they are observing, in contrast to some 
other data gathering techniques. The situation being observed is not contrived for research 
purposes.9  
                                                 
9
 Keith Fu. Punch (n 1) 185. 
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The observation itself evolved during the meetings of comitology committees. Two 
comitology committee meetings were attended – a Climate Change Committee meeting and a 
Nitrate Committee meeting. I was allowed to stay and observe all the procedures – 
discussions and voting. The attended meetings also hosted external participants, who were 
invited due to their scientific and technical input. 
This method was not applied for writing responses in the questionnaire of the second 
empirical research.  
 
Documentary Data 
During the interviews, respondents offered some documentary data to be included into 
the research. Some of the documents were of strict use and not for quotation, while others 
were of public use and could be quoted directly in the research. Most of the documents, 
received during the interview, were original, but the information was often vague and hidden 
in the text – only a few passages could be taken out to be included into the research. The 
representativeness of the provided documents was only for the specific comitology 
committee, and most of them could not be applied to other comitology committees.  
The acquired documents were used to update the research of the literature and the 
previously collected information. 
 
Written responses to the questionnaire 
The second empirical research was conducted by using the drafted questionnaire. It 
was prepared using open-ended, semi-closed and closed types of questions. There were 55 
questions in the questionnaire. It was prepared only in English. The questionnaire was sent 
out to respondents selected randomly. They were asked to fill it in and return back either by e-
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mail or via the database. The respondents were not provided with additional information or 
explanations. The received replies were coded and processed using the SPSS program. 
 
8.2.3. THE ANALYSIS OF QUALITATIVE DATA. 
 
All the interviews were summarised separately, including the research of the 
secondary literature, and coded10 according to the name of a committee. The recording was 
done keeping the same structure, which was defined in the questionnaire. The structuring of 
data was based on a systematic reading of records in order to develop, examine and compare 
the recurring subjects: the history of the creation and development of the committee, the legal 
background, the procedures of the comitology committee, the main functions and the 
differences between committees. Each subject comprised various codes and labels that 
explained the components of each subject. 
After the interviews, all the data was looked through once again and collated with the 
information provided in the primary sources. 11 All the ad hoc groups, working groups and 
etc., mentioned during the interview, were checked, in order to get more information and 
more detailed descriptions, as the facts were provided as a matter-of-fact. Respondents 
mentioned and suggested reading various documents, websites, books, cases, etc., which were 
                                                 
10
 ibid 205-206: “[c]oding is the starting activity and the foundation of what comes later, i.e. it is both the first 
part of the analysis, and part of getting the data ready for subsequent analysis. Codes are tags, names and labels, 
and coding is therefore the process of putting tags, names or labels against pieces of the data. The point of 
assigning labels is to attach meaning to the pieces of data, and these labels serve a number of functions. They 
index the data, providing a basis for storage and retrieval. There are two main types of codes: descriptive codes, 
and inferential (or pattern codes). Early labels may be descriptive codes, requiring little or no inference beyond 
the piece of data itself. Second-level coding tends to focus on pattern codes, which pull together material into 
smaller and more meaningful units – more descriptive codes.” 
11
 ibid 207: "[i]t is the second basic operation – it begins at the start of the analysis, along with coding. Memos 
can be substantive, theoretical, methodological or even personal. Some of the memos can produce deeper 
concepts, others propositions and conceptual outputs it is the way of balancing discipline with creativity.” 
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not identified during the research of the literature phase. The more detailed research helped to 
understand the origin and the development of each comitology committee.  
As for the second empirical research there were approximately 950 invitations sent out 
to participate in the survey. 21 filled in questionnaires were returned; these were used for the 
data analysis. 
 
8.2.4. VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
  
Validity is a problematic concept with regard to both quantitative and qualitative 
studies.12 Since the measure in the social sciences is often indirect, the question is whether 
researchers are measuring what they have intended to. Hence, validity depends on the 
audience, researchers, or academics, as well as the participants of the study themselves.  
In this study due to the long interval between the initial interviews and the final 
research report and due to the rapid turnover of the Commission’s personnel, it was not 
possible to ask all the original informants for their opinions of the plausibility of the results of 
the final interpretation. Lack of the informants’ reviews and comments highlights one 
limitation of the methodology used in this study. Nevertheless, the opinions of various experts 
have been sought to ascertain the plausibility of the results and interpretations, also the 
interviewers’ accounts and reports have been studied in order to compare the interpretation of 
                                                 
12
 D. L. Altheide and J. M. Johnson (1994), Criteria for Assessing Interpretive validity in Qualitative Research, 
in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds.) (1994), Handbook of qualitative research, Thousand Oaks 
(CA) etc: Sage Publications, p. 485-499. 
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the data. Although as Morse13 claims, expecting the audience or another expert to have the 
same insight as the initial researcher is rather unrealistic.14 
 
Potential biases 
There are several factors that might have biased the data. One problem is related to the 
approach of the Commission towards comitology committees. Some of civil servants, who 
were interviewed, took his/her comitoloyg tasks as an additional burden to the regular work-
load. They could explain what they were doing and what the last meeting was about, but they 
were not very interested in the particularities of comitology committees. They could not 
provide more information, despite what they needed to know in order to follow the basic 
procedures. Consequently, some of the information might have been missed or misinterpreted, 
due to the lack of interest of some of the representatives of the Commission in comitology 
committees.  
 
Ethical considerations  
Traditionally, the ethics of sociological research are concerned with informed consent, 
the protection of the integrity and the privacy of the research participants.15 Informed consent 
means agreement received from the individual to participate in the study after she/he has been 
carefully and truthfully informed about the research and the use of the results. Nevertheless, 
the comitology committees were clearly defined in the research as the information on each 
committee was publicly available and, without disclosing the committees’ identities, the 
analysis would not have been comprehensive.  
                                                 
13
 J. M. Morse (1994), “Designing Funded Qualitative Research”, in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln 
(eds.) (1994), Handbook of qualitative research, Thousand Oaks (CA) etc: Sage Publications, p.229. 
14
 ibid 231: “no one takes a second reader to the library to check that indeed he or she is interpreting the original 
sources correctly, so why does anyone need a reliability checker for his or her data?”  
15
 D. de Vaus (2002), Surveys in Social Research, London: Routledge. 
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In this study, attempts were made to secure the voluntary and informed participation 
of the respondents by informing of them the procedure and the goals of the interviews and the 
study.16 All the respondents’ participation was voluntarily; they could refuse to participate in 
an interview and decline to provide the information that was asked. Indeed, some of the 
representatives of comitology committees refused to meet the interviewer and to provide 
information. The request was sent out to all DG Environment comitology committees, but 
eight representatives of comitology committees did not reply. Those committees were 
included in the research analysis, based on publicly available information. 
The written survey that was achieved by sending out questionnaires followed the same 
rules. Respondents were free to contribute or not. Both the goals of the survey and the 
researcher leading it were presented in the introductory part of the questionnaire. 
 
8.3. THE NEED FOR COMITOLOGY COMMITTEES.  
 
The data is used to verify the issues raised and statements made in the preceding 
chapters. As the establishment of committees is believed to be due to “the complexity of the 
text and the diversity of possible solutions to scientific, technical and practical questions”,17 
the data shall either confirm or deny this. As the demand for technical and scientific expertise 
increased with the growing complexity of the regulation of contemporary society, it was 
decided to develop a formal consultative body, which could be used when needed without 
burdening civil servants of the EU institutions. On the other hand, the EU institutions need the 
latest scientific and technical expertise in order to establish appropriate and acceptable 
                                                 
16
 Formally, the investigator should ask the informant to sign a special form of informed consent. At the time the 
study was carried out, such procedure was not very common and hence it was not included into ethical 
considerations. 
17
 Common Implementation Strategy for the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC), Strategic Document as 
agreed by the Water Directors under Swedish Presidency 2 May 2001; p.1. 
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implementation measures, which, in the end, are exclusively for national governments to 
decide. If the scientific and/or technical data, on which the legislation is drafted, is outdated, it 
means that the decisions will need to be amended very soon, which might weaken the trust in 
and legitimacy in the EU and in its decisions.  
In this part of the chapter, the interview data, survey results and academic research are 
compared, in order to rebut the opinion that the need for comitology committees is not always 
so great and that, in some cases, they are being set just due to the fact that such an obligation 
is implemented in  secondary legislation.   
Politically sensitive decisions receive more power. It was noticed, that if decisions are 
politically sensitive, a comitology committee receives more power in the decision-making 
process. As an example the GMO Contain Use and Release Committee could be mentioned. 
The meetings of the committee, as well as the drafted material is treated strictly confidential 
before the adoption, as the issue is very sensitive for business, industry, environment, 
consumers, agriculture etc. The Commission is not willing to take the final decision itself, as 
it might engender dissatisfaction in different Member States, especially those, where the 
population is strictly against GMO products. In such case, the adoption of the decision is left 
to the comitology committee. External experts as well as various interest groups are not 
allowed to participate in comitology committee meetings until the final adoption of the 
drafted legal act for the sake of security of information. 
 
Transcience of some of the comitology committees based on delegated policies. 
Comitology committees are established under secondary legislation, where specific tasks are 
determined. And, in some cases, as soon as the provided task is implemented, a comitology 
committee becomes inactive. For example the Non-road Mobile Machinery Committee, which 
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is not active at the moment as all the implementation measures were adopted. The only 
possibility to make the committee active again is to revise the secondary legislation and 
define other tasks or update the previous ones. But, if a comitology committee is not needed 
to revise a directive or another legal act, in most cases, this type of committee will be taken 
off the register after a few years. When discussing the withdrawal of a committee from the 
official database, one should mention a VOC by Petrol Stations Committee, which at the time 
of the interview had not held any meetings for four years.18 The person in charge of this 
committee mentioned that the unit was planning to eliminate this committee from the register.  
Two distinct cases are given which leads us to assume that the importance of a 
comitology committee is mainly based on a political issue assigned to the committee. The 
more sensitive it is, the more decision-making power committee members possess. If a 
committee is established just because it is foreseen in the secondary legislation without being 
in demand, as soon as it fulfils its tasks, it ceases its activities.  
 
The need for scientific and technical experience. Other important criteria for 
establishing a comitology committee is its standing as a representative as well as the obtained 
knowledge and expertise. As it was already mentioned in the chapter “External participation 
through comitology”, comitology committees consist of a number of representatives of social 
groups, parties, sectors, local and regional authorities or similar.19 They either hold academic 
or professional experience, in order to provide expertise and technical knowledge. This is a 
very general statement regarding the composition of comitology committees.  
The previous paragraph highlights two necessary components to make a comitology 
committee efficient. First, members of different committees have to sustain the interests of 
                                                 
18
 The interview took place in June 2005. 
19
 H. Pitkin (1972), The Concept of Representation, University of California Press, Berkeley. 
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key players in an environment. Second, the members have to have appropriate knowledge and 
expertise on the debated issue. This is due to the enlarging scope of the taken decisions, which 
could not be taken by civil servants, as they require sometimes very precise technical and up-
to-date scientific knowledge. National bodies refused to take this responsibility, so it was 
decided to invite external expertise into different committees in order to consult them. 
The interviews have proved that most of the committees involve members of 
comitology committees in technical drafting procedures due to their knowledge or ability to 
obtain such expertise. Most of the members work themselves or sub-contract commercial 
experts, in order to provide an up-to-date technical knowledge, such as the setting of 
implementation criteria, drafting and amending monitoring and implementation plans, 
carrying out different feasibility studies, and drafting guidelines for monitoring or other 
implementation measures. The sub-contracting of experts is done pursuant to the public 
procurement legislation. The Commission publishes a proposal and invites public and/or 
private bodies to tender.  
Five years before the observed meeting of the Nitrate Committee meeting,20 the 
Netherlands requested derogation under the Nitrate Directive 91/676/EEC. The request under 
paragraph 2b of annex III was prepared by the sub-contracted experts’ consultants who 
evaluated the possible consequences for the neighbouring countries, the possible damage to 
underground waters and costs for the implementation of the derogation. The presentation of 
the finished study was made in the committee and questions from Member States were 
answered by a civil servant from the Netherlands. Experts were present during the meeting 
just in case any technical questions arose or any empirical or specific data were needed. Such 
experts or consultants might be tendered by the Commission or by any Member State. As the 
                                                 
20
 Held on 27 June 2005. 
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Dutch request for derogation was almost agreed prior to the meeting, Austria presented its 
own request for derogation under the same provisions of the Nitrate Directive. This example 
shows that the activities of the Nitrate Committee entail implementation of the Directive, its 
adaptation to scientific and technical progress, the adoption of monitoring guidelines as well 
as annexes to secondary legislation where scientific and technical progress is taken into 
account. 
 
Consultative bodies involved in decision-making process as experts. Most of the DG 
Environment committees, as all the rest of comitology committees established by different 
DGs in the Commission, deal with implementation measures of adopted legislations. The 
Commission has established a number of consultative bodies, as confirmed by the research. 
Most of the interviewed committees have formed consultative bodies on an ad-hoc basis, in 
order to ensure a valuable and up-to-date technical solution. Among the most technical 
committees are Eco-label Committee, Nitrates Committee, and Water Framework Directive 
(WFD) Committee. Those committees deal with the implementation of legislative acts. They 
review it every two years in order to update the progress and work programme as well as to 
support Member States in establishing monitoring networks, management plans, etc. 
Members of the committees provide, or make accessible, technical and scientific knowledge. 
They are not dealing with specific questions concerning national and/or regional situations, or 
institutional and administrative arrangements. These are left to individual Member States.  
Members of the committees have a duty to check that the selected combination of 
measures is cost effective. The work under the WFD committee is so extensive in technical 
terms that they need to invite more experts to establish quality standards, prioritise hazardous 
substances, or analyse them. This work is assigned to sub-committees.  
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The Eco-label Committee deals with more or less similar issues. According to the 
Community Eco-label Award Scheme, the European Union Eco-label Board develops and 
sets or reviews ecological criteria (to be implemented in Member States for various products), 
and verifies both assessment and compliance. It is worth noting that the Eco-label Committee 
is the only committee where it is possible to identify most of the theoretical components of 
comitology committees. As for ad-hoc working groups, the Eco-label Committee has 
established legal rules that “for the development of eco-label criteria for each product group 
as well as the assessment and verification requirements related to those criteria, a specific 
group, involving both the interested parties, identifying and selecting key environmental 
aspects, and competent bodies, is established”.21  
The reasons for establishing ad-hoc groups might not be strictly necessary for 
scientific knowledge and expertise accumulation purposes. It may be due to political 
agreements among the highest political leaders and/or top-experts. Such practice is applied in 
the Packaging and Packaging Waste Committee, where informal groups are formed. One of 
them is for the purpose of achieving political decisions regarding the waste management 
framework, another works on high technical issues, regarding waste shipping regulation. The 
meetings of both working groups are strictly confidential and the decisions taken are not 
minuted. Members of those groups meet just to agree on political orientations and then the 
decision is drafted by the experts under the supervision of the members of the comitology 
committee. 
  
So, the main task and function for the committees is to draft technical measures, which 
need to be adopted by the EU institutions – the Council and the Parliament. The adopted legal 
                                                 
21
 Regulation (EC) No 1980/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 July 2000 on a revised 
Community Eco-label Award Scheme [2000] OJ L 237, Annex IV “Interested parties involvement”. 
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act needs to be implemented by national legislation. Still, committees have not been 
recognised as EU institutions, their decisions are not binding and finally committees do not 
have any formal investigative power. However, this position is changing with every new 
political decision being implemented. As most of the committees are staffed by constantly 
changing experts and representatives and rely on established ad-hoc working or expert groups, 
there is a risk that new representatives, new scientific expertise and interests would aggravate 
the implementation of long-term policy goals.  
Additionally, whatever decisions are taken in the committees system, the final 
implementation is done by national governments, which have the responsibility of ensuring 
uniform implementation and compliance. The only reason for reaching a common agreement 
between Member States is the common aim to harmonise most of legal requirements are the 
same in their scope all over the EU. 
It can be concluded that EU is in high demand of scientific knowledge and expertise, 
in order to be able to take effective and up-to-date political, as well as, legislative decisions. 
The research has shown that the gained experience and knowledge is successfully used in 
comitology committees. Members of committees possess different types of experience and 
scientific data, hence experts and consultants are more often involved in the decision-making 
process. The only problem, which is still not solved, is the legal regulation of the involvement 
of expertise in the decision- making process. There are already some initial steps, but it is not 
enough. 
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8.4. TYPOLOGY OF COMITOLOGY COMMITTEES.  
 
The committees under the EU auspices are so diverse in their nature that it is difficult 
to develop a concept of ‘committee decision-making’ which is meaningful.22 Despite the 
miscellaneous nature of committees, they all share one feature in common: a committee is 
always embedded in, and therefore functionally dependent on, the overall decision-making 
process. Decision-making processes involving committees are sequenced in one way or 
another, so that the significance of a committee depends on its specific contribution to a larger 
decision-making process.23 Another important issue is the ability to influence EU decision-
making and to modify the outcome of the Council negotiations with Member States. A 
committee that does not have an impact either way will be largely irrelevant for the EU 
system.24  
It is difficult to make a distinction between comitology committees based on their 
type. Whatever typology is provided, each of the comitology committees holds at least some 
of the criteria from each type. Due to this, the dominant types and their key features are 
discussed later.  
The clearest distinction between comitology committees was made by the Council in 
the Comitology Decision:25 advisory committees, management committees and regulatory 
committees (safeguard committees were not formed in the DG Environment). Based on the 
                                                 
22
 P. van der Knaap (1996), “Government by Committee: Legal Typology, Quantitative Assessment and 
Institutional Repercussions of Committees in the European Union”, in R.H. Pedler and G.F. Schaefer (eds.), 
Shaping European Law and Policy. The Role of Committees and Comitology in the Political Process, 
Maastricht, p. 83-116. 
23
 Thomas Gehring (1999), “Bargaining, Arguing and Functional Differentiation of Decision-making: the Role 
of Committees in European Environmental Process Regulation“, in Christian Joerges and Ellen Vos (eds.) 
(1999), EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics, Hart Publishing: Oxford-Portland, p.196. 
24
 ibid 197. 
25
 Council Decision No. 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of 
implementing powers conferred on the Commission [1999] OJ L 184. 
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information received during the research, it is possible to make other distinctions: level of 
technical operation, level of influence and level of participation.  
The defined typology in the Second Comitology Decision also covers other types. The 
level of technical operation mainly depends on the experts and external participants involved 
in the decision-making process in any of the regulated committees. The degree of influence 
depends on the type of committee; for instance, an advisory committee has less decision-
making power than a regulatory one. Decision-making power depends on the following issue 
– how politically sensitive the question is. In addition, the level of the comitology committee 
decision-making power depends on the participants’ level; for example, if members of a 
committee are just civil servants, then the influence is lower. And vice versa, if members are 
the heads of departments, their decisions have more binding power on the Commission. It 
may be assumed that the type of a comitology committee mainly depends on two elements: 
the powers of the participants and the type of drafted decisions. 
 
Advisory – expert committees. The academic literature states that decisions taken by an 
advisory committee should be seriously considered by the Commission; however, the 
decisions, in most cases, are not meaningful and they are not legally binding. In order to give 
them more weight, the decisions should be integrated in the decision-making process and 
should be more formalised.  
It is stated that “the advisory procedure should be followed in any case in which it is 
considered to be the most appropriate”.26 When this procedure is chosen, there are general 
rules on how an advisory committee is managed; namely, it has to be composed of 
                                                 
26
 ibid, preamble, recital 8; the same statement is retained in the Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning 
mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers [2011] OJ L 
55, preamble, recital 15. 
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representatives of Member States, who have to deliver opinion on the submitted draft. The 
whole procedure of the advisory comitology committee is similar to the procedures and 
obligations set for expert groups. Advisory committees, which may involve scientific 
committees and expert groups, mainly work in the drafting phase. Its position of being able to 
involve experts into the drafting phase provides a committee with more decision-making 
power in comparison with external participants. These committees and groups can also be 
influential, even though their consultation is not compulsory. 
First, most of them are established by a particular decision to achieve a definite task. 
Thus, most of these committees and expert groups are officially established to provide a 
definite opinion in the drafting phase. These opinions should be binding, otherwise other 
scientific groups will be needed later to verify the appropriateness of the decisions. It would 
mean double expenses, double workload, and the Commission would need to face the fact that 
it may be hard to find additional experts for a second scientific committee on the same issues 
for many areas of expertise.  
Second, advisory committees and expert groups are usually involved at a very early 
stage in policy making. It is the best time to influence any decision. The structure and the 
content of the draft can be shaped then. 
Third, members of advisory bodies are usually top-experts, who issue highly credible 
and political advice.  
 
However, interests groups, as well as technical and scientific experts and their 
involvement procedures, are not regulated under the EU legislation. There are already some 
first steps regarding the involvement of experts into the decision-making procedure, such as 
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drafted guidelines, best practice examples, experts’ database, but those instruments are not 
legally formalised and not binding for the EU institutions.  
 
In practice, advisory committees are not so influential at all, or at least civil servants 
and the Commission consider them a necessity to conform to legal obligations; the 
Commission shapes the drafted decisions itself. Many advisory committees are not even 
active (e.g. Emission of volatile organic compounds committee (DG ENV) and Reduction in 
the sulphur content of certain liquid fuels committee (DG ENV)). Those committees have not 
met for the last couple of years and they seem to have been abandoned. There are three 
registered advisory committees out of 35 committees established under the auspices of DG 
Environment. As their opinion is not legally binding, civil servants of the Commission do not 
try to keep them active. In order to invite members of the committees, a relevant issue needs 
to emerge, all the needed documents prepared, and other organizational arrangements need to 
be made. It means additional work, so if there is no need declared in the secondary legislation, 
the committees become inactive.  
In DG Environment case, the committees mentioned above were established to get 
advice regarding specific technical issues and also to ascertain the political position on the 
precise issue in each Member State. As soon as the deadlines were met and implementation 
measures were adopted in basic legal acts, the Commission stopped inviting members of the 
committees, alleging that there were no issues to discuss. The members of the Committee 
were not needed unless the Commission decided to revise the implemented legal acts.  
 
Management committee – financial decisions. A management committee usually 
consists of representatives of Member States. It is obliged to provide its opinion on a draft 
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decision. Subsequently, the Commission may adopt the measures, having an immediate 
effect. The provided opinion of the management committee is not binding. But, the committee 
may block the Commission’s proposal if a qualified majority is required. Management 
committees are usually established to decide upon common agriculture and fisheries policies, 
as well as upon financial instruments (e.g. LIFE Committee (Financial Instrument for the 
Environment)). The LIFE Committee provides an opinion on projects receiving financial 
support. However, the projects are chosen by the Commission. In his situation, the 
representatives of the committee are asked to vote on the prepared list, but they are not asked 
to draft it.  
There are six management committees active under DG Environment. Most of them 
are consulted, because the rules require it, but civil servants do not regard these committees as 
an important part of the decision-making process. Although most management committees 
have to approve projects, which receive financial support from the Commission, they vote on 
the provided lists. 
The influence of the management committees on the decision-making procedure is 
similar to advisory committees. 
 
Regulatory committees adopt legally binding opinions and represent the most 
powerful participant in the decision-making process. A regulatory committee is the only 
committee, the opinion of which is binding and it holds the most influential position in the 
decision-making process. Committees consist of higher-level civil servants, who can take 
decisions on sensitive issues and compulsory provisions to be eventually implemented by 
national legislation. Under this procedure, members of a committee need to decide on general 
measures to implement the basic acts. Due to its influence and decision-making power, 
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regulatory committees are the most popular committees in the EU legislation implementation 
system.  
On the one hand, an investment of time and scientific or expert knowledge, which 
might not be taken into account, is not attractive for most experts and civil servants. On the 
other hand, most of the decisions on the implementation of EU primary legislation for EU 
basic legal acts need to be implemented by binding national legislation. Political decisions, 
which come from the EU, might be unattractive to many constituencies, i.e. interests groups, 
trade unions, businesses, and civil society at large and they will blame the Member State for 
such decisions. Each Member State has its national interests (with regard to individual 
decisions) and is keen to tailor decisions to their national background and legal system. Major 
changes will cost taxpayers money and add work for national civil servants.  
Consequently, DG Environment established 26 regulatory committees.27 These were 
the most influential, and were usually established in order to guarantee the continuity and 
stability of scientific and political decisions during the drafting and implementation stages. 
Regulatory committees had the biggest power to involve technical expertise in the decision-
making process. Regulatory committees also had the biggest political power, as this procedure 
was usually applied to politically sensitive questions and Member States did not want to leave 
all decisions to the EU institutions. 
However, after the Treaty of Lisbon came into force and the comitology legislation 
was amended, there were only 30 committees left in total.28 
 
                                                 
27
 Report from the Commission on the working of committees during 2003, COM (2004) 860, [2005] OJ C65 
E/01, p. 21. 
28
 <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=List.list&NewSearch=1> accessed 24 
September 2013. 
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8.5. PHASES OF INVOLVEMENT OF COMITOLOGY COMMITTEES IN THE 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS. 
 
The three types of comitology committees – advisory, management and regulatory - 
operate under the three phases: drafting, adoption and execution. For the comitology 
committees working under the Commission structure, the most important phase is drafting. In 
comparison with other phases, experts and national representatives can influence the drafted 
decisions. In the adoption phase, the Council and the Parliament would not question the base 
of the scientific decision, as they would need to form their own technical expertise group in 
order to do that.   
 
The adoption phase will not be discussed in this research analysis, as at this phase, the 
Council and the Parliament are involved and the comitology committees do not usually 
participate.  
 
The implementation phase is also no less an important phase, because committees 
have to decide on the implementation details to be implemented at the national level all over 
the EU. Even though implementation powers are not formally given to the established 
committees and they only assist the Commission, usually they decide how to implement 
adopted legal documents. At the implementation phase, committees have the final decisive 
power to propose and set technical parameters to be implemented under the adopted legal 
measure. The Nitrate Committee could serve as an example. The already mentioned requests 
for derogation from the Netherlands and Austria show that the Commission is not obliged to 
make the final decision. During the voting procedure, some of Member States declared that 
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due to the fact that the final version of the document was disseminated just a week before the 
meeting, they did not have sufficient time to submit this document for final approval to the 
national ministry. So, the ministries have not authorised them to provide any kind of decision 
and they are not empowered to vote. It shows that at regulatory committee meetings, when the 
final decision is voted on for implementation, the members are expected to represent the 
position of national authorities. At this stage national representatives hold the most important 
power.  
Nevertheless, committees working on implementation measures are the most 
influential. They are staffed by high-level civil servants or policy makers, who are 
representatives of Member States and have the power to make decisions. Once adopted, the 
decisions will be implemented into national legal systems.  
However, the delegation of powers can be withdrawn. As an example, the Drinking 
Water Committee can be provided. As the result of its evolution, it had gained important 
powers and might have led to important changes to the European policy on drinking water. It 
got to the point where important changes had to be introduced. The final decision would have 
changed the scope of the directive and the relevance of drafted annexes would not have been 
limited to mere technicalities, which could have lead to an adoption of a major decision at the 
comitology level. As the comitology committee was authorised to make decisions at minor 
level, and members did not want to adopt costly changes from this major decision. 
 
8.6. PROCEDURES OF THE COMMITTEE MEETINGS.  
 
 Decision-making procedures are more or less similar for all committees. A meeting is 
chaired by the representative of the Commission, who is usually a high ranking EU civil 
 305
servant, i.e. the head of the relevant Unit, responsible for the issues discussed in the specific 
committee, so as to keep a balance with regard to all members of the committee. In rare cases, 
when the head of the Unit is not able to attend the meeting, he or she might be replaced by the 
civil servant, directly responsible to the committee. This is used as a general practice, even 
though it is not required anywhere. When the managing person of an EMAS Committee was 
asked about the reasons for this practice, the answer was that the political debates and 
negotiations have to be conducted by a high level civil servant empowered to make a 
decision. Otherwise, if no agreement occurs during the committee meeting, or if the 
representatives of the Commission or any Member State cannot vote on the issues, another 
meeting needs to be convened with all the relevant civil servants. This would be costly in 
terms of both time and money, especially as some issues need to be decided and implemented 
urgently. Consequently, committee members will mainly be of the same level to be entitled to 
make decisions within the authorised limits of power. 
 The comitology committee meetings observed during the empirical research were 
dealing with specific issues and none of the meetings were postponed due to the lack of 
authority. Instead, members of the comitology committees, especially the ones representing 
large Member States, had to seek approval from their national authorities, when the drafts 
were altered during the meeting. It seemed that representatives from smaller countries were 
invested with wider decision-making powers.29 This may be due to the fact that different 
experts and civil servants cannot participate at all levels of the decision-making process. 
Under the circumstances, a Member State can resort to the same person for most stages of the 
process. During the meeting of the Eco-label Committee, some members specified that if the 
decision was taken, regardless of their opinion, they could revisit it at another level. Another 
                                                 
29
 At least, this was the impression during the observation period. 
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issue is that most of the governmental authorities cannot separate experts from civil servants 
on some issues. Usually the same person works on technical and scientific issues of the draft, 
and then votes on the proposal. In rare cases, the same person also votes on the proposal at 
Council level. It is very difficult to alter the situation, due to the lack of experts in some 
policy areas.  
Such wide decision-making power is not granted in all cases: for instance, when a 
comitology committee is attended by a high-ranking civil servant, he/she is usually authorised 
to make a decision. In other cases, the decision-making structure at national level is quite 
limited, so before leaving for such meetings, the representative is given directions on all the 
possible votes. According to a member of the Eco-label Committee, political decisions are 
usually taken by large countries with the smaller ones unable to change them. When voting on 
financial obligations of each Member State, the representative has to have formal ministerial 
approval. In such cases, the decision-making power is more limited. 
 
At the very beginning of each meeting, the chairman draws up an attendance list 
specifying the authorities or bodies to which the persons designated by Member States belong 
to. In practice, this is actually a double list: an attendance list for reimbursement of travel 
expenses and a list of participants. Committees’ members request that the attendance list be 
sent out afterwards. In many cases the list of participants is published on the register. The 
disclosure of the list depends on the general attitude of the unit and members of the 
committee. Additionally, members are requested to sign declarations regarding possible 
conflict of interests. During the Climate Change Committee meeting,30 the chairman simply 
asked if there was anyone whose participation would have given rise to a conflict of interests 
                                                 
30
 Held on 20 July 2005. 
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with regard to a particular item on the agenda. It was left to the members of the committee to 
decide upon the sensitivity of the issue and their suitability to participate in the meeting. The 
latter issue concerned mainly Member States representatives who might well belong to an 
NGO, association or similar sectional interest’s organization.  
While some of the committees meet 2-3 times per year, others have been established, 
but have never met,31 or, at least, they did not meet before the period of the empirical 
research. Reasons for the comitology committees not meeting or doing so at a random are not 
recorded by the Commission. The Secretary General cannot analyse this information, as it is 
neither included in the guidelines nor in the questionnaires, which are required to be filled in 
by the responsible staff after each meeting of a comitology committee.  
The reasons can be guessed. First, the legal provisions establishing the comitology 
committee have been withdrawn or suspended. Second, the issue has become irrelevant or the 
Commission has focused its resources on more pressing policies. Third, the issue for which 
the comitology committee was established has been addressed by the adoption of 
implementation measures. In this case, the comitology committee is either re-structured or is 
maintained for another similar issue to arise. This solution is used quite often,32 as the 
Commission might otherwise lose access to valuable scientific and technical expertise. This 
kind of practice was noticed in a couple of committees, which formed a group of experts on 
specific issues and are keen to keep them in a view to providing scientific knowledge on a 
constant basis. For instance, the Eco-label Committee, where the same or at least a little 
modified expert group works on different products criteria over many years. The Water 
Framework Directive Committee has also formed a steady expert group, which continues 
working on different issues. 
                                                 
31
 e.g. Drinking Water Committee. 
32
 Water Framework Directive Committee. 
 308
 
Usually NGOs, stakeholders and other external participants are not allowed to take 
part in committee meetings, unless they are invited to provide some scientific advice or know-
how. For instance, the chairperson of the European Union Eco-labelling Board may invite 
other interested parties to participate, which are not listed in the Regulation (§16).33 This 
power is quite common. Comitology committees are allowed to invite scientific, technical, or 
other experts and interest groups, if members of a committee decide it to be essential. Those 
experts are not provided with the confidential or non-public information, they are just asked to 
provide their opinion or scientific/technical data on a specific question. As it was mentioned 
in the chapter on “External Participation through Comitology framework” the involved 
experts do not have a right to vote or be present during the vote. 
The difference between the routine involvement of experts in any comitology 
committees and the Eco-labelling Board is that experts and scientists working under this 
Board are officially invited and do not depend on the courtesy of official members of the 
comitology committee. Once decision has more legitimacy than those adopted on the 
recommendation of experts appearing before comitology committees meetings. Another 
difference is that experts, invited to appear before a comitology committee, are only asked to 
provide an opinion; there is little continuity when it comes to the issues addressed. The 
members of the Eco-labelling board are invited on a more durable basis and their contribution 
to the work is more thorough. Members of the Board are also asked to vote on the decision. In 
fact, experts and scientists on this Board are the only ones with such decision-making power. 
  
                                                 
33
 Regulation (EC) No 1980/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 July 2000 on a revised 
Community eco-label award scheme [2000] OJ L 237, Annex “Rules of procedure of the European Union Eco-
labelling Board (EUEB) of Commission Decision 2000/730/EC”. 
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Committees do not aim at achieving complete consensus. Most of the discussions have 
been implemented before the committees’ meetings and usually a consensus had already been 
built. It does not mean that the meetings of comitology committees are irrelevant. Members of 
comitology committees try to find an agreement before the meeting, on the most sensitive 
issues at least. It might happen via e-mails, telephone conversations or during other meetings, 
where different members meet. Possibilities are not exhaustive. The general consent is aimed 
due to the reason that the Commission cannot arrange monthly meetings on the same issue, 
and an agreement needs to be reached within the set time limit. Otherwise, the adoption might 
take too long. Furthermore, it is not possible to guarantee against the change of membership 
of the committee; new members might disagree with past negotiations. Consequently, the 
chair and members of the comitology committees try to reach consensus before the official 
meeting.   
If the Commission is worried about the number of votes for a proposal, it can start 
test-voting. Member States are asked to reveal their voting intention during the “real” voting. 
On the basis of those results, the decision might be taken to amend the proposal and take these 
intentions into account. There are other methods to “influence” voting. The Commission can 
start its “tour de table”34 in reverse order, in the hope that a strong lead in favour of a proposal 
might help swing any wavering participant.35 This procedure was followed in the Eco-label 
Committee meeting, as well as in the Nitrates Committee. It is not recognised officially, but it 
is not prohibited anywhere. Furthermore, the CJEU has even approved it. This kind of voting 
could help to find a compromise acceptable to all delegations, even though the members are 
                                                 
34
 “Tour de table” is an expression, describing the way of voting on decisions drafted. Usually, voting takes place 
in a room, where members of a committee took place during the meeting. As the voting gets announced, the 
chairman calls each country and asks for its position regarding the voting issue. Typically, before the meeting, 
the organizers set places for the members in alphabetical order. So, that is where the expression came from – a 
vote goes around the table as the member states are called in alphabetical order.  
35
 A. B. Philip (1998), “The Eco-label Regulatory Committee”, in M.P.C.M. van Schendelen (1998), EU 
Committee as Influential Policymakers, Ashgate, p. 172. 
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expected to approve the initial text, when they vote. It absolutely does not mean that the 
Commission withdraws its initial proposal and presents a new document. Such a way of 
voting could help in saving the time of members of a comitology committee as well as civil 
servants, who can discuss an issue on spot, instead of sending e-mails. 
 The voting itself is open; soon, all Member States will know one another’s position. 
Sometimes, the results are agreed upon after a break in the proceedings. The large countries 
request a break and gather in a separate room or in a corner to negotiate an acceptable version 
of the text. The version, which might be negotiated and amended during the meeting, is 
finally put to the vote before adoption.  
 
8.7. SCOPE OF THE DELEGATED TASKS. 
 
In this part of the chapter the tasks delegated and the results achieved are discussed. 
Most comitology committees and adopt implementation measures. Some have even been 
created to perform specific tasks. 
Sometimes the tasks, delegated to a specific expert group, a very narrow range of 
issues to be decided. In other cases, some of the delegated issues might be delivered to other 
pre-existing bodies, instead of creating a new comitology committee. Committees may also 
deal with implementation problems, faced by Member States. It provides an extensive 
overview of the situation when dealing with specific tasks. Whatever the tasks, so long as the 
committee might set an ad hoc group to provide the needed technical support, they are within 
the scope of the Commission powers. 
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The analysis of the literature  as  well as secondary legislation, establishing 
comitology committees and assigning specific tasks, have specified the list of common tasks. 
Those tasks, with the help of experts or other interests groups, have to be implemented:  
• technical specifications and standardised methods; 
• transmission and processing of data; 
• drafting of an indicative plan of measures to be implemented at each Member State; 
• adaptation to scientific and technical progress (adaptation mainly concerns annexes to 
secondary legislation); 
• review and updating of guidelines on the implementation of annexes to secondary 
legislation; 
• harmonisation of national measures; 
• establishing working plans as well as their annual or regular review; 
• setting draft criteria and their periods of validity; 
• exchange of information between competent authorities and the Commission; 
• exchange of experience concerning the implementation and practical application of a 
Directive and discuss matters of common interest in the related fields; 
• collection and analysis of reports; 
• advice to the Commission with respect to the conclusions and amendments agreed to in 
committees; 
• reporting of results regarding the monitoring programmes for compliance with a 
Directive; 
• setting of procedures and methods for evaluation. 
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This list is not exhaustive. Based on the environment, changing situations and 
demands, at different times, a comitology committee may be established for a different 
reason, but the scope remains largely the same: a comitology committee has to draft an 
implementation measure to ensure that the adopted annexes to secondary legislation are 
properly applied.  
In order to introduce a specific example, the Water Framework Directive Committee 
worked on guidelines to be implemented under the regulatory procedure when the empirical 
research was conducted. The more general activities are named as follows:  
1) development of guidance on technical issues;  
2) ensuring better access to validated data and information, as well as preparing proposals, 
discussing the findings, co-ordinating the work and enhancing information exchange, 
application, testing and validation;  
3) policy development and integration of the Water Framework Directive into other policies;  
4) revision and updating of the list of priority substances;  
5) setting controls and environmental standards for new Community law by developing 
specific daughter directives.  
 
This list is taken out of secondary acquis communautaire, and regulates 
responsibilities and rights of members of comitology committees. Legislative acts also 
identify areas of responsibilities and actions to be implemented. Accordingly, members of DG 
Environment comitology committees (examples were taken from legislation, regulating 
environmental issues) work mostly on the implementation of technical up-to-date issues, 
drafting, adopting and implementing guidelines, as well as monitoring activities. It is proved 
once again that comitology committees mainly work on very technical and scientific issues. 
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They guarantee the implementation of secondary legislation and the stability of whatever 
primary legislation is adopted by the EU institutions. 
It shall be noted that comitology committees cannot initiate anything that is not 
specifically provided for in secondary legislation. These committees can, and do, discuss all 
sorts of questions. However, they cannot initiate legislation. All comitology legislation has to 
have a legal basis in secondary legislation that is adopted by the Council or the Parliament 
and the Council. 
 
8.8. EXTERNAL PARTICIPATION IN EU DECISION-MAKING PROCESS. 
 
The second empirical research targeted respondents, related to or working in the area 
of the environment. In order to get a full picture, the other actors to the decision-making 
process were asked to participate in the survey. Representatives of national ministries of 
environment and experts in environmental policies, representatives of NGOs, universities, 
consultancies, and other stakeholders were invited to participate in this survey by filling in the 
questionnaire. 
21 replies were returned. Respondents were equally divided – 11 represented Europe-
wide NGOs or research institutions and private consultancies; and 10 were national civil 
servants, mainly based in Eastern Europe (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). For the most part 
respondents were males aged 45 and above.  
When the respondents were asked whether they participated in the EU decision – 
making process, more than a half of civil servants (8 respondents) replied that they 
participated in EU committees and /or working groups meetings and draft solutions from the 
inception. The same respondents also considered that their main task was to participate in 
 314
preparing and representing national positions in different committees and /or working groups. 
The rest prepared information and reports for colleagues, participating in activities at EU 
level.  
It was interesting to note that some representatives (4 respondents) of Europe-wide 
NGOs also prepared information and reports for colleagues who participated in EU meetings. 
It may indicate that transnational NGOs which are active throughout Europe may be part of a 
complex institutional system, with national experts and others who participate at EU level 
because of specific knowledge and expertise. Those who participated directly in the EU 
decision-making process represented various associations and interest groups (5 respondents). 
The survey also identified that some of the test work or collections of statistical and other data 
is entrusted to volunteers. Based on their information and experience, the related external 
participants as well as national and EU administrative bodies are invited to engage further 
with the topic.  
Often representatives from NGOs were personally involved in the EU decision-
making process. There were two civil servants who also gave this answer. It seems to confirm 
the fact that some national civil servants are involved as supranational representatives and 
experts at the same time with a great deal of behavioural discretion at their disposal. One 
respondent stated that “some national experts have far too big a say and are not controlled at 
all”. The more detailed explanation of this type of representatives is provided in the Chapter 
“External participation through comitology framework”. 
Seven civil servants replied that their direct work required them to participate in the 
EU decision-making process as experts. It means that they did not need to put any additional 
efforts and prove their qualification in order to be involved in the process. Moreover, it may 
also be assumed that national authorities take responsibility for deciding the level of expertise 
 315
of representatives they send to comitology committee and/or working groups meetings. Three 
respondents were invited personally as experts in a specific field.  
Respondents identified that they usually used the existing research results and 
knowledge available as well as their background knowledge and experience to make a 
decision on the subject of the participation. Only few mentioned that they used expert NGO 
opinion that was open to discussions. It was also noted (mainly by civil servants) that they try 
to reach consensus on the drafted proposals before the meeting.  
When the respondents were asked what kind of input they provide to the decision-
making process, the replies covered all the types of inputs: civil servants mainly provide 
opinions (6 respondents), data (6 respondents) and consultations (4 respondents); as external 
participants are more active in providing opinions (7 respondents), expertise (7 respondents) 
and data (6 respondents). Four replies were regarding active involvement in providing 
decisions, however it was not only replied by civil servants – two external participants defined 
it as part of their activities. 
The analysis of academic literature has raised the issue that opinions, provided by 
external experts, are not binding on the Commission. This issue was supported in the survey – 
8 civil servants asserted that their participation at the highest or medium high level as they 
participated both in the Council and the Commission work and meetings, while 7 external 
participants considered their participation low (they participate in the Commission meetings 
without binding power over the Commission or just providing written information on 
different requests). Though, when a cross-test question was provided, only one respondent 
confirmed that the provided opinion and vote bound the EU institutions on specific issues. 
The majority (13 respondents) replied that the requested opinion was not legally binding. 
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Only three respondents (civil servants) took the personal responsibility for the decisions they 
provided. 
Civil servants were also more restricted on the opinion that was delivered, as they 
needed to agree with the authorities or colleagues on the changes during the meetings (9 
respondents). External participants had more freedom on the opinion that was delivered or 
they were not asked to deliver any opinion during the meetings. Nevertheless, it was 
emphasized once again that it is expected to build a consensus before the voting takes place 
and the previous agreement is adopted. 14 respondents confirmed the existence of pre-
meetings. 16 respondents agreed that members of decision-making or working groups agree 
on the strategy or the draft of the decision before an official meeting. Participation usually 
proceeded strictly according the rules, set by the Commission (6 respondents), or it may be 
eased depending on the importance of the decision (6 respondents). 
10 respondents confirmed that expertise is very frequently involved in the decision-
making process they attend; and 7 respondents estimated that it is required only sometimes. 
Only one respondent replied that expertise is never needed in the process. Respondents 
identified that they are also actively involved in the provision of expertise and scientific 
know-how themselves, for example, by providing scientific knowledge through different 
arrangements, such as platforms, workshops and other dialogue mechanisms (9 respondents) 
or by using scientific knowledge as their own qualification in the daily work (6 respondents). 
Surprisingly, 10 respondents did not know whether the technical and scientific expertise that 
they provided was used by the EU institutions and 3 respondents were assured that it was not 
used at all.  
Usually the Commission acquires expertise from the pre-existing expert groups (7 
respondents) or organises conferences on a hot topic (5 respondents). It was believed, that the 
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least popular method to acquire expertise is to invite other interested departments to 
contribute (1 respondent). Such estimation could be done due to the fact that external 
participants might not be aware of internal procedures and “the homework” done by the Unit 
in charge. If the information is beyond the possessed know-how, the Commission usually 
chooses to purchase it (5 respondents) or just invites external participants who possess this 
information (4 respondents). It seems that an in-house expertise is not very often checked. 
One respondent has identified that when the Commission chooses to exclude the part, which 
needs additional scientific data from the prepared document and continues with the possessed 
one. If true, such cases may require additional investigation.  
Another block of questions related to access to information and its relevance to 
external participants. The replies were quite diverse. 4 respondents agreed that they got 
enough support and advocacy from the Commission, as 5 respondents supported this 
statement only if they manage “to get through”.  
As for access to information, 11 respondents marked that the information received is 
understandable, though the flows of different papers and positions are very high. Nobody 
identified that the EU provided information is of very high quality and easy to work with. 5 
respondents found the information too bureaucratic, not understandable for common people 
and without relevant scientific information. The same criticism was expressed regarding 
information intended for civil society – the information centres are not easy accessible, there 
are too few of them and they provide very generic help (11 respondents). Though, 4 
respondents believe that the provided information and one-stop-shops are of high use. 
6 respondents did not feel that there was an initiative from the Commission to open a 
dialogue between experts and civil society. While 8 respondents replied positively, half of the 
respondents agreed that the Commission provides information and informs civil society on 
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important issues of public concern at the time. The same frequency was defined regarding an 
open dialogue between the Commission and external participants, though 5 representatives of 
NGOs do not agree with this statement.  
With regard to risk assessment only 6 respondents were involved in such activities. It 
was identified by external participants (8 respondents) that they were aware of cases when a 
national authority or an external participant warned the government of possible risk to be 
faced. Though, none of the civil servants could specify such case.  
It was stated (10 respondents) that the priority in making a decision was to reduce 
adverse effects to on the environment, human, animal or plant health. The decision on risk 
assessment is made either on the basis of the respondent’s own experience (3 respondents) or 
on an expertise invited on ad hoc basis (3 respondents). Moreover, 13 respondents confirmed 
that their authorities invited scientists and experts to evaluate scientific data of a risk. If the 
scientific evaluation stays incomplete, it is usually a political decision on whether to act or not 
under the existing circumstances (14 respondents), which may be taken either at the minister’s 
level or by the head of the responsible department. 
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IX CHAPTER 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The thesis aimed to show whether and how external participants were involved in the EU 
decision-making process using the example of the environment policy. The main conclusion of 
the thesis is that external participants are not legally allowed to participate directly in the EU 
environmental decision-making process. However, various EU policies and laws have established 
the main rules and practices for successful and effective indirect participation. In most cases 
external experts and other participants are only invited to provide the missing scientific 
information, which otherwise need to be purchased from external sources.   
To conclude, the following findings are highlighted:  
• Even though there were a lot of discussions regarding the need for efficient involvement 
of external participants as well as scientific and technical expertise, the Treaty of Lisbon 
did not retain the principle of participation. This means that there is a legal gap in the 
primary legislation concerning the regulation of participation. There might be attempts to 
solve the demand for scientific and technical expertise by creating a myriad of 
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communications, policy documents, and initiatives in this domain. Though, the analysis 
showed that this only creates confusion and contradiction between the implemented 
documents. The more detailed conclusions are provided in the concluding part of Chapter 
II “EU law and policy on participation in EU governance”.  
As a result, the real “constitutional text” is considered to be the White Paper on European 
Governance: it is the starting point for the involvement of external participants and the 
use of scientific and technical knowledge in the EU decision-making process, even though 
it is not a binding policy document for Member States. This document is strictly followed 
by the civil servants of the Commission, regardless of the fact that the instruments created 
under this document are non-binding.  
External access to information and justice in the environmental decision-making process 
is regulated by binding legislative acts; these limit the impact of external participation due 
the number of rules and restrictions that are imposed on this decision-making process. 
• Another important conclusion shall be drawn regarding the existing communication and 
consultation policies and strategies for external participation in the EU. The established 
non-binding instruments seem to be applied only on an ad hoc basis and the EU system 
still faces communication problems between civil society and the EU institutions. This is 
partly because the communication link breaks at the highest level of national authority 
and it does not reach the civil society. It means that EU governance needs wider and more 
complex approach to the developing policies as well as effective involvement of all the 
constituent parts. The same could be said about the consultation culture, as it is not 
adequately established either. The Commission welcomes efforts to take into account 
local and regional knowledge, though participation of the latter is left to member states. 
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There is no feedback on whether and how local and regional opinion and scientific 
knowledge is used in the EU decision-making process. It diminishes motivation and trust 
in EU and national administrations. Due to different communication and consultation 
practices in national administrations, participation might also be different on the same 
draft implementation measures. It might lead to distrust in the decision-making process 
and in the possibility for involvement. A more detailed analysis is provided in the 
concluding part of Chapter II and in Chapter IV “Collection and use of expertise”. 
Also, available information is not always accessible to all participants, as the EU 
institutions are not able to translate all working documents into all official languages. The 
accessible information is often bureaucratic and not easily understandable. Furthermore, 
draft documents do not provide the necessary scientific information to understand the 
background of some of the implemented acts. More detailed conclusions are provided in 
Chapter III. 
• It is believed that comitology committees have the highest potential in attracting technical 
and scientific knowledge from external sources, though this possibility is not 
implemented in the primary and secondary legislation, which is analysed in the thesis. 
External participants are usually involved on an ad hoc basis. By rule, only civil servants 
of Member States may be officially involved in the decision-making process of 
comitology committees. However, in some cases, external participants were also involved 
in the process due to a high demand for their technical and scientific knowledge. The low 
involvement of external participants is based on the assumption that external participants 
may represent conflicting interest groups and protect their positions. For this reason, they 
should not be responsible for making decisions. The more detailed conclusions are 
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provided in the concluding part of Chapter III “External participation through 
comitology”. 
The final decision should be taken by a political body only, but it should be informed by 
the most reliable and cogent scientific data, the assessment of which should be based on 
the precautionary principle. The EU Institutions, especially the Commission, are granted a 
broad discretion regarding the use and implementation of the scientific advice, but they 
are not ready to deal with the challenges raised by scientific uncertainty or contradictory 
information. More detailed conclusions are provided in Chapter V “Precautionary 
principle in collection and use of scientific expertise”. 
• Even though EU communications and policies claim to be open to all kinds of 
participation, external participation is only accepted in an organised form. This can be 
observed in all kind of EU activity – citizens are also required to form a qualified entity in 
order to be eligible to submit an EU Citizens’ initiative. Though the criteria of a qualified 
entity are not set yet, both the EU institutions and the CJEU may decide to stay with those 
contained in the case-law. The requirement to structure external expertise or interests in 
this manner may limit this kind of participation. 
The rule that involved external experts may not be consulted on politically sensitive issues 
and are not allowed to vote on relevant decisions is strictly maintained by the Parliament 
and the Council. The final decision is based on political considerations rather than 
scientific expertise. External participants are not provided with independent right to 
implement executive requirements. It is assumed that the organisation of external 
participation could benefit only if a complete legislative overhaul is implemented in the 
EU decision-making process. 
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ANNEX I 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE – INFO COMPILATION 
 
The aim of the questionnaire is to identify the legal basis of the committees and their legal 
power in decision making procedure. 
 
1. Name of the committee.  
2. Type of the committee: 
- scientific; 
- interest representing; 
- advisory group; 
- expert group; 
- policy-making/implementation; 
- mixture. 
 
3. Responsible DG and responsible persons (chairman, coordinator of committee, 
responsible in Commission). 
 
4. Activities of the committee: 
- areas of responsibility; 
- main tasks; 
- objectives. 
 
5. Legal basis: 
- legal act, regulating the establishment of the committee; 
- soft law, regarding the activity of the committee; 
- rules of procedure (are they published externally, access over the internet and etc.); 
- coherence with Comitology Committees directive; 
- code of conduct; 
- activity documents (taken decisions, minutes of the meeting and etc.); 
- any court decisions, regarding the committee activities. 
 
6. Operation level/phase: 
- drafting; 
- adoption; 
- execution. 
 
7. Selection of committee members/representatives – composition of the committee: 
- public competition via the published calls for tender (selection criteria); 
- national decision making (member state decides whom to send as a state 
representative; selection criteria) – relevant national Ministry or public authority; 
- experts at Member state level or socio-professionals; 
- possibility to participate in decision making through committees (NGOs, non-member 
states, experts and etc.). 
 
 
 
8. Participation level/general powers: 
- political representation (only representatives from member states?) with socio-
economic interests; 
- technical representation (technical expertise); 
- supranational actor; 
- consultative participation; 
- forum of reflection; 
- constituting good practice for decisions and proposals; 
- policy binding/non-binding (compulsory for Commission/non-compulsory); 
- reflections and discussions in the Commission; 
- voting power. 
 
9. Level of influence: 
- committees with importance (0-3); 
- committees with importance (3-7); 
- committees with importance (7-10) 
- possibility to have influence through political willingness. 
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Invitation to participate 
 
Dear Respondent, 
My name is Ingrida Ilgauskiene and I am doing a PhD thesis in the School of Law, University of Birmingham, 
UK. The topic of my thesis focuses on external participation in the EU decision-making process through the EU 
established instruments. This empirical research is part of the thesis. The aim of this research is to verify the list 
of the established EU instruments, which are created by the EU institutions for national civil officers as well as 
other interested groups, to be used in order to reach the set goals and assess the current situation and recent 
developments of the 27 Member States in legal measures, implementing the requirements of effective participation in 
EU decision-making process.  
 
I would greatly appreciate your efforts and time devoted to answer the provided questions, which would be 
included into the analysis of the research anonymously. Please mark the most appropriate answer by x. If you 
find a couple of answers appropriate to your choice – please mark all the relevant choices of replies to the 
provided questions. I would greatly appreciate your time for providing additional information, which was not 
identified in the questions. And please forward this questionnaire to a colleague who is involved in the EU 
decision-making process and who might not have received this questionnaire.   
 
If you need any further information and comments, please contact at e-mail:  
 
 
Data Protection 
This questionnaire aims at collecting information on the level of external participation in the EU decision-
making process through the EU established instruments in the Member States of the European Union. It is not 
the purpose of this questionnaire to gather data on the performance of individual administrations in terms of 
participation in the EU decision-making process.  
Accordingly, all the data you will report in this questionnaire will be treated confidentially and reported 
only in an aggregate form. It will be impossible to trace, from the data that will be included in my final 
thesis, the specific arrangements in place in a given administration.   
 
 
1. Which institution do you represent or work in (please write the full name of your institution): 
  private consulting company; 
  research and/or academic institution; 
  national association of private bodies; 
  NGO and/or public organization; 
  SME; 
  individual person; 
  national local authorities (commune, municipality, county or similar); 
  national governmental authority (ministry, department, agency and similar); 
  other ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 2. Which country do you represent (please write down the name of your country you work for or represent): 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. What is your qualification background? 
  I have a university degree in natural sciences; 
  I have a university degree in social sciences; 
  I have a university degree in IT; 
  I have a nuniversity degree in linguistics; 
  I have a university degree in humanity studies; 
  I have post-secondary non-university qualification; 
  I have professional qualification; 
  I have a secondary degree; 
  I have a college degree; 
  other ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Your gender: 
  Female; 
  Male. 
 
5. To which age group would you attribute yourself: 
  less than 18; 
  18-24; 
  25-44; 
  45-64; 
  65 and more. 
 
6. Do you participate in the EU decision-making process in different (any) institutions: 
  Yes, I am actively and personally involved in the EU decision-making process; 
  Yes, I participate in EU committees and/or working groups meetings; 
  Yes, I prepare information and reports for colleagues, who participate in EU different meetings; 
  No, I do not participate in EU process – my direct work only concerns national issues; 
  Other ___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Are you involved at the very beginning of the stage of drafting solutions to the EU administration: 
  Yes; 
  No; 
  We just need to correct the already defined solutions; 
  other____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. To which group of respondents would you attribute yourself? 
  civil servant; 
  external expert of the specific area; 
  stakeholder; 
  representative of an interest group; 
  expert, working in national governmental structures; 
  lobbyist or consultant on EU public affairs; 
  representative of an NGO and/or public organization; 
  representative of a private organisation; 
  representative of a university or other research institution; 
  other ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. How were you chosen as an expert into the EU decision-making process? 
  I participated in EU calls for expertise and have won a competition; 
  my direct work requires to participate in EU decision-making process as an expert; 
  I have been assigned to participate as an expert; 
  my client requests me to participate in different meetings; 
  I have direct interest to the subject and I was invited to participate as an individual; 
  other ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Please explain shortly how do you (the working group you are engaged in) make a decision on the subject 
of your participation: 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. What kind of input/data you provide to the decision-making process? 
  opinion; 
  input/data; 
  decision; 
  expertise; 
  consultation; 
  other ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. How many input/data did you and/or your institution provide for EU institutions per last year: 
  none; 
  up to 10; 
  10-30; 
  30-50; 
  50-100; 
  more than 100. 
 
13. Which area of decision – making you are involved in? 
  environmental issues; 
  food and safety; 
  industry and energy; 
  health and consumers issues; 
  agriculture and rural development; 
  competition, economic and financial issues; 
  employment, social affairs and equal opportunity; 
  enterprise and industry; 
  home affairs; 
  mobility and transport; 
  information society and media; 
  internal market and services; 
  education and culture; 
  justice; 
  research; 
  external relations; 
  other ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 14. What would be the subject of your participation in the decision-making process: 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. How would you describe your participation: 
  I participate as an individual and represent myself; 
  I participate as an employee of a company, which represents a client; 
  I participate as a leader of a political party/business association or similar; 
  I participate as a civil servant, representing a national governmental institution (a member state); 
  Other ___________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Does your national authority initiate any legal acts to be discussed and adopted by the European 
Commission? 
  Very frequently; 
  Sometimes; 
  Seldom; 
  Very rarely; 
  Never. 
 
17. How would you describe your input in the participation in the EU decision-making process: 
  I actively participate in preparing and representing national position in different committees and/or working 
groups; 
  I am invited to provide scientific know-how and expertise on specified issues; 
  I am a civil servant’s and/or minister’s consultant/advisor on EU issues; 
  I represent the position of various associations and interest groups; 
  Other ___________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. How would you define the level of your participation: 
  High – I participate in Council session meetings; 
  Medium high – I participate both at the Commission’s and the Council’s work; 
  Medium – I participate in Commision’s organised comitology committees and/or working groups meetings 
and the provided drafted opinions are of high importance; 
  Medium low – I participate in Commission’s organised meetings, but our opinion does not have obligatory 
power to the Commission; 
  Low – I just provide written information on different requests from the EU Commission; 
  Other ___________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. Is your participation as a civil-servant or an external participant bound by responsibilities for the 
provided opinions and decisions for EU administrators?  
  I need to participate to reach the quorum; 
  my opinion and vote binds the EU institutions on specific issues; 
  they request our opinion, but it does not bind them for the final report; 
  the given responsibility is not legally binding; 
  we are in person responsible for our decisions; 
  Other____________________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. Do you need to get a permission from your authorities if there are any changes in voted legal acts during 
the meeting and you have to vote on the final results? 
  Yes, I have to agree with my authorities whatever changes are taken during the meetings in order to vote; 
  Yes, I have to confer with my colleagues if major changes occur and which might have financial influence for 
our government; 
  No, I do not need to arrange anything as we agree on anything before the meeting and usually only minor 
changes appear; 
  No, I do not need to contact anyone, as authorities provide all responsibility for me to take a decision; 
  other ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. Might anyone have an impact on the decision-making process you participate in: 
  yes, my employer forms the final opinion, which is represented during a meeting; 
  yes, the opinion I represent, is agreed and confirmed by the head of governmental authorities I am working 
with; 
  yes, the opinion is agreed with the members of a working group in the company I work in and I represent it at 
the EU level; 
  yes, the opnion is confirmed by the contractor; 
  no, I do not need to agree on my opinion with anyone; 
  other ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. Are you involved in a risk evaluation and communication to the EU administration? 
  Yes; 
  No. 
 
23. How is the risk ascertained? 
  related expertise is invited on an ad-hoc basis; 
  the decision is taken on the basis of the own knowledge; 
  the decision is left to a judicial institution to be decided; 
  a relevant legal act is framed to solve this issue; 
  other ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
24. Which of the following definitions have a priority while making a decision: 
  firstly, the freedom and rights of individuals, industry and organizations have to be balanced; 
  the priority in making a decision is a reducement of the risk of adverse effects to the environment, human, 
 animal or plant health; 
  we base our decision on different values, implied in the local community; 
  none of the above listed is important in the decision-making process; 
  other ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
25. Do the authorities of your country identify the potential negative effects to the risks, to believe that 
harmful effects might occur, even if the likelihood of harm is remote? 
  Yes; 
  No; 
  I do not know. 
 
26. Do the authorities invite scientists and experts to evaluate scientific data of a risk which because of 
insufficiency of the data, their inconclusive or imprecise nature, makes it impossible to determine with 
sufficient certainty the risk in question: 
  Yes; 
  No; 
  I do not know. 
 
 
27. Who takes a decision at national level whether or not to act when the scientific evaluation is not complete? 
  the highest manager of our institution; 
  it is usually a political decision; 
  only the minister of the relevant Ministry; 
  the head of our department; 
  the responsible scientist of the possessed scientific data; 
  the chair of the ad hoc working group; 
  I do not know; 
  Other ___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
28. Do you think that the national legislation of your country ensures efficient implementation of the rights of 
the public concerned (the public concerned – the public affected or likely to be affected by, or having 
interest in, the decision-making procedures)? 
  Yes; 
  No; 
  I do not know. 
 
29. How often do you attend meetings? 
  we have met only once; 
  once a year; 
  twice a year; 
  each quarter; 
  every month; 
  other ____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
30. Do you have pre-meetings before an official meeting date? 
  Yes; 
  No. 
 
31. Do members of your decision-making and/or working group agree on a strategy or a draft of the decision 
before an official meeting? 
  Yes; 
  No. 
 
32. In what language are the meetings held and the work documents prepared? 
  in one of the working languages (French, German or English); 
  only in English; 
  we each use our national languages and the translation is provided; 
  other ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
33. Have you set your own guidelines to be applied in the EU decision-making process in a working group 
you are involved: 
  Yes; 
  No; 
  We use the Commission’s set guidelines and we have not made any changes to this document. 
  
34. Do you think you get enough support and advocacy from the EU Commission administration? 
  Yes; 
  I have to request it myself, and if I manage “to get through” – they are very helpful; 
  I have personal contacts, and they are very helpful; 
  No, I cannot get through the bureaucracy and they send my request from one civil servant to another; 
  No; 
  Other ___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 35. Do you think that the EU provided information is understandable and of high quality? 
  Yes, it is of very high quality and easy to work with; 
  Yes, it is understandable, but the flows of different papers and positions are very high; 
  No, the information acceptable is too bureaucratic and no relevant scientific information is available; 
  No, the language it is written in is not understandable for common people; 
  No, the information provided is too scientific and technical; 
  Other ___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
36. Do you think that access of information is possible to any participant of the community: 
  the established information centers for citizens are hidden in web-jungles; 
  the provided information is usually out-of-date; 
  there are too many information boots and all of them provide very generic help; 
  the provided information is very technical and expertise orientated; 
  yes, the provided information and one-stop-shops are of high use; 
  other ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
37. Do you feel that the Commission has initiated an operating dialogue between experts and civil society: 
  Yes; 
  No; 
  I do not know. 
 
38. Do you think that the Commission provides information and informs civil society on time on important 
issues of public concern: 
  Yes; 
  No; 
  I do not know. 
 
39. Do you think that an open dialogue between NGOs, industry, other interested groups and government is 
established with the EU institutions? 
  Yes; 
  No; 
  I do not know. 
 
40. How often is expertise involved into the decision-making process you attend?  
  Very frequently; 
  Sometimes; 
  Seldom; 
  Very rarely; 
  Never. 
 
41. How do you provide your expertise and scientific know-how to the EU institutions? 
  I prepare scientific research and reports on hot topics on random basis; 
  I am invited to meetings whenever EU administrators need a scientific evaluation and advice; 
  I am included into experts’ databases and invited to participate on active projects; 
  I am invited to provide a feedback on scientific research; 
  I use my scientific knowledge as my own qualification in my daily work; 
  I provide my scientific knowledge through different arrangements, such as platforms, workshops and other 
dialogue mechanisms; 
  Other____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
42. Is your provided technical and scientific know-how used by the EU institutions administration? 
  Yes; 
  No; 
  I do not know. 
 
43. How is the required expertise chosen by the EU administration? 
  in-house expertise; 
  external consultancy; 
  invite other departments interested to contribute; 
  using the already formed expert groups; 
  establish permanent scientific committees; 
  organising conferences on the active issue; 
  individually approaching people, having the relevant scientific or technical know-how; 
  every time individual case might be applied; 
  other ____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
44. If experts require additional data, which is beyond their possessed know-how, does the Commission take 
one of the following actions: 
  it initiates procurement for the needed scientific date to apply it from the outside; 
  it invites external participants from NGOs, associations, consultation companies and similar; 
  it tries to find an adequate expertise in-house; 
  it excludes part, which needs additional scientific data, from the prepared document and continues with the 
possessed data; 
  other ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
45. What would be the culture of the participation process you are engaged in: 
  strictly according to the rules, set by the EU Commission; 
  strictly to the rules, established by the national authorities; 
  the form of participation is set by the client; 
  participants are able to free themselves from the imposed national traditions and values and find a common 
decision while judging effectiveness of the taken decisions; 
  decisions are drafted based on ad-hoc basis;    
  it depends on the importance of the decision; 
  other ___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
46. Was there a case in your practice when a national authority or any external participant has warned the 
government on possible risk to be faced in the society and/or environment? 
  Yes; 
  No; 
  I do not know. 
 
If the answer to the question No. 46 is “yes”, could you please shortly describe the case you have had in mind: 
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
47. Is the decision-making power centralised in your country? 
  Yes; 
  No; 
  I do not know. 
 48. Does the national political sector participate in risk evaluation and management at national level on the 
taken decisions? 
  Yes; 
  No; 
  I do not know. 
 
49. Do regional authorities participate in national governance and decision-making at national level? 
  Yes; 
  No. 
 
50. Are regional governments ensured responsibilities for delegated functions and the taken decisions? 
  Yes; 
  No; 
  I do not know. 
 
51. Do national governmental authorities involve in-house and external expertise in decision-making process? 
  Yes; 
  No; 
  I do not know. 
 
52. Are regional governments involved in collection and conclusions of scientific and technical expertise in 
your country? 
  Yes; 
  No; 
  I do not know. 
 
53. Do citizens have an easy access to participation and opinion representation both at regional and national 
governance level in your country? 
  Yes; 
  No; 
  I do not know. 
 
54. Does national governance involve different stakeholders, consultants, interest representatives, experts and 
similar whenever a decision is being drafted? 
  Yes; 
  No; 
  I do not know. 
 
55. Do you think that access to justice on environmental issues is guaranteed in your country? 
  it is not clear who could access judicial proceedings in our country; 
  it is not clearly defined in our national legislation a party, possessing sufficient interest and impairment of a 
right; 
  it should be publicly available possibilities on how to get access to justice in our country; 
  national legislation makes access to justice complicated; 
  access to justice is only allowed for qualified entities, which are limited in our country; 
  the public standing is not ruled in our national legislation; 
  the organization I represent cannot prove to have a sufficient interest or impairment of rights; 
  other ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Thank you very much for your time and answers. 
